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“[T]he genius of the United States is not best or most in its executives or 
legislatures, nor in its ambassadors or inventors . . . but always most in the common 
people. Their manners speech dress friendships—the freshness and candor of their 
physiognomy—the picturesque looseness of their carriage . . . their deathless 
attachment to freedom—their aversion to anything indecorous or soft or mean—the 
practical acknowledgment of the citizens of one state by the citizens of all other 
states—the fierceness of their roused resentment—their curiosity and welcome of 
novelty—their self-esteem and wonderful sympathy—their susceptibility to a 
slight—the air they have of persons who never knew how it felt to stand in the 
presence of superiors—the fluency of their speech—their delight in music, the sure 
symptom of manly tenderness and native elegance of soul . . . their good temper and 
openhandedness—the terrible significance of their elections—the President’s taking 
off his hat to them not they to him—these too are unrhymed poetry.” 
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Democratic voting is desperately in need of defense. Contemporary institutions of mass 
electoral participation are undertheorized, and there is a critical disconnect between conceptions 
of voting in democratic theory and election laws and policies that implicate participatory values 
and interests. This dissertation fills some of these gaps between the theories and practices of 
modern democracy by examining the factors that motivate individual decisions to vote or abstain 
and the electoral institutions that structure and respond to such decisions. With a primary focus on 
elections in the United States, this work explores how normative conceptions of voting not only 
influence individual participation decisions, but also provide foundations for electoral rules and 
procedures that impact turnout levels, both in the aggregate and for distinct demographic groups. 
As an analytical framework, the rational choice calculus of voting is utilized to parse the varied 
motivations for turnout, with the four elements of the calculus providing the outline for the four 
main chapters of the dissertation. The voting calculus has often been interpreted in ways that 
minimize the value of voting and provide reasons that explain why individuals do not—and 
perhaps even should not—participate in elections. This dissertation critically examines those 
views, and it reinterprets the terms of the calculus in a manner that demonstrates how the act of 
voting can in fact be highly valued, which explains why individuals do—and indeed generally 
should—participate in democratic elections. The analysis proceeds by first redefining the 
expected probability of one vote having a casual effect on an election outcome (Chapter 1), then 
by reevaluating the normative significance of the instrumental benefits of voting (Chapter 2) and 
the various types of voting costs (Chapter 3), and finally by reconsidering the theoretical and 
practical implications of non-instrumental motivations for participation, especially the notion of a 
civic duty to vote (Chapter 4). Each chapter further derives policy, legal, and broader ethical 
implications associated with these new interpretations of the terms of the calculus and makes 
specific reform proposals designed to increase participation in American elections at federal, 
state, and local levels.  
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1) MOTIVATION: IN DEFENSE OF VOTING 
Why does voting need a defense? And how can reinterpreting the terms of the 
voting calculus with a view toward election law and policy help to provide this defense? 
Perhaps the title of this dissertation itself needs a defense, or at least an explanation. The 
title is admittedly more descriptive than evocative, although it might have been even 
more descriptively accurate had the initial title read: “In Defense of Mass Electoral 
Participation in a Liberal Representative Democracy.” There are indeed many reasons 
why the institutions and practices of voting in modern democracies—and particularly in 
the United States—are in need of defense, desperately some might say. Democracy itself 
seems currently to be undergoing a period of grave crisis—not just in this country, but all 
around the world, and widespread skepticism regarding the value of participating in 
elections is a significant part of the problem. The current crisis of democracy has deep 
historical roots, but the general loss of faith in electoral institutions seems particularly 
profound and prevalent more recently.  
Unfortunately, academic scholarship has probably not helped much with this 
situation; in fact, it may have contributed to the current crisis in no small part. While 
electoral institutions in this country and elsewhere have been widely scrutinized for 
empirical effects on voting behavior and political outcomes, there has been far less 
attention to how normative assumptions about the meaning and purpose of democracy 
undergird its implementation in particular legal and administrative contexts. More 
problematically, as discussed throughout this dissertation, both theoretical and empirical 
research on democracy and elections have given reasons for fundamental skepticism 
regarding the value of voting: Rational choice scholarship has led to the general claim 
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that participating in any large election is essentially useless from an individual 
perspective, and even if one’s participation were thought to matter somehow to the 
outcome, participatory theorists have generally maintained that the ability simply to 
choose one’s political representatives is not a meaningful form of democratic 
engagement. Empirical political scientists have further asserted evidence claiming to 
show that democratic citizens generally lack the minimum levels of political knowledge 
needed to vote in a competent manner, and relatedly, many political theorists have 
expressed reservations about whether mass participation, in the form of high voter 
turnout, is something that is necessary—or even necessarily something that is good—for 
effective democratic governance.  
At the same time, there is an ongoing partisan political battle raging around the 
rules and procedures for voting in American elections. This is accompanied by a general 
consensus among election law scholars that Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area is 
missing basic theoretical foundations needed to make fair and principled decisions on 
these matters. However, legal research seems thus far to have failed to fill these gaps 
between theory and practice adequately, especially with respect to clarifying the 
normative foundations for the value of voting to individual citizens. Institutions of mass 
participation in general remain undertheorized, and there is a particularly critical 
disconnect between conceptions of the role of voting in democratic theory and election 
laws and policies that implicate the individual-level interest in participation. These 
missing links are particularly problematic in the American context, given a system of 
highly decentralized administration substantially controlled by partisan officials, and the 
current antagonisms of polarized politics extending into the realm of election law and 
policy. Making progress in ongoing disputes over election administration and voting 
rights will require expanding the conversation about basic democratic norms. In short, 
 3 
there is an urgent need—not just in the academy, but also in the courts, and in the general 
public discourse—for increased attention to the normative foundations of electoral 
institutions.  
There has of course been a great deal of research into the causes and effects of 
variation in voter participation—whether at the country, group, or individual level; 
however, there has been relatively little attention to how conceptions of democratic 
theory may contribute and respond to this variation. This might be because the general 
question of how much participation is desirable from a normative standpoint is essentially 
unanswered, and in fact remains a matter of fundamental debate. As discussed throughout 
this dissertation, this basic theoretical question has enormous implications for election 
law and policy, as well as broader relevance for the conditions of citizenship in a modern 
democracy. The defense of voting in this work is thus also intended to lay the 
groundwork for a more supportive view of the value of mass participation in elections, 
and thereby to provide a stronger foundation for law and policy reforms aimed at 
increasing and equalizing voter turnout. To be clear, this research is motivated in large 
part by a perceived problem of low and unequal participation in American elections at the 
national, state, and local levels. It is particularly concerned with how patterns of 
socioeconomic inequality may be reproduced in the political sphere by electoral 
institutions that structure voting in ways that contribute to unequal participation among 
different demographic groups. Addressing the missing links between the theories and 
practices of elections may thus be crucial to preventing the perpetuation of social and 
political inequities in the United States and elsewhere. 
For reasons discussed in the methodology section below, public policy research 
should be well placed to help better fill some of these gaps between the theories and 
practices of democracy. This dissertation seeks to advance that agenda through a broad 
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policy-oriented analysis of varying theoretical perspectives on the meaning and purpose 
of participating in elections, and of the implications of these varying perspectives, both 
for individual voters and for electoral institutions. More specifically, this work focuses on 
the motivating factors of voter turnout in order to demonstrate how normative 
conceptions of voting not only influence participation decisions at the individual level, 
but also provide foundations for election laws and policies that influence participation 
levels, both in the aggregate and for groups of potential voters.  
 
2) ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: REINTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE VOTING 
CALCULUS 
This work’s defense of voting and its effort at bridging the gap between the 
theories and practices of democratic elections is framed by the rational choice calculus of 
voting, which formalizes the individual-level decision of whether to vote or abstain in a 
particular election as follows: 
pB – C + D 
The terms of the calculus—the variables p, B, C, and D—yield a four-fold classification 
of individual-level motivations for the turnout decision, which respectively are as 
follows: 1) the probability of an individual’s vote having a causal effect on the outcome 
of the election; 2) the expected instrumental benefit derived from an individual’s 
preferred candidate or choice prevailing; 3) the costs of voting, both substantively and in 
terms of information; and 4) any expressive or otherwise non-instrumental motivation for 
participating, including a perceived civic duty to vote. The formula of the calculus 
represents the following decision process by any prospective voter: First one multiplies 
the perceived probability of having a causal effect on the outcome by the expectation of 
benefit from one’s preference prevailing (p*B, or just pB), then one subtracts the costs of 
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voting (C), and adds the perceived utility of any non-instrumental benefit from 
participating, such as fulfilling the duty to vote (D). If the result is positive, the individual 
decides to vote, while if negative, the individual abstains. The four elemental terms of the 
calculus provide the outline for the four main chapters of the dissertation. 
Although the voting calculus originates in the economics-based school of rational 
choice, the calculus itself can be seen as just a generic model of the voting decision. In 
this work, the calculus is not being utilized as the empirical model it was originally 
intended to be, but rather is employed simply as an analytical framework to parse the 
potential motivations for voting. Moreover, the use of the calculus here is not intended to 
provide support for rational choice as a broadly explanatory or predictive theory of 
political behavior, at least not in its conventional form, although this work does engage 
an expansive notion of rationality as goal-oriented choice that can include ethical or 
otherwise non-utilitarian motives. There is also no assumption here that individuals 
actually proceed explicitly through the decisional logic of the calculus, but the terms of 
the calculus are assumed to represent, at least abstractly, all relevant considerations in the 
decision of whether to vote or abstain.  
As indicated above, and as discussed throughout this dissertation, the scholarly 
literature on democracy and elections has tended in many ways to devalue the act of 
voting. The terms of the calculus have thus often been interpreted in ways meant to 
explain—and to argue—why individuals do not—and why they should not—participate 
in elections. There are at least four ways in which this interpretative devaluation has 
taken place, which parallel the four elements of the voting calculus, as follows: 1) 
Scholars have concluded, almost universally, that the individual act of voting in a large 
election is basically pointless, since one vote is incredibly unlikely to have a causal effect 
on the outcome. 2) Many theorists have suggested that the instrumental benefits of voting 
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under current systems of representative democracy are essentially worthless, since 
choices between candidates are often effectively meaningless, and because voting is a 
weak and ineffectual form of participation in general. 3) Scholars have generally assumed 
that the informational costs of voting are relatively high, or even prohibitively high with 
respect to many—if not most—citizens, given a presumption that substantial political 
knowledge is needed to cast a minimally competent vote. 4) Scholars have argued that 
non-instrumental motivations for voting are normatively problematic, and more generally 
that voting should not be conceived as a universal duty incumbent on all citizens of a 
democracy, but is rather best left as a purely voluntary choice to be undertaken only by 
those who are sufficiently—and perhaps properly—motivated to participate.  
This dissertation critically examines these views and takes the opposite tack, 
reinterpreting the terms of the calculus in a manner meant to explain—and to argue—how 
the individual act of voting can in fact be highly valuable, and thus why individuals do—
and indeed generally should— participate in elections. This work thus provides new 
perspectives on the motivations for voting, first by redefining the probability of an 
individual vote having a causal effect on an election outcome, then by reevaluating the 
normative significance of both instrumental benefits and the various types of voting 
costs, and finally by exploring the theoretical and practical implications of non-
instrumental motivations, particularly the idea of a civic duty to vote. The four main 
chapters of the dissertation thus argue and explain as follows: 1) An individual vote can 
have a high degree of causal efficacy even in the largest of mass elections. 2) The 
expected benefit of having one’s preferred candidate prevail in contemporary elections 
may reasonably be perceived as extremely high. 3) Informed voting for representatives in 
a liberal democracy is not and should not be viewed as prohibitively costly. 4) Electoral 
participation should be institutionalized, and possibly enforced in some manner, as a 
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constitutional civic duty. Each chapter further derives policy, legal, and broader ethical 
implications associated with these new interpretations of the terms of the calculus, and 
then makes specific proposals for election law and policy reform in the United States.  
Chapter 1 begins with p in the calculus and the so-called paradox of voter turnout, 
which assumes that participating in a large election can never be instrumentally rational 
from an individual perspective, given the infinitesimally small probability that one vote 
will ever have a causal effect on the outcome. This chapter critiques that mostly 
unquestioned assumption, and it develops a new formal model of the value of p that 
draws on the innovative approach of Richard Tuck in his book, Free Riding (2008). In 
this model, if an election is expected to be highly competitive, the prospective probability 
of any one vote having a causal effect on the outcome is essentially equal to one—not 
zero as generally assumed. The chapter then discusses how this new approach to the 
instrumental rationality of voting could have important consequences for election law and 
policy in areas of voting rights and partisan gerrymandering, as well as broader normative 
implications for the understanding of collective action problems in general.  
Chapter 2 considers the instrumental benefits of voting represented by B in the 
calculus, formally defined as the expected utility differential between candidates on the 
ballot. Transcending the alleged paradox of voting, this chapter interrogates prevailing 
assumptions about a lack of meaningful instrumental value in voting, and it suggests a 
new interpretive focus that yields insights into how and why instrumental motivations 
lead individuals to vote or abstain in particular elections. The analysis proceeds by 
distinguishing three typical attitudes that diminish the perceived value of B in the 
calculus: indifference, alienation, and ambivalence. Indifference is most commonly 
associated simply with lack of information, and some basic policy reforms are suggested 
to reduce indifference-based abstention by providing additional information on the ballot, 
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particularly in state and local elections where it is most needed. Alienation presents a 
more difficult normative problem, analysis of which leads to discussion of the rationality 
and ethics of voting for a lesser evil, and the possibility of an instrumentally-based duty 
to vote even under conditions of extreme alienation. The chapter then explores the 
problems of ambivalence in the face of conflicting political ideals or motivations, and it 
evaluates the difficult ethical dilemmas that can arise when elections pose particularly 
hard choices, whether between perceived goods, perceived evils, or between instrumental 
motivations to vote and expressive reasons to abstain. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of democratic theory as it relates to the instrumental benefits of voting under 
contemporary political conditions. 
Chapter 3 discusses the C term representing the costs of voting, which are divided 
into two primary categories: substantive costs and information costs. While substantive 
costs—which involve the administrative and logistical burdens on casting a ballot—are 
observed to vary widely, information costs implicate long-running normative debates 
about whether mass electorates have the knowledge and reasoning abilities deemed 
necessary for democratic competence. This chapter delves into foundational issues of 
democratic theory by comparing the informational requirements of voting under two 
broadly opposing approaches, drawing on William Riker’s seminal distinction in 
Liberalism Against Populism. The populist interpretation of voting, which relies on a 
strong epistemic assumption of independent standards of correctness, is associated with 
deliberative theory and its skepticism about mass participation in a representative 
democracy. As an alternative, Riker’s liberalism is elaborated into a unified theory that 
incorporates the value of participation within a broader framework of competitive 
democracy. Mass electoral competence is thus demonstrated to be viable through a more 
procedural political epistemology and a value-based approach to representation, under 
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which the costs of voting in a minimally informed manner are more widely affordable. 
The chapter then discusses implications of this theoretical approach for constitutional 
design and election law jurisprudence, and for policy reform proposals that aim to 
increase participation by minimizing the substantive costs of voting. 
Finally, Chapter 4 on the D term of the calculus considers the question of whether 
electoral participation should be treated—and perhaps institutionalized—as a general 
obligation of all adult citizens in a liberal democracy, or whether it is best left as a purely 
voluntary choice. The chapter first discusses the nature of non-instrumental benefits in 
general, and it reviews specific implementations of the constitutional duty to vote and 
compulsory voting laws in democracies around the world. The chapter then proceeds to 
outline a normative argument—based on Rawlsian principles of equal justice—that 
voting should be not just a civil right under a liberal democratic constitution, but a civic 
duty as well. Some of the primary arguments against voting as a civic duty are then 
discussed and rejected, although possible limits on the duty to vote—both in principle 
and in practice—are acknowledged and briefly explored. The main implication of this 
chapter’s argument centers on a proposal for amending the U.S. Constitution to declare 
that all citizens have a duty as well as a right to vote, which could have significant 
consequences for election law and policy even without implementation or enforcement. 
Some possibilities for implementation or enforcement in the United States are 
nevertheless discussed, and while monetary fines associated with compulsory voting laws 
may be inconsistent with American sensibilities, there might be more openness to 
positive incentives that are not seen as actively compelling citizens to vote, and more 
generally to policies that are conceived as enabling and encouraging participation by 
offsetting the costs of voting.  
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Each of the four chapters of the dissertation can stand alone and be read 
independently, but they are held together by the framework of the calculus and by 
common themes running throughout the work. Furthermore, the chapters build upon each 
other and are in some sense cumulatively directed toward the ultimate conclusion in 
Chapter 4, which incorporates the arguments of previous chapters in its conclusion that 
the civic duty to vote can supply the missing foundation for broadly participatory theory 
and practice under modern conditions of liberal democracy. In this manner, the chapters 
all contribute to a more positive interpretation of the value of participating in elections, 
and all form part of this defense of voting.  
 
3) METHODOLOGY: A VIEW TOWARD TO ELECTION LAW AND POLICY 
The methodological approach of this work is somewhat unconventional for a 
dissertation in public policy, and so this too may require explanation and defense. First is 
the presumption that law and policy are interrelated on a fundamental level, and that they 
can—and arguably should—be studied together. Clearly there is substantial overlap 
between these two interdisciplinary subject areas, the boundaries of each of which are 
already somewhat blurry. Certain areas are conventionally seen as the domain of law—
constitutional interpretation, for example; however, judges interpreting the Constitution 
may be seen as “making policy” just as they are often seen as making law. Similarly, the 
political and administrative process through which government action is planned, 
promoted, implemented, and evaluated—which generally defines the policy process—
clearly entails the involvement of law at many points. Policy needs law, just as law needs 
policy. In fact, law’s need for policy seems generally acknowledged and understood, for 
there is little doubt that law at all levels should be backed by policy principles, and that 
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judges in their interpretations of law should generally be guided by those principles of 
policy. However, it may be somewhat less well understood and acknowledged that policy 
is also crucially dependent on law, although perhaps this too should be obvious, as it is 
primarily—though not exclusively—through law that policy is given effect. Law and 
policy are thus inextricably linked in many subject areas, and the rules and procedures for 
conducting elections provide just a typical example. The first methodological assumption 
is therefore that legal and policy research should be more closely connected, and this 
work accordingly represents an effort to bridge the two disciplines.  
This leads to the second methodological assumption—which is probably even 
more in need of defense—namely, that academic research in public policy should pay 
more explicit attention to the normative dimensions of policy problems. Again, 
scholarship in the legal academy appears generally to acknowledge and understand the 
need for normative theory and methods of analysis, but public policy as a discipline 
seems less open to this kind of approach. Instead, academic policy research seems largely 
to focus on applying empirical—and mostly quantitative—analytical methods to policy 
problems, as exemplified in its emphasis on “evidence-based policy,” in the general 
excitement about the promises of “big data,” and in the rising popularity of randomly 
assigned studies and “quasi-experimental” design approaches. Indeed, academic research 
in public policy is not generally known for engaging in normative theory and analysis, 
and most dissertations in the discipline take an approach very different from this one. 
This, arguably, is unfortunate, for while empirical methods may be crucial in helping to 
resolve many important policy problems, ignoring the need for foundational normative 
theory can lead to research questions and answers that are largely irrelevant in terms of 
the actual policy process.  
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Different areas of policy may be more or less in need of increased attention to 
normative issues, but voting rules and procedures might provide a perfect example of the 
need for this type of approach, given that the gaps between theory and practice seem so 
clear in this area. Rather than avoiding these admittedly difficult and politically charged 
issue areas, academic research in public policy could actually be in a perfect position to 
help connect democratic theory and practice in a more meaningful way. In fact, one of 
the forefathers of public policy, Harold Laswell, referred to the discipline around its 
inception as the “policy sciences of democracy,” which he anticipated would be 
specifically oriented toward identifying and resolving the “discrepancy between doctrine 
and practice” with regard to democratic ideals (Laswell 1951, 10). While Laswell may 
have been somewhat enamored of the burgeoning potential for quantitative analytical 
methods at the time, he was also sensitive to the need for policy research to include “a 
very considerable clarification of the value goals involved in policy” (9). Of course 
Laswell also clearly recognized the value of an interdisciplinary approach in policy 
research, and he specifically mentions the intersection of law and policy as a promising 
new development at the time of his writing (14). He concludes, “It is probable that the 
policy-science orientation in the United States will be directed toward providing the 
knowledge needed to improve the practice of democracy” (15).  
The methodological approach of this dissertation is thus consistent with Laswell’s 
overall vision for research in public policy: It explores fundamental ideas in democratic 
theory relating to the value of participating in elections, utilizing normative methods 
common in legal research, and incorporating findings from empirical political science 
and formal analytical methods, to produce a policy-oriented analysis with real-world 
implications, particularly for electoral institutions in the United States, but also more 
broadly for democracies worldwide. For as argued throughout this dissertation, 
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foundational conceptions of voting in modern democratic theory, including basic notions 
of the meaning and purpose of participating in mass elections, have profound 
implications for election law and policy. A central premise of this work is that electoral 
institutions embody democratic theory in practice, and so election laws and policies—
from U.S. Supreme Court doctrine down to the decisions of local administrators—are 
inevitably expressive of democratic ideals and values. Any critical analysis of electoral 
institutions therefore requires fundamental normative assumptions about what voting 
means—and how or whether voting matters—under prevailing conditions of democratic 
politics.  
Additionally, the approach taken here further assumes that election laws and 
policies may themselves reflect back on normative conceptions of voting and inform 
prevailing ideas about the meaning and value of participating in elections. This is broadly 
consistent with the interpretive policy analysis of Dvora Yanow, which asks the general 
question, “How Does a Policy Mean?” (1996). Similarly, Suzanne Mettler and Joe Soss 
have drawn attention to this mode of policy analysis in an important article entitled, “The 
Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and 
Mass Politics” (Mettler and Soss 2004). In contrast to conventional methods of analysis, 
Mettler and Soss advocate for conceptualizing political behavior as resulting from 
“policy feedback,” an analytical method they say “offers scholars an approach to mass 
politics that clarifies the place of public policy within the field of political behavior” (57). 
In fact, Mettler and Soss specifically associate their approach with analysis of low and 
unequal voter turnout, an approach they see epitomized in E. E. Schattschneider’s 
influential work on the structural reasons for nonparticipation in American politics (58). 
Indeed, in The Semisovereign People, Schattschneider expressly states, “The expansion 
of the participating political community ought to be a major objective of American 
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politics,” an objective he indicates will require development of “public policy about 
politics” (Schattschneider 1960, 112-113). Moreover, he states this approach should force 
scholars to “reexamine the chasm between theory and practice” in American democracy 
(131).  
The essential point here is that many—if not most—of the key legal and policy 
issues related to electoral rules and procedures involve fundamental normative questions, 
for not only do theoretical conceptions of the value of voting have important implications 
for electoral institutions, but these institutions themselves also have significant 
consequences for ideas of democratic meaning and purpose. Empirical analysis may 
therefore be incapable of providing much guidance in the major problem areas of election 
law and policy.  
For example, research on strict voter identification laws—the subject of 
widespread debate in recent years—has largely focused on analyzing the effects these 
laws may have on patterns of turnout, and particularly on their potential for 
discriminatory demographic or partisan effects. This line of research may be interesting 
and informative, and perhaps even useful in some manner, but it neglects a fundamental 
normative question regarding these administrative requirements, which is as follows: Is it 
acceptable for any individual citizen to be disenfranchised due to lack of an official 
identification document? This question arguably poses a more policy-relevant problem 
than estimating the turnout effects of various ID laws, although it is a normative question 
that is presumably more difficult, particularly since it may have no objectively correct 
answer. Nevertheless, this work posits that these types of questions pose important policy 
problems that demand discussion and analysis (and there might actually turn out to be 
more consensus than expected on the answers). Again, this is not to say that empirical 
analysis of the effects of voting rules and procedures is not also interesting and important, 
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and potentially relevant to election law and policy: For instance, if an ID requirement is 
demonstrated to have a discriminatory effect on the participation of certain groups, this 
should certainly count as a strong policy argument against it, and it may of course have 
legal consequences as well. However, empirical analysis cannot substitute for—and 
should not be allowed to “crowd out”—research on broader normative problems relating 
to voting rules and procedures.  
Furthermore, it is essential not to allow policy questions to be determined by the 
methodological tools that happen to be available, but rather first to determine what policy 
questions are important, and then to use whatever methods are best suited for addressing 
these questions. The framing of what are considered to be policy-relevant questions not 
only influences the substance of public policy debates, but perhaps more importantly, it 
reveals and reinforces certain theoretical assumptions, some of which might actually be 
counterproductive to broader normative objectives.  
Returning again to voter ID laws, current debates revolve largely around the 
assumption of an inevitable tradeoff between competing interests in electoral integrity 
and participatory access. Without entering here into the details of this debate, there 
should of course be no dispute about the need to secure the electoral process from fraud 
and error, which clearly entails identification procedures of some kind to ensure that 
individuals vote only once, vote in their own name, are eligible to vote, etc. However, 
administrative procedures for electoral integrity must be designed around fundamental 
democratic norms. For example, the institution of the secret ballot makes securing 
elections much more difficult, but it is today universally accepted as a normative 
requirement of democracy, and efforts to ensure electoral integrity simply have to work 
within the constraints of ballot secrecy. Similarly, if disenfranchisement for lack of a 
valid identification document were viewed as normatively unacceptable, as a matter of 
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participatory democratic theory, then security procedures would just need to work within 
that constraint (which incidentally is not that difficult in practice, though that matter is 
beyond the current scope). The fact that scholarly debates around voter ID laws seem 
instead to center mostly on empirical questions of how many individuals might be 
deterred from voting, and whether certain demographic groups are disproportionately 
affected, can be seen as conceding the fundamental normative question of whether it is 
acceptable for even one citizen to be disenfranchised by an unnecessary administrative 
requirement.  
This methodological critique may extend to other areas of public policy where 
empirical analysis seems generally insufficient to answer important questions, and might 
even in some ways be counterproductive. However, the need for a normative approach 
seems especially evident for policy issues involving electoral institutions and the 
motivating factors of voter turnout, as explored in this dissertation through the framework 
of the calculus. In fact, many of the election laws and policies discussed in this work have 
effects on turnout that are fairly clear; what is unclear is how to interpret the normative 
significance of these effects. Thus, the overall argument here is that public policy in the 
area of voting rules and procedures is not really in need of more empirical research at this 
time, and to the extent that such research may be needed, it can probably be provided by 
the traditional academic disciplines. Rather, now in particular—with the value of voting 
and democracy itself under serious threat—what is urgently needed, what the discipline 
of public policy is in a unique position to provide, and what this dissertation aims to 
contribute, is increased attention to the normative foundations of democratic elections. 
One might hope this approach will contribute to the eventual development of broader 
consensus in this area, but even if no consensus on these matters is possible, the 
discussion itself may be important and useful—especially in drawing attention to the gaps 
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between theory and practice regarding the individual-level interest in electoral 
participation. 
Some might respond that current debates over voting rules and procedures are at 
root matters of base political partisanship, and thus arguably do not even deserve to be 
treated as matters of election law and policy, except perhaps to suggest procedural 
reforms seeking to constrain the manipulation of electoral institutions for political 
purposes. The problem of partisanship in the adoption—and reform—of voting rules and 
procedures is certainly an important area of focus, but more substantive discussion of 
normative theory is also needed, not least because partisan actors generally try to frame 
their actions as based on substantive principles. Furthermore, even if the influence of 
partisanship could somehow be eliminated—or perhaps at least reduced—the missing 
links between democratic theory and practice would remain, and would still need to be 
addressed.  
There is no doubt that the issues raised here are highly charged politically, 
particularly given the polarized environment currently dominating American politics, 
where suggestions of electoral reform are almost automatically perceived—probably 
quite often correctly—as intended to influence electoral outcomes and the distribution of 
political power. Moreover, beyond the partisan battles there is also a potentially more 
principled argument over where the authority to determine voting rules and procedures 
should actually reside, and precisely how that authority should be distributed among 
federal, state, and local levels of government—and perhaps also the judiciary. It might 
therefore be especially difficult to locate foundational normative principles underlying 
these complex and highly politicized debates. However, scholarship in election law and 
policy should not evade these important issues simply because they are politically 
sensitive or philosophically contentious. In fact, it is specifically hard problems like these 
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that arguably deserve and require increased scholarly attention, and abandoning the field 
only makes it easier for partisan manipulation of electoral institutions to continue.  
Once again, the discipline of public policy—with its methodological flexibility 
and its orientation toward improving the democratic process—is ideally suited for this 
type of research, at least if there is a willingness to devote more attention to the 
normative dimensions of policy problems and to avoid the temptations of bright-line 
distinctions between policy and politics. As Deborah Stone has emphatically stated, 
“Policy analysis is political argument, and vice versa” (Stone 1997, 375). Stone’s 
approach relies on recognition that the policymaking process is inevitably structured by 
conflicting interpretations of fundamental normative ideals and standards, which is why 
there is a need for critical-interpretative perspectives in policy analysis like the one in this 
work. More research along these lines might actually help better define the function and 
position of public policy among the academic disciplines, perhaps bringing it closer in 
line with the overall model of the legal academy. Regardless of methodological 
proclivities, in the end, the approach taken in this dissertation is hopefully justified by the 
outcome of the research itself—to the extent that important and useful perspectives on 
election law and policy do emerge from reinterpretation of the terms of voting calculus, 
and that this defense of voting may be judged successful. 
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Chapter One: Reinterpreting p—A New Theory of How Individual 
Votes Contribute to Electoral Outcomes*  
 
 
 “If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a 
promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend’s or of thine own were…”  
–John Donne (1959 [1623], 108) 
 
“Everybody wants to rule the world.” 
–Tears for Fears (1985) 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
What is the probability that one vote will affect the outcome of an election? The 
conventional assumption—almost uniformly shared in the voting literature—is well 
known: The larger the electorate, the smaller the probability that any individual vote will 
affect the outcome, with that chance essentially equal to zero in all mass elections of 
modern democracies. From the individual-level point of view, therefore, participating in 
elections is said to be effectively meaningless, or more precisely, instrumentally useless. 
This chapter, however, argues that the conventional answer is wrong, or more precisely, 
that it represents a demonstrable mistake in normative reasoning. In its place is proposed 
an alternative interpretation of the probability of one vote affecting an election outcome, 
an interpretation that not only seems preferable from a normative perspective, but which 
is arguably also more empirically plausible than the conventional view. 
This alternative interpretation of the efficacy of individual votes in large elections 
has crucial consequences for theoretical conceptions of voter turnout, in addition to 
having potentially broad relevance to ideas about the nature of rational behavior and the 
                                                
* This chapter was published (with slight changes) as an article in Election Law Journal 14 (2): 111-135 
(2015), available from Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., publishers: http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/elj.2014.0263.  
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motivations for participating in collective action. However, this is not just a matter of 
theory, for as discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, and as detailed below, the 
interpretation of how individual votes contribute to outcomes also has important 
implications for election law and policy. Normative concepts of the meaning and purpose 
of voting in a representative democracy inform the design of electoral institutions, and 
the rules and procedures for administering elections therefore reflect fundamental 
conceptions of democratic values (Thompson 2002, vii-viii). In short, elections put 
democratic theory into practice. Overall, this work argues that the conventional theory 
proclaiming the instrumental futility of electoral participation results in tremendous 
underestimation of the potential value of voting at the individual level. The alternative 
interpretation offered here thus helps constitute a defense of a more expansive 
participatory approach in the practice of elections. At the same time, this new 
interpretation highlights the importance of competitive elections for effective 
representation, and so it also lends support to electoral reforms based in the competitive 
school of democratic theory. 
The probability of one vote affecting the outcome of an election is one of the most 
widely cited statistics in the voluminous voting literature. Anthony Downs was perhaps 
the first to formally consider “the probability that any one citizen’s vote will be decisive” 
to the outcome of a large election. While indicating that this probability is never exactly 
zero, Downs famously concludes that “under most circumstances, it is so negligible that 
it renders the return from voting…infinitesimal” (Downs 1957b, 146). Following Downs, 
Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) canonical work codifies the individual decision to vote or 
abstain in the well-known calculus of voter turnout: pB – C + D. Formalizing the rational 
choice approach to the turnout decision, pB represents the probability that an individual’s 
vote will affect the election outcome (p), multiplied by the expected utility differential 
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between the candidates on the ballot (B), while the C term represents the costs of voting 
to the individual, and D represents any utility gained from the act of voting independent 
of the outcome—such as gratification from complying with a perceived duty to vote, or 
other “expressive” benefits.1 The calculus designates that if the sum of these terms is 
positive, the individual votes, while if negative, the individual abstains (Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968, 25).  
In this chapter, p is analytically isolated from the other elements of the calculus in 
order to focus on what exactly it means for an individual vote to have a causal effect on 
an election outcome. It is, however, important to note how the interpretation of p 
influences interpretations of the other elements of the calculus: The value of p affects B 
directly, but it can also affect how C and D are construed, for if pB is assumed to be 
negligible, yet individuals are observed voting, the assumption must be that C is low, or 
that D is high (or both), as discussed below. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
approach of this dissertation is not to focus on the calculus as an empirical model of the 
turnout decision, although there may be testable hypotheses associated with the new 
interpretation on p proposed below. Instead, the calculus is utilized just as a framework 
for analyzing the factors that influence individual decisions to participate or abstain from 
voting—here specifically, the expected probability of having a causal impact on the 
election outcome. The goal of this work is thus not empirical analysis, but rather 
normative evaluation of the concept of individual causation in elections, which leads to 
specification of a new formal model for this element of the turnout decision, and to 
implications for participatory norms and for election law and policy.  
                                                
1 The D term may also be said to represent the “consumption” benefits of voting, as opposed to the 
“investment” benefits represented by B (see Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 526). 
  22 
While continuing empirical research on electoral institutions and voting behavior 
may be useful and important, the type of normative inquiry conducted here is arguably 
needed more urgently, as stronger foundations in democratic theory are essential to the 
development of more principled and coherent election laws and policies. There appears to 
be fairly wide agreement among legal scholars that the normative underpinnings of 
American electoral institutions are muddled and disorderly, particularly when viewed 
through the lens of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in this area (Karlan 1993; Gardner 
1997; Issacharoff and Pildes 1998; Gerken 2002; Charles 2007; Post 2014). There are, 
however, differences of opinion on how stronger theoretical foundations could be 
constructed. Much of the debate has centered on whether constitutional issues in election 
law should be decided using traditional individual rights balancing tests (Hasen 2003), or 
whether a structuralist approach that explicitly considers core democratic goals and 
values is more appropriate (Pildes 2004b; Elmendorf 2008).2 In broad terms, these 
debates trade on fundamental conceptions of democratic representation, including 
participatory and competitive variants of emphasis in democratic theory. This chapter 
does not take a definite side in these debates, but instead describes how the new 
interpretation of causation in voting has distinctive implications under these varying 
theoretical approaches.3  
Section 2 below discusses the so-called paradox of voter turnout and reviews 
some of the previous attempts at reinterpreting the calculus to resolve this purported 
                                                
2 Others have argued that the rights versus structure debate is not particularly useful (Charles 2005), that it 
is not generally applicable across different types of election law cases (Fishkin 2011), or that it fails to 
capture important aspects of representational democratic theory (Stephanopoulos 2014). A few scholars 
have expressed skepticism about calls for more explicit theoretical foundations in election law 
jurisprudence, worrying that judicial decisions tend to unnecessarily “lock in” a specific approach to 
democratic theory (Cain 1999; Lowenstein 2002). 
3 This is perhaps consistent with the intermediary approach of Daniel Farber, who indicates that election 
law issues generally implicate both structural and individual rights concerns (Farber 2004).   
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problem. Section 3 articulates the critique of the conventional interpretation of p leading 
to the paradox, and then introduces a new causal logic of voting based primarily on 
theoretical insights from Richard Tuck’s innovative work, Free Riding (2008). Section 4 
develops and elaborates on Tuck’s basic theory by proposing a formal model and 
simulating how this new interpretation of p could be calculated in actual elections. 
Section 5 responds to initial critiques of this alternative approach and considers some 
normative implications of how individual causation in elections is conceived. Section 6 
discusses practical implications of this new model, reexamining a few central issues in 
American election law and policy in light of the new understanding of how individual 
votes contribute to outcomes. Section 7 concludes and points out directions for future 
research in this area.   
 
2) THE PARADOX OF VOTER TURNOUT 
Riker and Ordeshook formally define p as the probability that an election is 
expected to result in a tie, which would allow a single individual to cast a tie-breaking 
vote that is decisive—or pivotal—to the outcome,4 and they show how the value of p is 
higher the closer the outcome is expected to be (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 31-32). 
Owen and Grofman further specify p as the “subjectively estimated probability that 
[one’s] vote will change the election outcome from what it would have been had [one] 
not voted” (Owen and Grofman 1984, 312). They formally model p as a function of both 
the size of the electorate and the expected closeness of the outcome, and they 
                                                
4 This assumes the total number of voters, including the individual voter, is odd. If the total is even, p 
represents the probability of an individual vote causing (rather than breaking) a tie. Riker and Ordeshook 
model p for this case as well, but an odd total can be assumed for simplicity, given any substantial number 
of voters (see e.g. Owen and Grofman 1984, 312). The terms “decisive” and “pivotal” are used 
interchangeably. 
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demonstrate how in a two-candidate race forecasted as a virtual dead heat, the size of the 
electorate would have to be less than 10,000 for p to rise above 0.01, while for an evenly 
split electorate of 1 million voters, p equals approximately 0.0008 (315). Owen and 
Grofman thus conclude, “no matter how close an election, it is almost inconceivable that 
one vote will prove decisive” (318).5 
Empirical studies of actual election results echo the conclusion that the value of p 
is always negligible in any large election. Mulligan and Hunter calculate the average 
probability of casting a pivotal vote in a U.S. House or state legislative race to fall 
somewhere between 2/n and 1/n, where n is the number of voters in the electoral district 
(Mulligan and Hunter 2003, 51). Similarly, Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi find that the 
chance of casting a pivotal vote in a U.S. presidential election is on the order of 1/n, 
where n is the size of the state electorate (Gelman et al. 2004, 669). Such studies utilize 
complex statistical methods to derive the value of p, but their conclusions are clear and 
unequivocal in devaluing the instrumental efficacy of an individual vote. Gelman, Silver, 
and Edlin thus compare the act of voting to buying a lottery ticket with about a 1 in 10 
million chance of winning (Gelman et al. 2012, 324; see also Jankowski 2002). Thomas 
Schwartz describes the upper limits of p in the closest of elections, and he concludes, 
“Saying that closeness increases the possibility of being pivotal…is like saying that tall 
[people] are more likely than short [people] to bump their head on the moon” (Schwartz 
1987, 118). Likewise, Paul Meehl grimly asserts that the “chances of determining who 
                                                
5 Owen and Grofman’s method assumes that the expected closeness of the election is known—or at least 
estimated—as an exact figure. Fischer (1999) describes an alternate method of calculating p that utilizes 
polling data to create a margin of error around the expected outcome, which yields even smaller 
probabilities. For example, in a population of 1 million voters who appear—based on a sample of 300—to 
be evenly split, Fischer’s method would put the chance of casting a decisive vote at about 0.000014. Thus, 
the chance of one vote being pivotal is arguably even more “inconceivable” than Owen and Grofman 
estimate. Fischer attributes his method to Good and Mayer (1975), while Owen and Grofman’s method 
builds on the work of Beck (1975) and others. 
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becomes president are of about the same order of magnitude as [the] chances of being 
killed driving to the polls—hardly a profitable venture” (Meehl 1977, 11).  
These are the types of descriptions that form the background for what is known as 
the paradox of voter turnout. Why—at least from a perspective of instrumental 
rationality—would so many individuals bother to engage in an activity with only a 
negligible chance of having any causal efficacy? This is the problem that led Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) to introduce the D term into the calculus, representing the non-
instrumental motivations that seem necessary to explain why (relatively) large numbers 
of people do turn out to vote in mass elections.6 Such motivations may also justify the 
decision to vote in terms of “collective rationality,” where an individual’s group 
membership produces social pressure that makes participation rational notwithstanding a 
lack of individual-level instrumental efficacy (Uhlaner 1989; Morton 1991).7 More 
generally, the D term represents expressive motivations for voting, which may have 
social-psychological or “existential” foundations (Schuessler 2000), and it also includes 
moral impulses toward cooperative behavior, which may be associated with a “rule-
utilitarian” approach to the turnout decision (Harsanyi 1980; Feddersen and Sandroni 
2006a). Furthermore, explanations of turnout that rely on the motivation to increase a 
preferred candidate or party’s political “mandate” may also be included in the D term, 
                                                
6 Downs originally proposed a somewhat similar solution to the paradox, suggesting that many individuals 
decide to vote after considering that the democratic system would collapse if no one participated in 
elections (Downs 1957a, 261-262). However, this solution runs back into the paradox, since individuals 
should reason that their individual vote would be highly unlikely to be pivotal to saving democracy (Fiorina 
1976, 392). Riker and Ordeshook address the paradox more directly by defining D in terms of ethical, or 
social-psychological gains in utility. They thus list several types of personal satisfaction that an individual 
might derive from the act of voting, even indicating that certain voting costs could be perceived by some 
individuals as benefits (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 28). 
7 Note that leaders of large groups, or others with wide spheres of influence (including parties and 
candidates), might conceivably influence enough votes to have a non-negligible chance of being pivotal to 
an election outcome (Uhlaner 1989, 402; see also Shachar and Nalebuff 1999). However, such attempts to 
influence outcomes through exertions of social pressure are not directly encompassed by the voting 
calculus, which addresses the individual motivation to turn out and cast a single vote.  
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since any expected utility in this case is derived independently of the electoral outcome 
(Guerrerro 2010; Mackie 2014).8 
To some, however, the D-term solution to the paradox is not a sufficiently rational 
explanation of the turnout decision, and it was criticized early on as a tautological and 
non-predictive model (Barry 1970, 13). Moreover, the assumption that the decision to 
vote is characterized primarily by expressive benefits raises issues beyond the question of 
whether a D-term solution is theoretically satisfying. The absence from the voting 
decision of any direct concern for an instrumental effect on the outcome can be said to 
open the way for “electoral irrationality of the most basic kind” (Brennan and Buchanan 
1984, 199), and expressive voting could lead individuals to vote for “morally unsavory” 
policies they would not choose if they thought their vote might actually impact the result 
(Brennan and Lomasky 1985, 204). Less perniciously, but perhaps more practically 
relevant, a purely expressive motivation for voting counsels always casting one’s ballot 
in favor of the most preferred candidate or party, regardless of that candidate or party’s 
chances of winning, given that one vote could never conceivably affect the outcome 
(Owen and Grofman 1984, 322). There may thus be serious consequences if voting is 
characterized as only expressively—and never instrumentally—rational. 
More generally, however, addition of the D term to the calculus may be useful to 
symbolize how the turnout decision can incorporate both instrumental and expressive 
elements (Fiorina 1976, 393). In the real world it might be difficult or impossible to 
distinguish such motivations from one another (Fischer 1996, 172), and such is not the 
present purpose. The intention here is rather to demonstrate how voting could indeed 
have instrumentally rational motivations, because the value of pB may in fact be non-
                                                
8 However, such explanations presumably remain subject to the paradox, as individuals should reason that 
their one vote would make no appreciable difference in the value of any political mandate. 
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negligible, and the D term therefore need not hold all the “action” in the calculus, as often 
assumed (Fiorina 1976, 393; see e.g. Copeland and Laband 2002). This is not to imply 
that addition of the D term is the only avenue of escape from the paradox. To the 
contrary, John Aldrich’s oft-cited conclusion is that turnout is best explained as a “low-
cost, low-benefit decision,” and that voting is therefore not a genuine collective action 
problem at all (Aldrich 1993, 265). Furthermore, others have suggested that including 
altruistic or social benefits in the value of B could yield a utility high enough to make 
voting instrumentally rational notwithstanding an infinitesimally small value for p 
(Margolis 1982; Jankowski 2002; Edlin et al. 2008).  
Moving beyond solutions based on interpretations of B, C, or D, there have also 
been more direct attempts to avoid the paradox by reinterpreting or modifying the 
understanding of p. In addition to their D-term explanation, Riker and Ordeshook also 
suggest that voters might simply be greatly overestimating their probability of being 
pivotal due to widespread “propaganda” about the importance of individual votes in close 
elections (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 39).9 Others have suggested that voters either fail 
to understand or even consider their probability of casting a pivotal vote, instead relying 
on broad predictions of the chance that their preference will prevail (Hinich 1981; Peters 
1998). These simplified approaches may or may not have empirical support,10 but they 
                                                
9 Similarly, Gregory Brunk (1980, 550) writes, “[T]he reason why so many people vote is because 
democratic societies systematically feed their citizens false information about the utility each individual 
personally gains from the franchise.” Downs actually suggests that the value of p could be “significant if 
[one] thinks the election will be very close” (Downs 1957b, 146), but it is not clear whether he thinks this 
valuation would be a statistical error, and he does not mention it resulting from propaganda.  
10 There is in fact some evidence that individuals either overestimate or fail to consider the probability of 
casting a pivotal vote (Blais 2000, 62-70; Blais et al. 2000, 191; Klor and Winter 2006; Esponda and Vespa 
2010). In general, there appears to be little empirical support for pivotal thinking outside of small-group 
experiments, and some contradictory evidence even at that level. Experimental studies that raise doubts 
about pivotal theory include: Tyran (2005), Klor & Winter (2007), Coate et al. (2008), Esponda &Vespa 
(2010), Großer & Schram (2010), and Morton & Tyran (2012). Experiments finding evidence for pivotal 
voting in smaller groups include Fischer (1996), Levine & Palfrey (2007), Duffy & Tavits (2008), and 
Feddersen et al. (2009). 
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clearly fall short of a theoretically grounded resolution of the paradox that remains 
consistent with an instrumentally rational approach (Dowding 2005, 452).  
Other p-based solutions to the paradox do not rely on assumptions of 
miscalculation or misunderstanding on the part of voters. One such approach is Ferejohn 
and Fiorina’s (1974) minimax regret model, which frames the turnout decision as taking 
place under conditions of generalized uncertainty (rather than specifiable risk), where the 
prevailing assumption is that it is rational to minimize the chance for an occurrence that 
would cause the maximum amount of regret. This approach effectively eliminates the 
need to consider p, as minimax regret logic appears to reduce the calculus to just the B 
and C terms (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 528).11 However, the minimax model is not 
generally accepted as a viable solution to the paradox (Dowding 2005, 449; Geys 2006b, 
21; Blais et al. 1995). For one thing, election outcomes are generally not completely—or 
even very highly—uncertain, as probabilities are quite often assigned to expectations 
about results. More fundamentally, however, the logic of pivotal theory in fact finds its 
way back into the minimax calculus: Maximum regret is said to arise from abstaining 
when one’s preferred candidate loses by one vote (or ties), but the chance of that 
occurrence remains infinitesimal in any large election. As Aldrich concludes, “[T]he 
positive prediction of turnout in minimax regret swings on the same set of (still just as 
wildly implausible) circumstances as in the calculus of voting” (Aldrich 1997, 381).  
Aldrich reaches a similar conclusion regarding attempts to rationalize turnout by 
reinterpreting p in a strategic context, indicating that “game theoretic models of turnout 
are apparently ‘driven’ by the same basic features as the individual decision-making 
models” (Aldrich 1997, 383). Other proposed solutions model the turnout decision as an 
                                                
11 Ferejohn and Fiorina are skeptical regarding the need for adding the D term to the calculus, asserting that 
“it is rational for many citizens to vote even if they neither distort their individual impact nor place a direct 
value on the act of voting” (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974, 526). 
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adaptive learning process grounded on previous voting experiences, thereby interpreting 
p in a way that makes participation more likely to be instrumentally rational (Kanazawa 
1998), or eliminating the need to calculate p altogether (Bendor et al. 2003). However, 
these models depart from the central assumption of forward-looking utility maximization 
in the calculus. Moreover, the main assumption of these models—that the turnout 
decision is based on perceptions of positive or negative outcomes associated with past 
actions—generally fails to correspond with empirical evidence regarding the motivating 
factors of turnout (Dowding 2005, 451; Guinjoan et al. 2014). 
There have also been some notable attempts to resolve the paradox by stepping 
outside conventional causal logic. In place of the individualized expected utility 
maximization employed by the causal decision theory of the calculus, Robert Grafstein 
(1991) suggests an “evidential” decision theory in which potential voters base their 
actions on expectations regarding the behavior of other similarly situated individuals. 
Accordingly, if one believes that most members of one’s social group are likely to vote 
for the same candidate or party, this increases the “conditional” expected utility of one’s 
vote, notwithstanding the fact that one’s decision to vote has no causal impact on anyone 
else’s actions. Grafstein explains this as an application of “stochastic dependence,” which 
he identifies with generalizing from one’s own behavior in a manner suggestive of the 
Kantian imperative, asking, “What if everyone did that?” (Grafstein 1991, 1006). This 
logic, however, has been faulted for irrationally confusing causal with “diagnostic,” or 
“correlational” contingencies, which Quattrone and Tversky refer to as “the voter’s 
illusion,” in which individuals mistakenly believe that their own decision to participate 
has some effect on the turnout decisions of others (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, 733-
734). Jon Elster similarly criticizes this approach as an erroneous application of 
“everyday Kantianism” that rests on a form of “magical thinking” (Elster 1989, 195). 
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Grafstein’s theory does indeed seem problematic to the extent that it relies on 
assumptions that cannot be supported within the conventional rational choice framework 
of the calculus (Dowding 2005, 450).12 Nevertheless, his approach is noteworthy for 
recognizing the potential role of collective interdependence in the individual turnout 
decision, and it perhaps points toward a more ethically grounded theory of the decision to 
participate.  
In sum, while there have been many attempts at resolving the paradox of voter 
turnout, the conventional interpretation of p as the probability of casting a pivotal vote 
continues to pose a major obstacle to theoretical modeling of the turnout decision. Hence, 
Keith Dowding’s comprehensive review of proposed solutions to the paradox describes 
these efforts as a “pathological quest for the holy grail of individually rational turnout” 
(Dowding 2005, 442). Dowding expresses doubts about whether an individual 
contribution can ever be conceived as having a “useful effect” on the outcome of a large 
election, maintaining that any perceived effect is likely “an expressive value 
masquerading as an instrumental one” (452). He also offers a practical critique of pivotal 
theory, indicating that no candidate would ever strive toward a one-vote margin, not just 
for prudential reasons, but because it would represent the weakest possible victory in 
terms of political mandate (Dowding 2005, 451-452). It does indeed seem clear that 
politicians and campaign strategists have incentives to challenge pivotal theory and 
mobilize supporters by arguing that their individual contributions could actually affect 
the outcome of the election. The question is, should prospective voters view this as mere 
propaganda, or might these urgings in fact allude to another way of interpreting the 
causal effect of individual votes? 
                                                
12 In subsequent work, Grafstein concludes that his notion of conditional expected utility ultimately 
“disables the core notion of free choice and self” (Grafstein 1995, 78), which certainly seems inconsistent 
with rational choice theory. 
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3) TOWARD A NEW CAUSAL LOGIC OF VOTING 
As indicated, pivotal voting theory assumes that an individual’s participation 
affects the result of an election only when it directly changes the outcome. This implies a 
counterfactual—or “but for”—logic of conditional causation, meaning that a given 
outcome is caused by an individual only if it would not have occurred without that 
individual’s participation. However, it is also possible to conceive of causation taking 
place in the absence of a strictly counterfactual relationship. In tort law, for example, if 
two defendants separately started fires that each independently would have burned down 
the plaintiff’s property, either one can be held fully responsible for causing the damage, 
even though neither was a “but for” cause of the result (Wright 1985, 1776). Another 
example is a firing squad, where no one member of the squad is a “but for” cause in the 
execution, but moral responsibility may still be assigned to each participant individually 
(Goldman 1999, 205). These situations may be referred to as cases of overdetermined, or 
redundant, causation.  
Derek Parfit points out that overdetermined causation often generates normative 
dilemmas, as “mistakes in moral mathematics” can emerge from concentrating only on 
the effects of an individual act, while “ignoring the effects of sets of acts” (Parfit 1984, 
70). The examples of the fire-starters and the firing squad are cases where each individual 
acting alone would have been fully sufficient to bring about the outcome, but Parfit also 
gives examples of overdetermination arising in contexts where collective action is 
required to achieve a certain goal (72).13 There may thus be reason to doubt whether the 
                                                
13 In connection with voting, Parfit disputes the claim that “below some threshold, extremely small chances 
have no rational or moral significance” (Parfit 1984, 73). However, he invokes the conventional 
interpretation of p—assuming it to equal about one in a hundred million—and suggests that voting may still 
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counterfactual causal logic of pivotal theory is truly the most appropriate way to model 
the turnout decision. Nonetheless, hardly anyone seems to have questioned the 
assumption that instrumentally rational voters should only value being a counterfactual 
cause of the outcome, and more specifically, that they should discount their expected 
benefits by the probability that their vote will be pivotal.14 It is worth emphasizing at this 
point that defining the boundaries of rational action is a fundamentally normative 
endeavor. In the words of John Harsanyi, the concept of rationality is normative simply 
because “it points to what we should do in order to attain a given end or objective” 
(Harsanyi 1986, 83). Pivotal theory can thus be seen as setting a specific normative 
standard for rationality—a standard that, incidentally, has implications not just for voting, 
but for other collective action situations as well.  
In one of the rare critiques of pivotal theory, Patrick Dunleavy pointedly asks, 
“What is rational about wanting to be a unique swing voter in contexts where large 
numbers of actors are involved?” (Dunleavy 1997, 56). Tracing the origins of pivotal 
theory to the works of Downs (1957a) and Olson (1965) applying the expected utility 
analysis pioneered by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Dunleavy admits that it 
makes sense to assume that rational actors in a collective action situation should discount 
their expected benefits by some probability factor (Dunleavy 1997, 57-63). However, he 
forcefully rejects the assumption that this discount factor should be the probability of 
being pivotal to the preferred outcome, and he ultimately characterizes the desire to be 
pivotal within a large group as not only “not rational,” but even “pathological, almost 
psychotic” (81). His particular arguments against pivotal theory may not be very 
                                                                                                                                            
be instrumentally rational given the expectation of an extremely large public benefit, thus relying on a B-
term solution to the paradox (74-75).  
14 Of course, many scholars have criticized rational choice theory as a model of political or social behavior 
(e.g. Green and Shapiro 1994; Udehn 1996). Few, however, appear to question the specific assumption that 
the desire to be pivotal is inevitably associated with rational choice in a collective action situation. 
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convincing,15 but Dunleavy makes at least one point that seems novel and noteworthy, 
and which suggests—albeit obliquely—a different way of thinking about what it means 
to have a causal effect on an election outcome. 
Dunleavy mentions an obvious consequence of pivotal theory that seems to have 
gone largely overlooked: It is that no individual can ever be solely pivotal to an election 
outcome. The reasoning is simple: In any election decided by a margin of one vote (or 
tied), everyone who cast a vote for the winner (or either side if tied) would 
“simultaneously be equally pivotal” (Dunleavy 1997, 79). In other words, the crowning 
achievement of pivotal theory, the goal toward which all rational actors should 
presumably be striving—casting a vote that individually decides the election—is by 
definition always a shared experience. Dunleavy argues that the fundamental ideal of 
pivotality is thus basically unrealizable, since “many others voting or abstaining would 
have an equal claim to being the decisive actor” (79). Strictly speaking this could be 
mistaken, as one might still insist that it is rational to participate only to the extent that 
one’s vote will be pivotal, even if this distinction must always be shared with other 
voters. However, the requirement of always having to share any claim to pivotal 
causation hints at an alternate way of thinking about causing an election outcome.  
Perhaps the pivotal situation is best framed simply as a representation of the 
closest possible election. Yet elections can of course be very close without being as close 
                                                
15 Dunleavy argues that the concept of pivotality is problematic because it is subject to formal ambiguity, 
since there could be reasonable disagreement, even after the fact, about whether an individual’s vote was 
decisive to an outcome. The reason, he argues, is that a pivotal situation could also arise from the 
perspective of an abstainer whose participation might have affected the result, or from a voter 
contemplating voting against preference (Dunleavy 1997, 75). (He admits that voting against preference 
seems implausible, but he implies that it could happen as a result of ambivalence or uncertainty.) In the 
latter case, a pivotal situation could arise from a two-vote difference, as a changed vote by anyone who 
would otherwise have voted for the winner (assuming a two-candidate race) would create a tie. Dunleavy’s 
objections, however, do not challenge the basic assumption of counterfactual causation employed in pivotal 
theory, and the formal ambiguities he points out seem trivial in large electorates. 
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as mathematically possible. In fact, when a very large election is decided by 2 votes, or 
10 votes, or 100 votes (or even say 537 votes), the outcome may be statistically 
indistinguishable from the pivotal situation. It is thus arguably a mistake to draw what is 
virtually an arbitrary line at the ultimate degree of closeness—i.e., a one-vote margin (or 
a tie)—and then to assume that participation becomes utterly ineffectual, from an 
individual perspective, at any greater margin. Instead, what seems missing is a way to 
define and measure how an individual vote could still represent a causal factor as an 
electoral outcome diverges from the pivotal situation.  
As indicated, when an election is decided by one vote, everyone who voted for the 
winner—bracketing for now those who voted for the loser—was strictly pivotal to the 
outcome. When an election is decided by two votes, the conventional assumption is that 
no one was pivotal. Note how this is tantamount to asserting that each individual voter—
holding all other voters constant—could have abstained without altering the outcome. 
However, while this may be true in a formal sense, practically speaking it seems 
problematic, for given a two-vote margin the outcome would have changed if any more 
than one person voting for the winner had abstained. More realistically perhaps, instead 
of saying that no one was pivotal in an election decided by two votes, one might instead 
assert that everyone (who voted for the winner) was pivotal, except for one voter. 
Moreover, since votes are perfectly fungible and effectively simultaneous, there is no 
way of knowing which voter cast the one non-pivotal vote. Therefore, if X equals the 
number of votes for the winner, everyone voting for the winner had a 1/X probability of 
having cast the non-pivotal vote, or an (X−1)/X probability of having been pivotal to the 
outcome. 
Admittedly, the term “pivotal” is being stretched beyond its intended meaning 
here. A vote in the true pivotal situation is not only individually necessary to an election 
  35 
outcome, it is also, in some sense at least, individually sufficient to bring about the 
outcome.16 In the case of an election decided by a margin of two votes, there exists a set 
of X−1 votes that were each individually necessary, and that were collectively—though 
not in any sense individually—sufficient to cause the outcome. Although in practice no 
one voter can be identified with certainty as having been part of that set, nevertheless, 
everyone who voted for the winner has an (X−1)/X probability of having been 
individually necessary to a set of votes that were collectively sufficient for the outcome. 
In the terminology of Richard Tuck, we can identify an “efficacious set” of votes, “with 
each vote in the efficacious set having true causal efficacy in bringing about the result” 
(Tuck 2008, 44). In a plurality voting system, this set of votes will always contain exactly 
one vote more than the number of votes for the second-place finisher, since this is the 
number of votes needed to win.17 It is thus simple to calculate the ex post probability that 
an individual vote was in the efficacious set by dividing the number of votes in this set—
the second-place finisher’s tally plus one—by the number of votes the winner actually 
received. The probability of being in the efficacious set can then be said to represent the 
chance that an individual vote causally contributed to the election outcome, in the sense 
of having been individually necessary to that outcome. 
 While the above calculation may be quite simple, the underlying concept is 
another matter. At issue here is the essential nature of the collective action problem posed 
by opportunities for participation in very large groups. In fact, Tuck’s pathbreaking work, 
                                                
16 One vote, even if pivotal, can never truly be individually sufficient, since an election by definition 
requires collective action. Nevertheless, from a ceteris paribus perspective, a pivotal vote can be seen as 
individually sufficient to bring about the desired outcome. This is related to the fact that being pivotal is 
always a shared experience, yet each individual claims counterfactual causal power over the outcome.  
17 This also holds true for majority-rule elections with only two candidates, and even with more candidates 
the two top finishers may be said to win—in the sense of advancing to a runoff—by obtaining at least one 
vote more than the third-place finisher. The idea of an efficacious set of votes under a system of 
proportional representation (PR) is more complicated, and calculating values for p under PR is a complex 
problem beyond the current scope (see Blais et al. 2014). 
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Free Riding (2008), poses a direct challenge to Mancur Olson’s well-established theory, 
in The Logic of Collective Action (1965) regarding the negligibility of individual 
contributions to very large enterprises. Tuck explains that voting is a type of collective 
action problem that is not actually a good example of a “genuinely Olsonian problem,” 
because there is always a specific threshold that determines the outcome of an election 
(Tuck 2008, 44). The real Olsonian problem, according to Tuck, is a situation portrayed 
by the paradox of the sorities, an ancient riddle asking when a collection of grains of 
wheat becomes—or ceases to become—a “heap.” The paradox, of course, is that one can 
never identify a threshold, for at any point it could be argued that one grain more or less 
would make no difference (67). Tuck explains how in a true sorities situation with no 
threshold, one might argue—as does Olson—that any individual contribution has only a 
negligible effect, since there is no identifiable point when an additional contribution 
clearly matters. In cases like elections, however, where there is always a definite 
threshold determining the outcome, Tuck argues that the collective action problem 
described by Olson never arises, for rational individuals in such situations have 
incentives to coordinate their activity to ensure meeting the threshold (48).18 Since 
elections do not represent a genuine Olsonian problem, Tuck concludes that “any analysis 
of voting which presumes that no individual vote has causal power over the result unless 
it is pivotal is mistaken” (44).19 
                                                
18 Such coordination should in fact be relatively easy in the electoral context, as the essential organizational 
structure for collective action is fully in place, at least for the major political parties, and all individuals 
must do is obtain a ballot and cast a vote for their preference. 
19 One might argue that elections actually do represent an instance of the sorities paradox, at least in 
practical terms, because if an initial result is close enough it will often elicit a recount and/or litigation, 
making the actual threshold for winning uncertain. Given this reality, combined with the practical 
limitations of election administration, any large election with a close enough result might be described as “a 
statistical tie,” with no identifiable threshold for when a result becomes that close (see e.g. McCaffery et al. 
2004a, 5). This is not a problem for Tuck’s theory, however, for he eventually concludes that even in a true 
sorities situation, rational behavior entails acting as if there is in fact a definite threshold, although it cannot 
be precisely identified (Tuck 2008, 95, 208; see Runciman 2008). In any event, an electoral outcome is 
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While Tuck provides the theoretical foundation for a new understanding of the 
collective action problem of voting, his analysis nevertheless stops short of a 
comprehensive account of the implications of efficacious set causation in the context of 
elections. Tuck broadly associates his position with an article by Alvin Goldman (1999) 
entitled, “Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach” (see Tuck 
2008, 51). Goldman echoes the idea that overdetermined causal effects can be 
meaningfully ascribed in cases where counterfactual causation fails, and he seems to have 
independently arrived at the general idea of an efficacious set of votes existing within the 
larger set of votes for a winning candidate (Goldman 1999, 205-207). However, neither 
Tuck nor Goldman fully integrates the probabilistic context of voting into their causal 
theory. Goldman indicates in a footnote, “Causation can take place even in chancy 
situations, where merely probabilistic laws hold sway,” yet he puzzlingly concludes, “In 
the context of voting, however, we do not need to worry about probabilistic causation. 
Wherever an electoral outcome occurs, some set of votes is sufficient for the outcome” 
(Goldman 1999, 208).  
Similarly, while Tuck originally references the “probability that [one] vote was 
part of the efficacious set” (Tuck 2008, 44), he later appears to abandon this probabilistic 
focus in favor of an emphasis on the rationality of “bandwagon” incentives that justify 
participation in cases of clear overdetermination. He thus concludes, “[I]t is precisely in 
the situation where it looks on the standard modern view as if my vote is unnecessary that 
I have a good reason to vote” (60).20 Strangely, he appears to entirely ignore elections in 
                                                                                                                                            
always at least formally determined by an exact threshold, and moreover, the practical uncertainty 
surrounding close elections can be modeled in a way that mirrors an exact threshold determination (Gelman 
et al. 2004, 674). 
20 Tuck again references the probability of being in the efficacious set in explaining that when one’s 
preference is an overwhelming favorite to win, the probability of being in that set might be small enough to 
justify abstention (Tuck 2008, 61). Since his primary focus is on an instrumental argument for voting in 
cases where one’s preference is expected to win, Tuck associates efficacious set causation with being 
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which the outcome may be uncertain, instead highlighting how individuals can have an 
instrumentally rational reason to vote even when they fully expect their preference to 
prevail. Tuck’s point is an important theoretical innovation of its own, but it arguably 
misses another key consequence of the theory of efficacious set causation—the 
motivation it provides for individuals to participate in close elections. Furthermore, Tuck 
also neglects to discuss how his theory might apply in cases where an individual’s 
preferred choice is expected not to win but rather to lose. A more comprehensive 
explanation of how efficacious set causation functions in these cases is needed in order to 
more fully integrate the probabilistic context of voting as ex ante decision-making. This 
more comprehensive explanation provides the basis for the new interpretation of p in the 
voting calculus.  
 
4) DEVELOPING THE NEW INTERPRETATION OF P 
The probability of one vote being necessary to an election outcome by forming 
part of an efficacious set can be illustrated with the result of a very famous close election: 
the 2000 U.S. presidential race in Florida. The official final tally was 2,912,253 votes for 
Al Gore, and 2,912,790 votes for George Bush. Leaving the Gore voters aside for the 
moment, the ex post probability that any individual Bush voter was in the efficacious set 
is 2,912,254/2,912,790, or about 0.9998. Prior to the election, assuming it was uncertain 
who would prevail in Florida, with polls showing the race to be within the margin of 
error (and thus “too close to call”), any prospective voter should rationally have assumed, 
ex ante, that their vote had an effectively 100 percent chance of being necessary to their 
                                                                                                                                            
sufficient, but not necessary to the outcome (101-102). Sufficiency, in Tuck’s usage, seems to refer to 
collective sufficiency, not to the individual (ceteris paribus) sufficiency associated with casting a pivotal 
vote, while his version of necessity seems to imply strict—not probabilistic—necessity. 
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preferred outcome. In other words, every vote mattered, at least prospectively. This is 
presumably how campaign strategists think about close elections, and it’s not clear why 
voters—at least those with clear preferences—should think much differently. Pivotal 
theory leads of course to a very different conclusion, as a negligible value for p 
effectively eliminates instrumental benefits in even the closest elections. Under this new 
interpretation, however, p can essentially be ignored in these cases. 
The theory of efficacious set causation can thus justify instrumental participation 
in cases of close elections, as just illustrated, as well as when one’s preferred choice is a 
favorite to win, as Tuck demonstrates in his emphasis on the rationality of bandwagon 
incentives. What of the case where one’s preferred choice is expected to lose? If ex ante 
information predicts that one’s favored candidate is essentially certain to lose (e.g., Nader 
voters in the 2000 election), then prospective voters should indeed rationally conclude 
that votes for that candidate would have zero probability of affecting the outcome. 
However, as the probability that one’s preferred choice might prevail begins to increase, 
the logic of efficacious set causation takes over: Suppose that pre-election polls indicate 
the outcome of a two-candidate race is expected to be 45 percent for candidate X, and 55 
percent for Y, leaving aside for now any margin of error. A prospective voter who prefers 
X might have a rational incentive to participate in this situation, since X is not certain to 
lose, even if that result appears more likely than not. What then is the ex ante probability 
that this voter’s participation will be necessary for X to win? It seems clear that in this 
situation the chance that a vote for X will be necessary to the preferred outcome is 100 
percent. Every vote for candidate X can be expected to be in the efficacious set in this 
case, because every vote is expected to be necessary in order for X to win. This is true 
even though ex post, if X happens to lose, every vote for X will have had a zero 
probability of forming part of an efficacious set, and will in fact have been instrumentally 
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useless. Ex ante, however, the fact that the odds appear to be somewhat—though not 
overwhelmingly—in Y’s favor means that the votes of every one of X’s supporters are 
needed if X is to have a chance at victory, so prospective voters who prefer X should 
interpret p as equal to 1. 
In sum, the theory advanced here suggests that a prospective voter with a clear 
preference between two candidates should go through a two-stage decision-making 
process with regard to the p term: First, the individual asks: Is there a “realistic” chance 
that my preferred candidate can win?21 If the answer is no, there is indeed no instrumental 
motivation to vote. If the answer is yes, the individual then proceeds to ask: What is the 
chance that my vote will be necessary to that outcome by forming part of an efficacious 
set? If the preferred candidate appears more likely to lose, or if the election is essentially 
“too close to call,” then p is equal to one. If, on the other hand, the preferred candidate is 
expected to win, the probability of forming part of an efficacious set declines in 
proportion to the strength of that expectation. Tuck’s theory of bandwagon incentives 
indicates that calculation of this probability may continue well past the point where the 
preferred candidate is perceived to have any realistic chance of losing, but at some point 
that probability may become small enough that there could again cease to be any 
instrumental motivation to participate (Tuck 2008, 61).22  
 
                                                
21 Asking whether one’s preferred candidate has a “realistic” possibility of winning implies a behavioral 
assumption relating to a prospective voter’s beliefs apart from objective estimations of the probability (or 
probability distribution) associated with the expected outcome. In other words, the answer to this question 
will be idiosyncratic, as discussed below.  
22 This implies another behavioral assumption regarding a prospective voter’s beliefs, not about whether 
the preferred candidate has a realistic possibility of losing, but rather about the idiosyncratic value of 
forming part of an efficacious set of votes for a winning candidate.  
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Figure 1.1: Value of p as Expected Outcome Changes 
Figure 1.1 illustrates a simulation of the value of p in a large electorate as the 
expected share of votes for candidate X moves between 0 and 1. When X’s expected 
share is small enough that the candidate is expected to lose for certain, p equals 0. 
However, there is a point where the expected loss of candidate X becomes uncertain, and 
a prospective voter begins to perceive that X has a realistic chance at winning. At this 
point there is a discontinuity, and p jumps from 0 to 1. Where exactly this occurs may be 
completely idiosyncratic, but Figure 1.1 assumes that it happens when the expected share 
of X rises above 40 percent. The value of p then remains at 1 until X becomes more 
likely to win, at which point it begins to descend, with p at each point equal to the 
expected number of votes for Y, plus one, divided by the expected votes for X.23 As 
                                                
23 One might wonder whether p should instead continue to equal 1 past the expected vote share of 0.5 until 
the point where X’s losing ceases to be a realistic possibility. This point might be assumed to fall 
somewhere around 0.6, in parallel to the discontinuity point on the losing side. However, the argument here 
is that p should be interpreted as 1 on the prospective losing side (at all points where there is still a realistic 
chance of winning) only because each vote is 100 percent certain to be necessary for X to win. On the 
prospective winning side p is attributed a distinct value, and there is no reason to assume a p of 1. 
Nevertheless, p will of course be very close to 1 when X is only a slight favorite.   
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indicated, there is presumably another point where the expected share is so high that 
voting for X begins to seem instrumentally useless, and p drops to 0 even though there 
remains a non-zero probability of forming part of the efficacious set. Note, however, the 
asymmetry: Where X appears more likely to lose, p shifts from 0 to 1 when a prospective 
voter perceives a realistic possibility of X winning—here when the expected share rises 
above 0.4. Where X is expected to win, however, a prospective voter might rationally 
pursue a chance at joining an efficacious set up to the point where bandwagon incentives 
run out, which Figure 1.1 assumes to occur when X’s vote share reaches 0.75, after which 
p returns to 0.24 
A key observation in distinguishing this interpretation of p from pivotal theory is 
that under this new approach the size of the electorate is effectively irrelevant in all but 
the very smallest elections: In other words, Figure 1.1 looks almost exactly the same 
whether the electorate has 100 or 100 million voters. In contrast to pivotal theory, where 
both closeness and size determine the value of p, what matters under this interpretation is 
essentially only expected closeness. Under efficacious set causation, p still equals 0 in 
some cases, but it may equal 1, or close to 1, when an election is expected to be highly 
competitive. Therefore, the perceived benefit of one’s preferred choice prevailing in the 
election—B in the calculus—need not be reflexively discounted to zero. This resolves the 
paradox of turnout, at least for cases of relatively close elections.  
                                                
24 The chosen discontinuity points of 0.4 and 0.75 are admittedly somewhat arbitrary. The hypothesis here 
is that these discontinuities should exist, but obviously, empirical research is needed to verify their 
existence and location. On the more likely to lose side, the discontinuity might be hypothesized to fall 
somewhere between 0.40 and 0.45, assuming that most prospective voters would likely agree that a 
candidate polling over 45 percent has a “realistic” chance at winning, and the reverse at less than 40 
percent. On the likely to win side, the discontinuity might be subject to greater variation based on how 
individuals value a chance at joining an efficacious set of votes. Note that the locations of these 
discontinuities could be seen as true instances of the sorities paradox, since they lack definite thresholds. 
Tuck’s theory, however, would entail acting as if they in fact do have clear thresholds, even if they cannot 
be precisely identified (see supra n. 19). 
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A simple approach to calculating p as the probability of being in the efficacious 
set could also incorporate a margin of error from a pre-election poll, as follows: A 
prospective voter who favors candidate X over candidate Y (in a two-person race) would 
first note whether the margin of error crosses the 50 percent point. For example, polls 
might indicate that candidate X is expected to receive 54 percent of the vote, ±5 percent. 
In this case, the probability of being in the efficacious set should be estimated at 1, since 
the expected outcome appears to be a statistical tie. If candidate X’s predicted likelihood 
of winning is beyond the margin of error, the chance of a vote for X being in the 
efficacious set would be projected downward from 1 in proportion to the (mean) expected 
outcome, up to the point where the higher discontinuity falls outside the margin of error, 
and p drops to 0. Conversely, if X appears more likely to lose, p would equal 1 at all 
points where the lower discontinuity point falls within the margin of error. To illustrate, 
X may be expected to obtain only 38 percent of the vote, again with a margin of error of 
5 points, meaning that X’s expected share could really be as high as 43 percent. 
Arguably, it would not be beyond the realm of “realistic” possibility for a potential voter 
to conclude that X has a chance of prevailing in this situation.25 In other words, it could 
well be worth the effort of voting for X, after considering expected costs and benefits, 
given that any vote for X in this situation is essentially certain to be necessary if X is to 
win.26 
                                                
25 It might first be noted that most polls have a 95 percent confidence interval—meaning there is a 5 
percent chance that the true value will fall beyond the margin of error (of about two standard deviations 
from the mean) in repeated sampling. More importantly, pre-election polls of “likely” voters measure only 
expressed intentions at the time surveyed, which are subject to various sources of bias, including the fact 
that respondents may not be very good at predicting their own likelihood of voting (Rogers and Aida 2014). 
As Fischer (1999, 273) explains, polls may have “non-sample errors, mainly because people do not vote the 
way they say they will.” For these reasons, it arguably makes sense to construct another margin of error 
around the formal margin of error when using pre-election polls in ex ante instrumental turnout decisions.  
26 Interestingly, there could be an interaction between the expected benefits of an individual’s preferred 
candidate winning (B in the calculus) and the location of the discontinuities in the estimate of p. If B is 
perceived to be very high—for instance, when one thinks the opposing candidate will cause great societal 
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A more complex estimation of p can be derived by using the predictions of pre-
election polls to construct a probability distribution for the expected outcome, and then 
summing up the probabilities for each possible outcome discounted by its associated 
value of p. Hypothetically, suppose a poll sampled 100 voters out of an electorate of 
1000, finding that 52 individuals preferred candidate X, and 48 favored Y. In this case, 
candidate X would be expected to receive 52 percent of the vote with a standard 
deviation of about 5 percentage points.27 Applied to the population of 1000 voters, the 
mean expectation for candidate X would be 520 votes, with a standard deviation of 50 
votes, yielding the normal distribution shown in Figure 1.2:  
 
                                                                                                                                            
harm—one might consider participating even when the chance that one’s preferred candidate will win is 
relatively small. This perhaps suggests a logic reminiscent of minimax regret: The greater the chance for 
regretting a decision to abstain, the more one might want to minimize that risk by participating. When a 
candidate loses by a relatively small margin, supporters who abstained might be seen as having more causal 
responsibility for the adverse outcome (see Goldman 1999). (This of course assumes the rejection of 
pivotal theory, so that one might experience regret even with a margin greater than one.) The level of regret 
for abstaining would then presumably be greater the closer one’s preferred candidate came to winning, and 
the greater the strength of one’s preference for that candidate. Prospectively, therefore, one would want to 
minimize the possibility of “maximal” regret by regarding one’s vote as potentially necessary and 
participating even in cases where one’s candidate seems more likely to lose, particularly where the B term 
is perceived to be high. In formal terms, this could be represented by a leftward shift in the location of the 
lower discontinuity in the value of p. When a highly preferred candidate is favored to win, one might also 
experience some regret at not being part of an efficacious set, but it would not seem to be as “maximal” a 
regret as abstention when one’s preferred candidate loses.     
27 This estimation method draws from Fischer’s (1999) approach to calculating the value of p under pivotal 
theory. As Fischer (1999, 270) notes, in a poll for a two-candidate election (a binomial distribution), the 
standard deviation (in numbers of voters) is calculated by multiplying the sample size by the expected vote 
share of each candidate and taking the square root of the product:! 100 ∗ 0.52 ∗ 0.48 ≈ 5. 
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Figure 1.2: Probability Distribution of Votes for X in Electorate of 1000 (n=100) 
 
The probability that candidate X will fail to win (losing or tying) is the area under 
the curve representing 500 votes or less, which is calculated by the cumulative 
distribution function to equal 0.344 of the entire area under the curve. The p associated 
with this probability would be 1, as indicated previously, except for points to the left of 
the lower discontinuity, where p is equal to 0. Assuming that the discontinuity point is at 
0.4, the probability that X will receive 400 votes or less is calculated at 0.008, which is 
subtracted from 0.344 to yield an overall probability of being in the efficacious set—on 
the prospective losing (or tying) side—of about 0.336. Summing up the probabilities 
where X is expected to win is more complex, since the probability of being in the 
efficacious set changes at each point on the curve. Therefore, probability mass 
functions—each representing the probability of a discrete outcome—must be calculated 
for every possible winning outcome.28 The associated p for each of these outcomes is 
                                                
28 For simplicity, this can be calculated only up to 3 standard deviations above the mean, here 670 votes, 
since the probability of X receiving more votes becomes infinitesimal. In any event, it would be calculated 
only up to the point of the upper discontinuity, here assumed to be 0.75, or 750 votes.  
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calculated by dividing the number of votes for candidate Y, plus 1, by the number of 
votes for X. The value of p at each outcome is then applied as a discount factor to the 
discrete probability associated with each outcome. Summing up the discounted 
probabilities for each outcome where X receives 501 votes or more (up to 3 standard 
deviations above the mean) yields an overall probability of 0.543. Adding this to the 
0.336 calculated on the other side of the curve yields an overall probability of 0.879 that a 
vote for candidate X will be in the efficacious set.29       
The following formal equation represents the probability of being in the 
efficacious set (Pr!") with respect to a given distribution (μ), where X equals the 
expected number of votes for candidate X (in a two-candidate race), N equals the 
expected total electorate, while a and b are (respectively) the lower and upper 
discontinuity points:30 Pr!"! = Pr! ! ≤ !2 − Pr! ! ≤ !" + ! − ! + 1! ∗ Pr![!]!"!!!!!! ! 
Figure 1.3 applies this equation repeatedly as the expected vote share of X shifts 
between 0 and 1, illustrating a simulation of p calculated from a probability distribution, 
based again on a hypothetical sampling of 100 from an expected electorate of 1000, with 
discontinuity points set at 0.4 and 0.75. When the expected distribution of votes is evenly 
divided at a mean of 0.5, the overall probability of being in the efficacious set is 
                                                
29 If p drops to zero at 0.4, the probability of receiving 400 votes or less is small enough that it does not 
significantly alter the final calculation. However, locating the lower discontinuity point significantly above 
0.4 would produce a greater effect on the final value. If it is instead located at 0.45, the overall probability 
of being in the efficacious set in this example drops to 0.807. For the upper discontinuity, the possibility of 
X receiving more than 0.75 of the votes is essentially 0, and the discontinuity point would have to move 
much further down from 0.75 to have any noticeable effect on the final value of p. 
30 This assumes an even number of voters. If N is odd, the summation term changes to: …!"!!!!!!! . 
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calculated at just above 0.9.31 The curve is again asymmetric, dropping more steeply 
where X appears more likely to lose since more of the distribution is being discounted to 
0 under those expected outcomes. Correspondingly, p drops below 0.5 on the left-hand 
side of the curve just as X’s mean expected vote share reaches 0.4, and p drops almost to 
0 by the time that vote share reaches 0.3; however, on the right-hand side p drops below 




Figure 1.3: Value of p Calculated from Probability Distribution (n=100) 
 
To conclude, none of the foregoing is meant as a claim that prospective voters can 
or should go through these types of calculations in practice, just as the statistical models 
of pivotal theory do not necessarily imply that voters can or should explicitly calculate 
their chances of being pivotal. Nevertheless, the simpler methods outlined above for 
                                                
31 If the lower discontinuity is instead set at 0.45, the highest value of p—about 0.81—occurs near a vote 
share of 0.52, while for an evenly split electorate p is about 0.77. This is perhaps conceptually problematic, 
since one might expect the highest value of p to always occur when the race is closest.  
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calculating p could perhaps be understood by most prospective voters, in contrast to even 
the most basic calculations required to estimate p under pivotal theory. Yet the main 
point for present purposes is that the alternate interpretation described here leads to a 
starkly different understanding of the instrumental efficacy of voting. The initial 
theoretical claim is thus simply that when prospective voters consider the chance of their 
vote affecting the outcome of an election, they could—consistent with instrumental 
rationality—consider their chance of forming part of an efficacious set instead of 
considering their probability of being pivotal. However, there is also a stronger normative 
argument that the probability of having a causal effect on an election should be calculated 
in this manner, and that employing pivotal theory might actually represent a less 
rational—if not outright irrational—approach to the collective action problem of voting. 
This normative argument has vital implications for conceptions of the role of voting in 
democratic theory, and it also has important consequences for the legal and policy 
regimes associated with elections, as discussed in the following sections.  
 
5) CRITIQUE AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF EFFICACIOUS SET CAUSATION 
 In order to begin evaluating the normative implications of this new understanding 
of how individual votes contribute to electoral outcomes, it is helpful to review some of 
the critical response to Tuck’s work. Notwithstanding the highly provocative nature of 
Tuck’s conclusions—which pose a fundamental challenge to the conventional modeling 
of collective action problems—the response to Free Riding seems relatively muted. 
Reviews have been mixed, with some praising Tuck’s innovative approach (Amadae 
2008; Runciman 2008), while others respond skeptically to his argument against the 
Olsonian orthodoxy (Kuhn 2010; Thompson 2011; Congleton 2009). Jason Brennan 
  49 
offers perhaps the most detailed criticism of Tuck’s causal logic, directly addressing the 
theory of efficacious set causation in his book, The Ethics of Voting (Brennan 2011a; see 
also Brennan 2009).       
 Brennan advances several arguments against Tuck’s position on the instrumental 
rationality of voting (Brennan 2011a, 28-34). Grounding his analysis, Brennan postulates 
the existence of two types of potential voters: Type-1 potential voters care not only about 
the electoral outcome, but they also care about being a causal agent of that outcome. 
Brennan’s type-2 potential voters, on the other hand, care about the outcome but attribute 
“no special value to being the agent of causation” (29). His main argument is that 
abstention is the most rational choice for Type-2 individuals (who prefer candidate A), 
because: “Given what others are doing, voting for A and abstaining from voting for A are 
both sufficient for A to be elected” (33). However, Brennan never really defines the 
parameters of “what others are doing,” and he does not mention close elections where the 
outcome may be uncertain. It may perhaps be understandable to miss the implications of 
Tuck’s theory for uncertain elections, for as indicated, Tuck himself neglects to elucidate 
this matter. Brennan parenthetically states, “Recall that Tuck is not trying to argue that 
one should vote because there is some small chance one’s vote will be decisive” 
(Brennan 2011a, 33). However, Tuck’s theory does in fact imply that one should vote 
because—or more precisely, whenever—there is some large chance that one’s vote will 
be necessary, if not “decisive,” to the preferred outcome.32  
In cases of uncertainty, the logic of efficacious set causation suggests that 
participation could be instrumentally rational—subject to the C term of the calculus—
                                                
32 Brennan interprets efficacious set causation as the state of being “minimally sufficient” for the outcome 
(Brennan 2011, 29), but he does not contemplate it representing the probability that one’s vote might be 
necessary to the outcome. Again, Tuck is unclear on this as well, since he focuses on the case where one’s 
preferred candidate is fully expected to win (see supra n. 20).  
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even for Brennan’s Type-2 individuals. For if these individuals truly do have a preferred 
outcome (the value of which is not outweighed by the costs of voting), they should want 
to do what they can to contribute—even in a very small way—to bringing about that 
outcome, regardless of how much “special value” they attach to their causal effect. The 
difference between Brennan’s two types of potential voters might instead be exhibited in 
the location of the upper discontinuity in the probability of being in the efficacious set: 
Type-2 individuals could be expected to have more symmetry between their lower and 
upper discontinuities, as they would not care about having a share of causal credit for 
their preferred outcome in cases where that outcome is fairly certain. Yet assuming they 
do in fact care about the outcome, they should rationally want to participate in cases 
where it remains uncertain. Under Tuck’s approach, caring about the outcome cannot be 
detached from attributing value to being an agent of causation, at least in cases of 
uncertainty, for if one truly cares about the outcome one by definition should want to 
influence it to the extent within one’s power. In fact, Brennan’s Type-2 individual 
appears to assume the counterfactual conception of causation employed by pivotal theory, 
taking for granted the virtual impossibility of affecting any election outcome, which 
makes Brennan’s argument against Tuck seem circular. 
Some of Brennan’s other objections to Tuck’s theory can be resolved by 
incorporating the other elements of the calculus. For example, he raises the existence of 
opportunity costs for the act of voting as an argument against Tuck’s causal logic 
(Brennan 2011a, 31, 33; see also Mackie 2014, 45). However, all costs associated with 
voting—including any costs related to missed opportunities during time spent voting—
are modeled in the C term of the calculus, and they should not directly affect estimation 
of p, whether under pivotal theory or efficacious set causation. Brennan also states that 
under Tuck’s theory the individual utility of voting is equal to the probability that one’s 
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vote will be in the efficacious set, multiplied by “the value of being in the efficacious set” 
(Brennan 2011a, 30). He then argues that “there is no obvious way” to determine the 
value of being in the efficacious set, citing Tuck’s rejection of the possibility of dividing 
up total utility among those with causal responsibility for bringing it about (Brennan 
2011a, 184; citing Tuck 2008, 40-43). However, Tuck actually concludes that “each vote 
carries the full causal responsibility for bringing about the result” (Tuck 2008, 41). The 
utility associated with the probability of being in the efficacious set is therefore simply 
the differential utility derived from one’s preferred candidate winning—in other words, 
the value of B in the calculus. While it is true that estimating the value of B raises 
difficult issues, this has no bearing on the logic of efficacious set causation. 
Brennan also argues that Tuck’s theory is fundamentally inconsistent with 
instrumental rational choice, which purportedly demands the conventional Olsonian 
logic. Brennan thus accuses Tuck of employing a theory of “rationality as effectiveness,” 
in which rational action is judged by ex post standards of whether success was achieved, 
regardless of the ex ante odds of achievement (Brennan 2011a, 32). Tuck is admittedly 
somewhat unclear regarding the probabilistic context of efficacious set causation, as 
indicated, but Brennan’s reading is nonetheless insupportable.33 Tuck clearly maintains 
that the logic of efficacious set causation falls within the bounds of instrumental 
rationality, although it obviously modifies the conventional Olsonian understanding of 
what constitutes a rational choice in collective action situations (see Tuck 2008, 99-100). 
Furthermore, the extension of Tuck’s theory to elections with uncertain outcomes, as 
                                                
33 In accusing Tuck of employing rationality as effectiveness, Brennan cites Tuck’s statement that “the 
essence of instrumental action is, after all, that what we do is a means to an end, that is, causes it” (Brennan 
2011, 32; citing Tuck 2008, 54). There is nothing in this quote, however, nor in its surrounding context (nor 
anywhere else in Free Riding for that matter), to indicate that Tuck endorses the concept of rationality as 
effectiveness, which as Brennan illustrates, leads to clearly irrational forms of decision-making. 
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developed here, reinforces the position of efficacious set causation within an 
instrumentally rational approach.  
Brennan’s critique helps reveal the normative implications of how Tuck’s 
approach departs from the conventional assumptions of pivotal theory and the Olsonian 
view of collective action problems. Brennan submits his Type-1 and Type-2 potential 
voters as if they represented two equal attitudes, devoid of normative connotations. 
However, one might question the claim to greater rationality of the Type-2 position, 
where an individual desires to receive a benefit while attaching “no special value to being 
the agent of causation.” This is of course the very definition of free riding: receiving 
benefits from the work of others while eschewing a contribution to the collective effort. 
The conventional Olsonian logic assumes that it is always most rational to have an 
overriding interest in trying to free ride whenever possible; hence the focus on not 
contributing unless one’s participation is likely to be pivotal. However, it might be 
equally rational—or perhaps even more rational—to have an overriding interest in 
ensuring that a particular public good is provided, or that one’s preferred candidate is 
elected. The theory of efficacious set causation provides a theoretical basis for 
questioning the conventional assumption that free riding is always the most rational 
response to a collective action situation, showing instead how it can sometimes be 
instrumentally rational to participate even in the largest of groups. In fact, the second half 
of Tuck’s book reviews the extended intellectual history of collective action problems, 
demonstrating how prior to the mid-20th century the inclination toward free riding was 
viewed as a decidedly irrational response to these situations.34  
                                                
34 As an example, Tuck characterizes David Hume’s position on collective action problems as follows: 
“Psychological features, such as the propensity to think about short term outcomes, or a general ignorance 
of the instrumental point of collaboration, might induce people not to cooperate, but this (though 
understandable, and predictable on Hume’s account of human character) was an error in reasoning” (Tuck 
2008, 126, emphasis added). 
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In the individual turnout calculus, therefore, it may in fact make more sense—in 
effect be more instrumentally rational—not to discount the expected benefits associated 
with one’s preferred candidate (B) by the chance that one’s vote will be pivotal, but rather 
by the chance that one’s vote will be necessary to the result of an uncertain election, or 
might otherwise contribute to an efficacious set of votes. What then is truly the more 
rational approach, assuming that by rational one means optimally oriented for achieving a 
certain goal? It bears repeating, as Harsanyi indicates, that the designation of rationality 
is at root a normative judgment (Harsanyi 1986, 83; see also Zuckert 1995). Tuck 
likewise asserts that his argument “must be understood as a normative claim, and not at 
all (or at least not much) as a predictive claim about how human beings will as a matter 
of fact behave” (Tuck 2008, 111). Furthermore, pivotal theory sets a normative standard 
for rational behavior that has implications not just for voting, but also for collective 
action problems more generally. It is thus certainly worth questioning whether pivotal 
theory sets the best normative standard for how individuals should behave.  
The standard of pivotal theory eliminates the value of very small effects by 
framing them as negligible and hence inconsequential. In normative terms, however, even 
imperceptible effects can matter greatly to ultimate outcomes. As noted previously, 
Derek Parfit (1984, 70) refers to the devaluing of small effects as a “mistake in moral 
mathematics.” The implications of efficacious set causation for the ethics of 
imperceptible effects may thus apply in many areas beyond voting. For example, this 
discussion may be relevant to the question of whether individuals can rationally justify 
minor contributions to environmental degradation on the basis of negligibility. In contrast 
to pivotal theory, which would endorse what seems like antisocial behavior in such cases, 
the rational standard set by efficacious set causation is more socially oriented, taking into 
account the collective effect of many individual causal acts. As Tuck makes clear, this is 
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not a standard meant to apply regardless of what others are doing; it explicitly accounts 
for the anticipated activity of other individuals (Tuck 2008, 207). In a sense, this echoes 
Grafstein’s (1991) “evidential” theory of turnout described earlier, in which individuals 
base their actions on expectations regarding the behavior of others. It might thus also help 
vindicate the rationality of “everyday Kantianism,” which Elster (1989) criticizes as a 
form of magical thinking. Similarly, it might not be a completely irrational “illusion” to 
incorporate diagnostic contingencies into the causal logic of voting, as Quattrone and 
Tversky (1988) assert.  
The movement away from pivotal theory can also be seen as part of a larger shift 
in recent scholarship away from conventional rational choice theory, and toward what 
Pildes and Anderson (1990, 2214) call, “a socially-situated understanding of individual 
and collective rationality” (see also Monroe 2001). Proponents of this shift have argued 
that theories of rationality have real-world implications, as normative standards for 
rational choice can have practical effects on how people behave. Pildes and Anderson 
thus suggest that academic adherence to conventional rational choice theory “might 
promote resignation, complacency, or at worst, a longing for antidemocratic politics” 
(2214). Similarly, Lars Udehn argues that the economic approach to collective action 
influences public attitudes, stating that “people become more egoistic by being told that 
this is what they are” (Udehn 1996, 194). Tuck himself reaches the identical conclusion, 
asserting that “the prevalence in modern economics and political science of the idea that 
it is not instrumentally rational to collaborate in large groups may well have led people to 
adjust their conduct accordingly” (Tuck 2008, 115).35  
                                                
35 In addition, at least two experimental studies have found that exposure to pivotal voting theory leads to 
more negative attitudes toward participating in elections (Brunk 1980; Blais & Young 1999). Blais & 
Young find that such exposure reduces actual turnout among college students.  
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It may therefore be especially troubling when prominent economists or 
economically oriented political scientists cite pivotal theory as a compelling reason 
against participating in elections. For just a prominent example, the widely-read 
“Freakonomics” column by Stephen Dubner and Steven Levitt in The New York Times 
implies that economists should be embarrassed to be seen in a voting booth, and that the 
reason much of the general public does vote is possibly because “we are just not very 
bright and therefore wrongly believe that our votes will affect the outcome” (Dubner and 
Levitt 2005). Similarly, the following exchange took place just before the 2012 
presidential election on Dubner and Levitt’s radio program: 
Dubner: So Levitt, how can you...tell the difference between a smart 
person and a not so smart person?  
Levitt: Well, one good indicator of a person who’s not so smart is if they 
vote in a presidential election because they think their vote might actually 
decide who wins (Dubner and Levitt 2012).36 
The theory of efficacious set causation provides an effective counterpoint to such 
encouragement of abstention, setting what is arguably a better normative standard of 
rationality, not only for participating in elections, but for contributing to collective action 
more generally. Moreover, beyond these broad normative implications, this new 
interpretation of how individual votes contribute to electoral outcomes has important 
consequences for how particular theories of democracy are translated into electoral 
institutions, as discussed next.  
                                                
36 See also the pre-election blog posts in support of Dubner and Levitt’s position by Phil Arena (2012), and 
Kindred Winecoff (2012); but see the response to Dubner and Levitt by Andrew Gelman (2012), citing his 
work with Edlin and Kaplan explaining that voting can be rational if one assumes an altruistic 
interpretation of B in the calculus (Edlin et al. 2008). The B-based explanation of the paradox is not 
inconsistent with the p-based resolution proposed here, but note that the logic of efficacious set causation 
could apply even with purely self-interested preferences.   
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6) IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTION LAW AND POLICY 
 As noted in the introduction, design choices for electoral institutions are linked to 
core principles in democratic theory, as election laws and policies reify interpretations of 
democracy in particular legal and administrative contexts. Two areas in which this 
practical implementation of democratic ideals may take place are discussed in this 
section, the first relating to participatory democratic theory, and the second relating to 
competitive theory. Without deeply engaging the extensive literature in these wide-
ranging schools of democratic thought, it is possible to outline how the interpretation of 
individual causation in voting reflects on “the law of democracy”37 and its institutional 
manifestations from the broad perspectives of these two theoretical approaches. 
The paradox of turnout that emerges from pivotal voting theory represents a 
serious challenge to participatory theories of democracy, with potentially important 
consequences for how elections are structured. To begin, McCaffery, Crigler, and Just, in 
discussing the prospects for electoral reform in the United States, seem largely dismissive 
of the possibility for major reforms based in participatory theory, concluding that 
“Downs’s paradox lives” (McCafferey et al. 2004b, 232). When individual votes are 
viewed as only infinitesimally likely to have a causal effect on the outcome, it is 
presumably more difficult to endorse a position in democratic theory that places a high 
value on participation. Consequently, the new interpretation of p offers needed support to 
participatory theory, and it provides a stronger foundation for electoral reforms based in 
this school of democracy. 
                                                
37 The term is borrowed from the title of the noted election law casebook by Issacharoff, Pildes, Karlan, 
and Persily (2016).  
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Strengthening the theoretical foundations of participatory democracy could thus 
provide guidance in analyzing election law cases of the type Daniel Tokaji calls the “new 
vote denial,” which assess the constitutional validity of various administrative burdens on 
casting a vote (Tokaji 2006).38 The issue of voter identification has become a flashpoint 
for debate in this area, though many other administrative procedures are also implicated, 
including registration requirements, provisions for absentee or early voting, and various 
other voting regulations and polling practices. As mentioned in this chapter’s 
introduction, while there is a general consensus that courts need better theoretical 
guidance for analyzing and deciding these cases, there remains disagreement as to what 
exactly that guidance should entail. The perhaps dominant approach traces to the work of 
Issacharoff and Pildes (1998) advocating a turn to “structuralism” in election law. 
Structuralists argue that burdens on the right to vote should not be analyzed through the 
conventional individual rights and equal protection modes of analysis, which involve 
balancing the rights of individuals against state interests served by burdensome election 
regulations. Instead, structuralists argue that courts should assess the aggregate effects of 
these regulations across population groups (Elmendorf 2008; Overton 2007), shifting the 
analytical focus to the “structural mechanisms for monitoring the proper operation of a 
constitutionalized system of representative democracy” (Gardner 2010, 457; see also 
Stephanopoulos 2014).39  
                                                
38 For Tokaji, who builds upon on a voting rights typology originally proposed by Pamela Karlan (1993), 
the “new” vote denial cases signal a return to the jurisprudence of participation that characterized the early 
voting rights cases, before a shift toward aggregative interests emerged in later cases alleging collective 
vote dilution rather than individual vote denial (Tokaji 2006, 692, n. 15). More recent cases, like those 
concerning voter identification, are thus seen as returning the focus to the individual participatory interest 
in casting a ballot, as opposed to the emphasis on group interests implicated in earlier challenges to 
methods of aggregation in electoral districts (718).  
39 Stephanopoulos’ theory of representational “alignment” between the preferences of the median voter and 
the election outcome can be associated with participatory theory to the extent that his approach is 
concerned with electoral regulations causing a divergence between the actual and the eligible median voter 
(Stephanopoulos 2014, 325). Likewise, one might worry that interpreting p in terms of pivotal theory 
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Other scholars, however, continue to endorse the traditional individual rights and 
equal protection analysis (Hasen 2003, 139), and particularly for deciding cases of vote 
denial (Fishkin 2011). In his extensive treatment of the theoretical foundations of voting 
rights, Joseph Fishkin sets forth requirements for deciding these cases: 
This enterprise demands a more carefully specified account of why, and in 
what way, the individual right to vote matters…. To distinguish more 
severe burdens from less severe ones, and to develop precedents for 
deciding when such burdens outweigh state interests, courts will need to 
make at least implicit use of a theory of vote denial: a theory that tells us 
in what way(s) disenfranchisement harms individuals (Fishkin 2011, 
1332). 
Fishkin associates rational choice theory generally with the structuralist approach, 
pointing out the challenge pivotal theory poses to an individual rights analysis (1333). 
The practical significance of this point is well illustrated by the appellate court decision 
of Judge Richard Posner in the voter ID case ultimately decided by the Supreme Court, 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.40 In finding that the State of Indiana’s 
photo-identification requirement did not impose an impermissible burden on the 
constitutional right to vote, Judge Posner writes, “The benefits of voting to an individual 
voter are elusive,” parenthetically adding that “a vote in a political election rarely has any 
instrumental value, since elections for political office at the state or federal level are 
                                                                                                                                            
affects turnout decisions in a way that causes such divergence. Stephanopoulos indicates that participation 
is a structural value (297); however, it can also be relevant to an individual rights approach, for as Farber 
(2004) indicates, structural and individual rights concerns are often implicated simultaneously. Note that 
the pivotal situation associated with the vote choice of the median voter, which emerges from the 
arrangement of individual preferences in relation to candidate positions, is different from the pivotal 
situation in the turnout decision. In the turnout decision, as indicated, no one individual can ever be solely 
pivotal, but in the context of vote choice, the one pivotal voter with median preferences can be precisely 
identified, at least in theory.  
40 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
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never decided by just one vote.” Judge Posner then proceeds with a structural analysis of 
the case, reasoning that “the fewer the people harmed by a law, the less total harm there 
is to balance against whatever benefits the law might confer.”41 Fishkin criticizes this 
structuralist reasoning, maintaining that the right to vote should be enforced more strictly 
at the individual level in cases alleging vote denial. He thus articulates a detailed 
normative argument—based in the historical development of conceptions of equal 
citizenship and a resulting “dignitary harm” in disenfranchisement—that a voting 
regulation could be unconstitutional even if it unduly burdens only one potential voter 
(Fishkin 2011, 1296, 1357).  
Fishkin makes a forceful argument, but the logic of efficacious set causation 
provides an additional—and arguably more fundamental—basis for valuing and 
protecting the individual interest in casting a vote. Moreover, this new interpretation of p 
shows that the rational choice approach need not lead inexorably to a purely structuralist 
theory of voting rights.42 The strengthening of participatory theory that emerges from the 
rejection of pivotal theory provides a straightforward justification for stricter scrutiny of 
regulations that potentially infringe on the right to vote at the individual level. Individual 
votes can and do have instrumental effects on election outcomes, and they should be 
deserving of protection on this basis alone. This does not mean that instrumental 
                                                
41 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 472 F. 3d 949, 951-952 (7th Cir. 2007). In affirming Judge 
Posner’s decision, the Supreme Court in Crawford (2008) utilized mainly the traditional individual rights 
versus state interests balancing test, although the majority opinion also invoked elements of structural 
analysis by questioning the overall number of individuals who would be affected by Indiana’s voter ID law 
(see Fishkin 2011, 1330). Judge Posner has since appeared to repudiate the result of his 2007 opinion 
upholding Indiana’s ID law (see Schwartz 2013), but there is nothing indicating his disavowal of the 
structuralist approach or the principles of pivotal theory (see Bauer 2013; also see Judge Posner’s dissent 
from denial of en banc rehearing in Frank v. Walker WL 5326463 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
42 Fishkin cites Judge Posner’s dismissive attitude toward voting costs—holding that potential voters who 
fail to clear administrative hurdles in the voting process simply “disenfranchise themselves”—as typical of 
the rational choice voting model (Fishkin 2011, 1337). However, it may in fact be unnecessary to assume 
that a rational choice approach inevitably supports what Fishkin calls the “formal” conception of the right 
to vote expressed by Judge Posner, as opposed to the more “substantive” conception advocated by Fishkin. 
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motivations are sufficient to fully embody the individual interest in voting, as expressive 
motivations might conceivably predominate, even in highly competitive elections. 
However, there is no reason to assume that instrumental rationality is wholly antagonistic 
to the participatory approach of individual rights protection, so it seems less necessary to 
resort to Fishkin’s conception of dignitary harm to justify more rigorous protection of the 
right to vote at the individual level. Voters need no longer be viewed as “little more than 
worker bees” (Gardner 2010, 462), but can instead claim their fair share of democratic 
sovereignty as bearers of authentic agency and influence over the outcomes of elections. 
It accordingly becomes more difficult to maintain the view that voting rights do not merit 
robust protection at the individual level. 
The second area of law and policy relevance relates to the competitive school of 
democracy. Competitive theory is often identified with the minimalist approach of Joseph 
Schumpeter, who famously held that elections are merely officially sanctioned 
competitions for power and authority, and democracy is essentially just a non-violent 
mechanism for resolving the practical problem of who should govern (Schumpeter [1942] 
2003). However, Schumpeter’s minimalism is given added substance in the work of more 
recent competitive theorists like Ian Shapiro, who holds up Schumpeterian competition as 
a model for structuring political institutions in a way that limits forms of domination—
hardly a minimalist enterprise (see Shapiro 2003, 51).43  
The new interpretation of p is naturally in harmony with competitive theory 
insofar as individual votes become more likely to form part of an efficacious set as 
                                                
43 It is often assumed that competitive theory is fundamentally inconsistent with participatory theory. This 
assumption is based on the work of early competitive theorists like Schumpeter, who clearly seemed quite 
cynical about the value of mass participation (see Fishkin 2009, 69; see also McCafferey et al. 2004a, 9-
11). However, under an updated interpretation of competitive theory—like Shapiro’s—these two 
approaches to democracy are not necessarily inconsistent, and a joining of the participatory and competitive 
strands of theory may in fact be perfectly coherent. 
  61 
elections become more competitive. When potential voters perceive a race as clearly 
uncompetitive, although many voters on the expected winning side could still have 
instrumental reasons to participate, those on the prospective losing side might see 
themselves as effectively disenfranchised, with their votes again becoming as 
instrumentally useless as under pivotal theory.44 This, to an extent, is perhaps 
unavoidable in a majoritarian electoral system; nevertheless, the new interpretation of p 
draws attention to reforms designed to ensure that more elections feature true 
competition, so greater numbers of prospective voters face a high ex ante likelihood of 
having an instrumental effect on the outcome. Empirical evidence is largely consistent 
with the prediction that individuals are more likely to vote when elections are perceived 
as competitive (Blais 2000, 60; Blais 2006, 119).45 The value of competition, however, 
involves more than just voter turnout at the individual or aggregate levels; it entails a 
structural concern with democracy. This is the central point of Issacharoff and Pildes 
(1998), who argue that representational democracy requires robust competition, and 
courts should intervene when necessary to “destabilize partisan lockups” of the 
                                                
44 Justin Buchler contests the value of competition in democratic elections, and one of his primary 
arguments is that closer elections yield less “representative” government, since they result in larger 
numbers of individuals in the minority who voted on the losing side of the election (Buchler 2011, 26). 
However, the situation of voters who end up on the losing side of a fairly close election does not seem akin 
to disenfranchisement, since these voters had a chance at winning, but simply failed to reach a majority (or 
plurality). On the other hand, when ex ante it’s clear that one’s preference has no hope at all of winning, it 
arguably is more problematic from a perspective of representational theory, because it appears to be—if not 
an actual disenfranchisement—at least a clear case of disempowerment. The theoretical value of 
competition under majoritarian (and primarily two-party) democracy thus seems tied to how it ensures a 
realistic chance that one’s preference might prevail, which of course provides the chance to gain power at 
some point over the longer term, and not remain a permanent minority.   
45 Blais’s 2006 study is based on a meta-analysis of 32 previous studies, 27 of which found a causal 
relationship between closeness and turnout. Blais comments on the relationship as follows: “This is the 
most firmly established result in the literature. I cannot see how this finding could be wrong” (Blais 2006, 
119).  But see Cann and Cole (2011), finding that the increase in turnout in competitive states during U.S. 
presidential elections is not a direct result of competition, but rather reflects mobilization effects. Cann and 
Cole attribute the apparent lack of a direct turnout effect to the workings of pivotal theory (351), but it 
might instead point to the predominance of non-instrumental motivations for voting.     
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democratic process. The structuralist approach of competitive theory is thus particularly 
appropriate for analyzing cases that allege unfair partisan gerrymanders of legislative 
districts.46 
This is another area where scholars see a need for greater clarity on foundational 
democratic theory in order to better guide law and policy (see e.g. Ortiz 2004). The 
Supreme Court has held that allegations of partisan gerrymanders are justiciable (Davis v. 
Bandemer),47 and that excessive partisanship in drawing congressional districts can be 
unconstitutional (Vieth v. Jubelirer),48 but the Court has been unable, or unwilling, to 
formulate a standard for when a particular districting scheme should be struck down (see 
Berman 2005).49 Issacharoff has taken the lead in employing competitive theory to argue 
that partisan gerrymandering should be prohibited, and he advocates a bright line rule that 
would mandate institutionalized non-partisanship in the drawing of districts (Issacharoff 
2002). In his words, the harm of gerrymandering is that it results in a “constriction of the 
competitive processes by which voters can express choice” (600). Similarly, Pildes writes 
of how “the constitutional violation [of partisan gerrymandering] lies in the structural 
harm to representative self-government” (Pildes 2006a, 271).50 The essential principle 
                                                
46 Note that even Joseph Fishkin endorses the use of structural analysis for deciding cases where the 
aggregate effects of electoral law and policy transcend individual interests, like cases of gerrymandering 
and vote dilution (Fishkin 2011, 1305; Fishkin 2012, 1893; see also Charles 2007, 651). 
47 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
48 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
49 Although the Court has criticized partisan gerrymandering for violating principles of fairness and 
equality, it does not appear to have specifically embraced a democratic value of competition (see 
Stephanopoulos 2013, 677).  
50 Nathaniel Persily argues that a concern for competition seems more fitting to an individual rights than a 
structuralist approach, since lack of competition reduces the chance that an individual might cast a “tie-
breaking vote that will decide the election” (Persily 2002, 678 n. 98). This is conceptually problematic, 
since the chance of casting a pivotal vote in a very large election is essentially zero even with perfect 
competition. In any event, the theory of efficacious set causation arguably reflects a more structural 
perspective on competition, since individuals look to the chance that their one vote will be aggregated into 
a larger set of winning votes, as opposed to calculating whether their vote might prove individually 
decisive. 
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states that if citizens are to fully exercise their democratic authority as collective 
sovereigns, they should have some realistic chance at electing their preferred 
representatives, which (at minimum) implies the existence of competitive elections. 
Interpreting p in terms of efficacious set causation, which allows levels of competition to 
produce meaningful variation in the instrumental motivation for voting, thus helps 
reinforce opposition to partisan gerrymanders from a structuralist perspective.  
This is not to argue that increasing competition should be the only—or even 
necessarily the overriding—factor in drawing districts, but it strongly supports the notion 
that competitive theory is worthy of increased doctrinal emphasis. The problem of 
gerrymandering is complex and contentious, both normatively and empirically. 
Nevertheless, the theory of efficacious set causation provides encouragement to 
arguments for judicial intervention to ensure that districts are not intentionally and 
systematically drawn to be clearly uncompetitive. More substantively perhaps, this new 
understanding of how individual votes contribute to electoral outcomes might support 
arguments for laws requiring districting schemes that aim to intentionally increase 
competition, at least to the extent consistent with other representational values. Moreover, 
the proposed model for interpreting p implies that districts need not be drawn that highly 
competitively in order to provide an instrumental motivation for voting, but rather just 
enough to ensure that prospective voters on the more likely losing side perceive a 
“realistic” possibility of prevailing.51  
  
                                                
51 The competitive aspect of this new interpretation of p could also have implications for thinking about 
U.S. presidential elections. While the Electoral College leads to competition being concentrated in only a 
few “swing” states, a national popular vote would distribute competition more widely, at least when the 
race is relatively close at the national level. Like partisan gerrymandering, however, the Electoral College 
raises complex issues beyond the current scope, and while it may be problematic from the perspective of 
competition, it may (or may not) serve other important purposes. 
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7) CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described and developed an arguably more plausible and 
normatively superior alternative to the conventional interpretation of p in the rational 
choice calculus of voter turnout. The theory of efficacious set causation, based on the 
pioneering work of Richard Tuck, provides an instrumentally rational justification for 
individuals to participate in large elections, credibly resolving the so-called paradox of 
voter turnout. Rejecting pivotal voting theory and restoring the potential for instrumental 
value in voting has been shown to have major normative implications for the rationality 
of participating in elections and collective action efforts more generally. The new 
interpretation of p also provides support to arguments from participatory democratic 
theory calling for stricter judicial scrutiny of procedural burdens on the individual right to 
vote, and it can contribute as well to a proposed jurisprudence of partisan gerrymandering 
based in competitive democratic theory.  
Nonetheless, this chapter potentially just scratches the surface of the deeper 
significance of this transformational approach to voting and other collective action 
situations. This work is intended to form part of the broader ongoing critique of rational 
choice theory, even though this work employs that theory’s own terms in the turnout 
calculus, and it aims at redefining the meaning of rational choice rather than supplanting 
the theory entirely. Hopefully, this might contribute to progress in the wider debate on the 
nature of rationality while at the same time helping to define a better conceptual 
framework for the motivating factors of voter turnout. As stated previously, the argument 
here is not meant to imply that turnout is ever fully explained by instrumental 
motivations. Individuals may also derive significant expressive, or otherwise non-
instrumental benefits from participating in elections, as represented by the D term of the 
calculus, and furthermore, p may often still be equal to zero even under this new 
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interpretation. The objective here has been merely to rescue instrumental motivations 
from the theoretical abyss created by the counterfactual causal logic of pivotal voting 
theory. Much more analysis is needed to parse the distinctions between instrumental and 
expressive motivations in theory and in practice, as discussed in the following chapters. 
The argument of this chapter could provide a provocation to empirical research, 
as the theoretical model described above leads to specific hypotheses about voting 
behavior that could be tested to confirm or deny the theory’s validity. First is the basic 
question of whether individuals ordinarily (or ever) think in terms of efficacious set 
causation when (or if) they consider the chance that their vote will affect an election 
outcome, or whether they more commonly think in terms of pivotal theory. Furthermore, 
if individuals do think in terms of efficacious set causation, they may or may not assign 
greater instrumental value to being on the winning side of an election, as predicted by 
Tuck’s theory of bandwagon incentives.52 In addition, pivotal theory predicts an 
“underdog effect” due to the strategic context of a majoritarian election, with higher 
turnout among the prospective minority than those expecting to be in the majority (see 
e.g. Levine and Palfrey 2007; Morton and Tyran 2012).53 In contrast, the theory of 
efficacious set causation predicts that voters on the prospective winning side will overall 
have more motivation to participate, although in close elections the incentive could be 
                                                
52 For a possible confirmation of Tuck’s theory, see Howell and Justwan (2013), who unexpectedly find 
that among those on the losing side after an election, satisfaction with the democratic system is unaffected 
by the electoral margin, while satisfaction among those on the winning side decreases for wider margins. 
This is perhaps consistent with the logic of efficacious set causation and bandwagon effects, since on the 
losing side, where the ex post probability of having been in the efficacious set is always zero, the margin of 
victory should be irrelevant, while on the winning side, where that probability is almost 1 for very close 
elections and then decreases gradually, margins of victory should matter more.      
53 Given costly voting, in equilibrium prospective voters on the expected winning side reduce their 
likelihood of participation, while those on the expected losing side increase their likelihood (see Morton 
and Tyran 2012, 10). Mackie indicates that his theory of the mandate value of voting also predicts that 
voters on the prospective losing side will be more likely to participate (Mackie 2014, 66); however, it is not 
clear why voters on the prospective winning side might not be equally motivated to increase the perceived 
mandate of their party or candidate.    
  66 
somewhat higher for those deemed (slightly) more likely to lose, given that p equals one 
for those prospective voters. This also raises questions about the existence, and typical 
locations, of the hypothesized discontinuities in the proposed model for calculating the 
value of p, as well as more basic questions about how different values of p might be 
perceived and acted upon in practice. 
Beyond these empirical issues, however, the normative and policy implications of 
this chapter are important on their own. Moreover, as noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, the interpretation of p affects how the other elements of the voting calculus are 
interpreted, and this new understanding of how individual votes contribute to election 
outcomes thus paves the way for a wider research agenda that better accounts for the 
varying individual and institutional factors that influence voter turnout. Fundamentally, 
the conception of the role of an individual voter in a large election is an essential element 
of democratic meaning under modern conditions of mass representation. This work aims 
to defend the much-maligned value of electoral participation under these conditions, and 
to thereby assist in development of the critical links between the theories and practices of 







 Chapter Two: The Ethics of Rational Choice and the Instrumental 
Benefits of Voting  
 “To vote or not to vote is all the same.”  
–John-Paul Sartre (1977, 209) 
 
“Perhaps some degree of suffering is ineradicable from human life, perhaps the 
choice before man is always a choice of evils…” 
–George Orwell (2000 [1944], 244) 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
What good is voting? More formally, what are the individual-level expected 
benefits of participating in elections for democratic representation? This is a complex 
question fraught with both empirical and normative difficulties. From an empirical 
perspective, there is enormous potential variation in the perceived (ex ante) utility of 
voting. In any given election, some individuals might attach momentous value to the 
outcome and expect a potentially high benefit from participating, while others could 
believe the outcome matters little or not at all, leaving them with no instrumental 
motivation for participating. The nature of the electoral office at stake is another possible 
source of variation, as an individual who anticipates a potential benefit from the outcome 
of a high-profile contest might see little or no value to voting in a race further down the 
ballot. More broadly, the perceived utility of voting may also be related to the 
institutional context of democratic representation, including factors such as electoral 
system design, the structure of party competition, and ballot access rules. Furthermore, 
prevailing political conditions and even general cultural trends can influence how the 





to clarify exactly what it means to empirically inquire into the prospective benefits of 
electoral participation. 
The difficulties are only compounded in seeking a conceptual grasp on the 
benefits of voting from the perspective of normative democratic theory. There is 
fundamental disagreement and even confusion about the value of participating in the 
mass elections of modern democracies. What is truly at stake in these formalized 
mechanisms for choosing political representatives? Do elections in fact embody forces of 
momentous weight involving the coercive power of the state and the management of 
potentially violent social conflict (e.g. Adams 2009)? Or are elections in fact more often a 
form of political theatre characterized by illusion and misdirection, with the ballot 
serving as a weak and effectively worthless gesture toward the ideal of popular 
sovereignty, working to conceal the true governing power that resides beyond democratic 
control (e.g. Crouch 2004)?1 Particularly given the political consequences of rising 
economic inequality in the United States, some democratic critics have come to see 
elections in this country as “essentially a sideshow with policy manufactured elsewhere” 
(Erikson 2015, 24). Regardless of which of these characterizations comes closer to the 
truth, this inquiry points toward a more basic question in analyzing the benefits of 
participating in elections: What are the normative foundations for ascriptions of value in 
the act of voting?  
Modern democracies provide many different avenues for political participation, 
and assessments of the efficacy of voting relative to other means of engagement can 
affect evaluations of voting’s benefits. Participatory theorists, who might be expected to 
lend support to the potentially widespread act of voting, may instead exhibit skepticism 
                                                
1 See also Fenster’s (2005, 374) description of Murray Edelman’s view that “politics doesn’t matter, since 
the state, captured by a small set of interests, persuades its citizens of its value through the management and 





about the value of mere participation in elections without a broader base of democratic 
engagement (e.g. Pateman 1970). Similarly, deliberative theorists may tend to view 
electoral choices as insufficiently reasoned and thus inadequate as a basis for legitimate 
democratic decision-making (e.g. Fishkin 2009). On the other hand, some democratic 
theorists emphasize how choices of political representation may in fact have hugely 
important practical consequences (e.g. Beerbohm 2012). At the minimum, elections can 
be seen as non-violent means of resolving the struggle for political power (Schumpeter 
2003 [1942]), which implies that the outcomes of these competitions for authority and 
leadership may carry significant potential for benefit or harm. More expansively, the idea 
exemplified by the common political refrain that “elections matter” reflects a belief that 
there are important public policy implications associated with participation in elections 
(e.g. Hill and Leighley 1992). The potential utility—or disutility—that may be brought 
about through voting could thus be quite high, not only at the individual level, but also 
for groups, societies, and possibly even the entire planet. From this perspective, it 
becomes clear that profound moral issues may be implicated in voting decisions. 
Normative political theorists may therefore choose to emphasize how voters should 
exercise due care and caution in their decision-making given the gravity of the potential 
consequences of electoral outcomes (e.g. Brennan 2011a). The perceived benefits of 
voting are thus intimately entwined with ideals of popular sovereignty and conceptions of 
democratic ethics, and with issues relating to how these ideals and ethics are 
implemented in practice. 
To aid in addressing these challenges, this work focuses on contemporary 
American elections. This designates a context of majoritarian institutions and primarily 
two-party politics, regulated under particular legal-administrative regimes, having a 





with significant decentralization of governing authority. The limitation to American 
elections obviously still leaves room for enormous variation in the perceived benefits of 
voting, but this provides at least some boundaries to the inquiry. The remaining 
complexity is addressed by employing the framework of the rational choice calculus of 
voter turnout (pB – C + D) to model the individual decision to vote or abstain in a 
particular election. This allows for conceptually isolating the expected instrumental 
utility of voting (B) from other factors that may influence turnout decisions, and it 
thereby provides a foundation for classifying various attitudes toward the value of voting 
and assessing the primary motivations for participation or abstention.  
The issues raised by this exploration of the benefits of voting are vital to both 
democratic theory and practice. To be clear, this approach does not directly address 
fundamental disagreements about democratic meaning, although it does formulate an 
analysis and argument that may be more relevant under certain theoretical approaches, as 
discussed below. More broadly, this work interrogates some of the prevailing ideas and 
assumptions about the instrumental value of voting, and it suggests a new interpretive 
focus that may yield important insights into how and why individuals decide to vote or 
abstain. This approach will be shown to have practical significance not only for turnout 
decisions, but also for vote choice, as well as potentially broad policy implications for the 
institutional structure of elections. Distinguishing and clarifying the expected 
instrumental benefits of voting is thus a crucial part of assessing the general motivations 
behind voter turnout. Furthermore, by paving the way for studying expressive (or 
otherwise non-instrumental) benefits, as well as the costs of electoral participation, this 
work forms a key portion of a more expansive critical evaluation of the theory and 





Section 2 introduces and explicates the B term of the turnout calculus and reviews 
some of the main ways it has been construed in the normative and empirical literature on 
voting. Section 3 outlines the new interpretative focus for the instrumental value of 
voting through a classification and analysis of three primary attitudinal motivations 
behind B-related abstention: indifference, alienation, and ambivalence. True instrumental 
indifference is most commonly associated with lack of information about the options on 
the ballot. The motivations behind alienation are more complex, and this section first 
distinguishes between expressive alienation and its instrumental consequences in creating 
functional indifference, which leads to discussion of both the rationality and the ethics of 
voting for lesser evils, and the possibility of a moral obligation to participate even under 
conditions of extreme alienation. This section continues by exploring the problems of 
ambivalence in the face of conflicting political ideals or motivations, focusing on the 
ethical dilemmas that arise when elections pose particularly hard choices, whether 
between perceived goods, perceived evils, or between instrumental motivations to vote 
and expressive reasons to abstain. Section 4 then discusses some implications for election 
law and policy in addressing the attitudes that lead to B-based abstention, while Section 5 
summarizes and concludes with some thoughts on the potential value of voting even in an 
admittedly imperfect political system. 
 
2) ASSESSING THE INSTRUMENTAL BENEFITS OF VOTING 
In the rational choice calculus of voter turnout, B represents the utility that a 
potential voter may expect to gain if the individual’s preferred candidate should win the 
election. In their canonical work formalizing the turnout calculus, William Riker and 





logical distinction between expected utility (or disutility) that is dependent on the result 
of the election, and any expected utility that may subsist in the act of voting independent 
of the outcome (Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 27). This is the foundation for conceptually 
isolating the instrumental benefits of voting—represented by B—from what are typically 
termed expressive benefits—represented by D, as well as from the costs of voting, 
represented by C.2  
Anthony Downs initially formulated the benefits of voting as the “expected party 
differential,” defined as the prospective voter’s expectation of difference in utility 
between the candidates in a two-party system (Downs 1957a, 39). Downs’ detailed 
explanation of how to compute this differential drifts into complexities, but his 
fundamental point is a simple one: In determining the benefits of voting, a rational 
decision involves two discrete utility calculations, as prospective voters must separately 
predict the benefits they expect to derive from each party in order to assess the difference. 
The turnout decision is thus modeled not simply as an assessment of expected utility from 
one’s preferred party prevailing in the election; rather, the decision also requires 
assessing one’s utility should the other party win. Calculating the benefits of voting thus 
always involves a comparison of (at least) two options, and B in fact represents an 
expectation regarding relative rather than absolute utility. The implications of this are 
explored further below, but for now, an arithmetic consequence of this notion is as 
follows: Note that since the value of B results from a subtraction of two utilities, the 
result will be positive even when the two utilities are negative (i.e., disutilities). In other 
words, even if a prospective voter happens to deeply detest each of the candidates in a 
                                                
2 Riker and Ordeshook note that in theory there may also be instrumental costs, or costs that are dependent 
on the outcome, which should therefore also be multiplied by p. As an example they point to the possibility 
that an employee may expect to suffer increased reprisal from an employer as a result of a closer election 
outcome (27). They opt to ignore these types of costs due to their presumed idiosyncrasy, but in any event 





two-person race, there could still be an instrumental benefit to voting if the aversion 
toward one candidate is significantly less than the other. 
For several possible reasons, there appears to have been much less attention in the 
voting literature to B than to the other elements of the calculus. The most prominent 
reason is presumably the alleged discounting effect of p, which represents the probability 
that an individual vote is expected to causally influence the election outcome. The value 
of p is conventionally interpreted as so vanishingly small that multiplying it by B 
effectively reduces pB to zero regardless of how important the result of an election might 
be to an individual. This is the basis of the so-called paradox of voter turnout, which 
underlies the commonly held belief that voting in a large election with the goal of 
affecting the outcome is never rational, since the instrumental benefits of participation are 
always essentially nil (e.g. Owen and Grofman 1984; Aldrich 1997, 378). Yet another 
reason for the lack of attention to B may be that its assessment is highly subjective, with 
no clear way to objectively determine what its value is, much less what it should be.3 
Furthermore, questions of how political parties or elected officials are viewed as 
providing varying benefits—whether in the form of private or public goods—raise 
contentious normative problems, in addition to being difficult to measure empirically. For 
these and perhaps other reasons, as Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler (2014, 123) state, 
“Discussions of benefits as integral to the decision to vote are few.” 
When a value for B is required for an analysis using the voting calculus, studies in 
both decision and game theory may normalize the benefit of voting to provide a utility of 
1, with losing providing 0 utility (Aldrich 1993, 247-248; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985, 
                                                
3 Contrast this with p and C, both of which are at least amenable to objective evaluation, although in 
practice of course there may be wide variation in how they are subjectively perceived. Valuation of the D 
term is presumably also highly subjective, but it has received greater attention since expressive benefits are 





63-65). This methodological assumption, while technically useful, obviously does little to 
exemplify the differing strengths of preferences for candidates as actually experienced by 
voters. A similar problem arises with empirical specifications like that of André Blais, 
who uses survey responses on the perceived importance of election outcomes to estimate 
a value for B within a fixed scale (Blais 2000, 73-77; see also Blais et al. 2000, 185-186). 
This modeling of B is useful in showing how relative differences in the perceptions of 
voting’s benefits may affect the turnout decision, but it provides a very limited range for 
assessing perceptions of the substantive benefits of having one’s preferred candidate 
prevail in a specific election.  
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1984) provide a more illustrative 
evaluation of B by allowing it to range as a monetary sum. In an equally divided 
electorate of 100 million voters, they show that given the miniscule value of p, B would 
have to be valued at more than 12 thousand dollars for voting to be instrumentally 
rational, even with only minimal voting costs of 1 dollar. Moreover, as the election 
becomes even slightly less than perfectly competitive, the value of B required to balance 
out even 1 dollar in costs quickly becomes astronomical (Brennan and Buchanan 1984, 
190). For an average congressional district, similar calculations show that even in a race 
deemed “too close to call,” the value of B would need to be over 1 million dollars for the 
calculus to yield a positive result, which is said to provide conclusive evidence that 
participating is never instrumentally rational (Lomasky and Brennan 2000, 66-67). 
However, it remains difficult to draw reliable conclusions about actual B-based 
decision-making based on these types calculations. Perhaps average voters might actually 





higher?4 This question reflects the deeper normative difficulty involved in interpreting B, 
having to do with how people perceive the role of government and its value to them in a 
broader sense, in addition to judgments about the particular political system in place at 
the moment. From a perspective of normative democratic theory, the instrumental 
benefits of voting are often assumed to be quite low. Going back at least to Robert 
Michels (2001 [1911]), many political theorists have expressed skepticism regarding the 
benefits of voting under conditions of mass representative democracy. Even theorists of 
participatory democracy, like Carole Pateman (1970), who as indicated might be 
expected to lend support to the practice of participating in elections, have instead often 
seemed to belittle the value of voting. Communitarian theorists, who likewise might 
conceivably value electoral participation as a collectively shared public ritual, and even 
perhaps as a responsibility of democratic citizenship, have instead also seemed generally 
skeptical of the value of voting. Robert Bellah, for example, appears to advocate an 
attitude of instrumental indifference, stating that American political contests exhibit a 
“very tame polarity, because the opponents agree so deeply on most of the terms of the 
problem” (Bellah 1995, 51).  
The recent civic engagement literature has likewise tended to deemphasize voting 
as a valuable form of democratic participation moving forward into the new political 
environment (see e.g. Boyte 2005; Zukin et al. 2006; Deneen 2008). Furthermore, some 
democratic theorists seem to harbor a normative bias against representative forms of 
democracy, which may be seen as distancing citizens from the possibility of genuine self-
government and popular sovereignty. For example, Benjamin Barber appears to justify an 
                                                
4 One might think to look at campaign contributions to provide some context on willingness to pay to elect 
a favored candidate, but contributions provide (or are at least perceived as providing) only a marginal 
increase in the probability of a candidate’s winning, so they might vastly understate the perceived value of 





attitude of alienation from electoral politics, arguing that voting is ineffective when 
citizens must rely on elected representatives in place of enjoying direct participation in 
government (Barber 1984, 171). Similarly, proponents of a deliberative conception of 
democracy, like James Fishkin (2009), also seem to devalue voting in their appeals for 
more thoughtful discussion of political issues than electoral representation generally 
provides (see Mackie 2011; Pennington 2010). Given an apparent deficiency of reasoned 
reflection and debate in electoral politics, these theorists view voting decisions as 
conveying at best vague and ambivalent preferences—or at worst highly irrational and 
potentially prejudiced dispositions. 
In the empirical literature on the calculus, when the perceived benefits of voting 
are evaluated they have generally been found to have a significant effect on the turnout 
decision (Filer and Kenny 1980; Katosh and Traugott 1982; Blais 2000, 43, 143; 
Leighley and Nagler 2014, 134). Nevertheless, the value of B has often been assumed to 
be small and insignificant relative to the other terms of the calculus. For example, John 
Aldrich is frequently cited for the view that the instrumental benefits of voting are 
minimal (Aldrich 1993; 1997). Benjamin Highton likewise states that “there is little 
doubt that for nearly everyone, voting is a low-benefit activity” (Highton 2004, 507). 
Predictions of candidate convergence based on the median voter theorem (Hotelling 
1929; Black 1948), in addition to broad complaints about the lack of political diversity in 
a two-party system—sometimes called “Tweedledee and Tweedeldum” politics—may 
also contribute to estimations of a relatively low value for B in the context of American 
elections. Aldrich thus states, “If there is little difference between the two candidates,” 
the B-term will be relatively small” (Aldrich 1997, 386), further writing that “it is not at 
all clear that people perceive much difference about who wins most elections” (Aldrich 





regard to U.S. federal elections; in state or local elections, where the political stakes may 
be perceived to be much smaller, the value of B might be even lower (Percival et al. 
2007; Blais 2000, 43).5  
Additionally, the conventional empirical finding in the voting literature is that 
higher turnout levels in major U.S. elections would generally not yield significant 
differences in either electoral or policy outcomes (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; 
Bennett and Resnick 1992; Gant and Lyons 1993; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Highton and 
Wolfinger 2001; Sides et al. 2008). This could perhaps be taken to imply that the 
prospective instrumental benefits of participating in these contests would be minimal for 
an individual deciding whether to vote or abstain. However, several other studies 
question the conventional wisdom that turnout doesn’t really matter, instead finding 
evidence that higher levels of participation—particularly by lower socioeconomic 
demographics—would in fact alter political outcomes (Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill et al. 
1995; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Martinez and Gil 2005; Leighley and Nagler 2014). 
Relatedly, the question of whether elected officials are generally responsive to public 
preferences may also be relevant to assessing the benefits of voting. Many studies of this 
issue have documented at least moderate policy responsiveness to the political opinions 
and vote choices of American citizens (Monroe 1979; Monroe 1998; Stimson et al. 1995; 
Martin 2003; Canes-Wrone 2015). At the same time, however, such responsiveness is 
generally shown to be biased against the preferences of nonvoters and lower socio-
                                                
5 On the other hand, one might think that the perceived benefits of voting might be higher in subnational 
elections, since state and local governments could be seen as having more direct effects on a prospective 
voter’s social and economic conditions (see Wood 2002, 228; Anzia 2014, 235 n. 3). Note that when state 
or local elections are held concurrently with federal elections, voting in down-ballot races is effectively 
costless, and participation may therefore be instrumentally rational even with low levels of expected 





economic demographic groups (Schumaker and Getter 1977; Griffin and Newman 2005; 
Gilens 2005; Bartels 2009; Gilens and Page 2014). 
Another important issue in interpreting the value of B is whether to characterize 
the prospective benefits of voting as purely self-interested, or whether broader 
motivations to affect general social welfare should also be considered. By raising the 
possibility of social or altruistic benefits, several scholars have suggested a high value of 
B as a potential solution to the apparent paradox of voter turnout. Riker and Ordeshook in 
fact opened the way for such a B-term solution, suggesting, “It is likely that B is much 
higher for many people than anyone has heretofore supposed” (Riker and Ordeshook 
1968, 39). Howard Margolis (1982) appears to have been the first to offer a detailed 
analysis of how introducing altruism or group-interest to the rational choice model could 
resolve the turnout paradox. In his model, individuals have separate utility functions for 
self-interest and group-interest, and they may therefore act rationally by devoting a share 
of their resources to altruistic goals (Margolis 1982, 38-39). Margolis concedes that in 
terms of self-interested utility the instrumental benefits of voting might not amount to 
more than a few thousand dollars, but he suggests that “the social value of a presidential 
election outcome is easily estimated in the billions.”6 He thus explains that even given a p 
valued at just 1 in 100 million, a B of 1 billion dollars would make voting rational with 
costs under 10 dollars (88-89).  
This approach raises some thorny issues concerning the meaning and motivations 
of rational behavior, echoing debates about the validity of transferring the common 
economic assumption of self-interest into the political arena (see Udehn 1996). Perhaps 
this explains why the B-term solution of Margolis seems for some time to have received 
                                                
6 Margolis supports this conclusion with the fact that one billion dollars represents only a small fraction of 





scant attention in the voting literature. More recent work, however, has revived this 
approach. Like Margolis, Richard Jankowski proposes introducing a separate B to 
represent the expected utility from altruistic concerns with benefiting others, similarly 
demonstrating how it can be instrumentally rational to vote if one believes that one’s 
preferred candidate will provide one billion dollars in collective or group benefits 
(Jankowski 2002, 64). Likewise, Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan utilize 
a social benefit model to show how voting in a relatively close election can be rational 
given the assumption that one’s preferred candidate will provide a benefit of only ten 
dollars per citizen (Edlin et al. 2008, 297; but see Brennan 2011a, 19-20). Concluding 
that participating in large elections is rational only “to the extent that voters are not 
selfish,” Edlin et al. also point out that the empirical literature on voting motivations is 
consistent with a social benefit explanation, given the strong evidence for “sociotropic” 
considerations in vote choices (Edlin et al. 2008, 304-305).7 James Fowler adds 
experimental evidence for the proposition that altruistic concern for the well being of 
others is a primary motivation in turnout decisions (Fowler 2006).  
Furthermore, from a normative perspective, David Estlund forcefully argues that 
voting should always be motivated by sociotropic concerns, indicating that “to the extent 
that voters…address only their own interests, the method of social choice is less than 
fully democratic” (Estlund 1990, 423). It may thus be quite reasonable to view the 
potential benefits of voting as exceedingly high. Simply put, individuals can have reasons 
to care deeply about electoral outcomes, and they may accordingly place a very high 
value on B in the calculus. As indicated, this perspective tends to highlight the profound 
                                                
7 Paul Meehl introduced the term “sociotropic” to designate the attitude of “taking some account…of other 
persons’ interests or…the collective’s interest (Meehl 1977, 14).” Although evidence of sociotropic 
considerations in vote choices does not necessarily prove a lack of selfish motivations (Kinder and Kiewiet 
1981, 132), it is today accepted even by the most economically-oriented theorists that voters are typically 





ethical issues that are involved in democratic elections, which legitimize the coercive 
power of the state and its legal monopoly on violence. An election may in fact be seen as 
“a form of ritualized, non-violent combat” (Adams 2009, 120), with the act of voting 
itself characterized as part of a coercive process in which democratic citizens engage in 
what is essentially “an exercise of power over one another” (Beerbohm 2012, 51). This 
approach lends support to a normative theory of democracy wherein citizens may incur 
moral liability for the outcomes that result from their decisions in the electoral arena. 
Political theorists may thus emphasize the potential for citizens to impose enormous costs 
and benefits on others through their electoral decisions (see e.g. Caplan 2007), thereby 
placing great responsibility on voters to make “good” choices (Brennan 2011a), however 
these may be defined.  
As should be clear from this discussion, the perceived benefits of voting are 
subject to wide variation among a citizenry with diverse ideas about democratic norms, 
and faced with varying types of electoral choices. It might thus seem difficult to 
generalize at all about the perceived benefits of voting. However, in place of simply 
assuming that B is generally very high or very low, as much of the previous work in this 
area seems to do, the value of B may instead be allowed its natural variation in hopes of 
deriving a theory that can account for these discrepancies. Focusing in more closely on 
the Downsian differential and its effects on the individual turnout decision in a specific 
election will help suggest a useful typology of potential reasons for B-based decisions to 






3) B-BASED TURNOUT DECISIONS: INDIFFERENCE, ALIENATION, AND AMBIVALENCE 
The social benefit resolutions of the turnout paradox, as described above, 
rationalize participation by relying on the possibility of a high enough B to outweigh even 
an infinitesimally small p. However, if p were actually a much larger fraction, perhaps 
even approaching or equaling one in a highly competitive election, an extremely high 
value for B would not be needed to make a decision to participate seem rational.8 
Nonetheless, even assuming that p were equal to one, it would obviously still not be 
instrumentally rational to participate in a given election where B is perceived to be zero. 
There are at least three potential attitudes that could give reason for the perceived benefits 
voting to be perceived as so negligible that turning out to vote seems useless even in a 
very close election: a) indifference, b) alienation, and c) ambivalence.   
a) Indifference 
As indicated, B will be very small where electoral choices are perceived to be so 
similar to each other that any expected utility difference between them seems negligible 
or nonexistent. Thus, Downs’ application of the median voter theorem in a spatial model 
is generally depicted as implying a convergence of ideological platforms that would be 
expected to yield a very minimal or zero value for B (see Grofman 2004, 25). Similarly, 
game-theoretic equilibrium analysis predicts strategic convergence of candidates to an 
identical position, resulting in universal abstention (e.g. Ledyard 1984, 18). Melvin 
Hinich and Peter Ordeshook were perhaps the first to formally define a decision to 
                                                
8 As argued in Chapter 1, p may be interpreted as equal to 1 whenever a predicted electoral outcome is too 
close to call, and it should generally have a non-negligible value as long as an election is somewhat 
competitive. See also Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 39), suggesting that individuals may greatly 
overestimate the value of p. Blais empirically confirms the propensity to overestimate p, particularly in 
close elections, and he suggests that individuals may not actually multiply p and B, but may instead 





abstain based on an insignificant utility differential between candidates or parties as 
abstention due to indifference (Hinich and Ordeshook 1971, 75; see also Brody and Page 
1973, 2). In the simplest spatial model, indifference would be represented as in Figure 
2.1, with the prospective voter’s ideal position represented by X, and the positions of the 
candidates in a two-person race represented by A and B:  
 
 
       
       
Figure 2.1: Indifference due to Candidate Convergence 
 
In practice, however, predictions of convergence have not generally borne out 
(Grofman 2004). This is particularly evident in the strongly polarized environment of 
contemporary U.S. politics (see Hetherington 2001; Pildes 2011). More commonly 
perhaps, indifference-based abstention may arise from lack of information about the 
choices on the ballot, which prevents a prospective voter from evaluating the utility 
differential between candidates. Thus, John Matsusaka demonstrates how having less 
information about electoral choices, and therefore being less certain about how to 
evaluate the candidates or parties, leads to a lower evaluation of B and a decreased 
likelihood of voting (Matsusaka 1995).9 Indifference resulting from insufficient 
information is indeed normatively and empirically important, but it does not entail any 
direct engagement with perceived benefits through evaluation of a utility differential. 
Instead, the value of B may be seen as equal to zero simply because the prospective voter, 
                                                
9 Matsusaka notes that in practice more information could actually make one less certain of one’s prior 
beliefs, also leading to a lower value of B (Matsusaka 1995, 112; see also Tollison and Willett 1973). 









lacking any relevant information with the regard to the electoral decision, has no basis for 
assessing the options (or the individual’s own position in relation to them), and no 
instrumental reason for voting, as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
     
Figure 2.2: Indifference due to Lack of Information 
b) Alienation 
A perhaps more complex source of B-based turnout decisions arises with 
alienation, which may be simply understood as having a negative attitude toward all 
options presented on the ballot. Hinich and Ordeshook thus define alienation in terms of 
perceptions of negative utility, stating: “A citizen’s probability of voting is inversely 
related to the loss he [or she] associates with his [or her] most preferred candidate” 
(Hinich and Ordeshook 1971, 75). However, as Richard Brody and Benjamin Page 
explain, abstaining due to this type of alienation is not necessarily instrumentally rational, 
since there would still be a positive utility difference between candidates even if the 
associated utilities are both negative (Brody and Page 1973, 3). Unless candidate 
positions are perceived as convergent, one candidate will always be closer to the voter’s 
ideal point, and there could thus be a strictly instrumental motivation for participating 
even under conditions of alienation. Brody and Page thus write, “Given a difference 
between two disliked candidates, abstention could lead to the victory of the greater over 
the lesser evil; knowing this, the rational citizen should vote” (Brody and Page 1973, 3). 
In fact, alienation-based abstention associated with a decision to withhold a vote for a 
“lesser evil” appears to be more of an expressive rather than an instrumental motivation, 
and it is consequently better modeled in D rather than in B (see Brennan and Hamlin 







1998, 155). In reality, a prospective voter may sometimes have to choose between 
instrumental and expressive motivations, which could pose a particularly hard choice, as 
explored further below. 
More persuasively perhaps, alienation-based abstention for instrumental reasons 
can be depicted as the situation where a prospective voter perceives both candidates in a 
two-person race to be so distant from the ideal position that it yields what is in effect an 
attitude of indifference.10 As depicted in Figure 2.3, alienation is thus instrumentally 
relevant only when it results in functional indifference between the candidates: 
 
     
Figure 2.3: Functional Indifference due to Alienation 
The negative effects of alienation on the turnout decision, beyond being consistent 
with common sense expectations, have been empirically demonstrated as well (Zipp 
1985, Plane and Gershtenson 2004, Leighley and Nagler 2014; Adams et al. 2006).11 
From a normative perspective, alienation is extremely important, representing perhaps the 
most common B-based motivation for non-voting. E. E. Schattschneider’s seminal work, 
The Semisovereign People, examines abstention from this exact perspective, explaining 
how the primary locus of conflict in modern democratic politics takes place around “the 
                                                
10 This seems generally consistent with an assumption of decreasing intensity of preferences, such that 
expected utility decreases more quickly moving further away from an individual’s ideal point (see e.g. 
Valasek 2012, 347). 
11 These studies distinguish between turnout effects associated with indifference—measured as the 
perceived distance between the two candidates, and effects associated with alienation—measured as the 
distance between the individual’s ideal position and the position of the closer candidate. They do not appear 
to distinguish expressively-based alienation from alienation that is instrumentally relevant because it leads 
to functional indifference, as suggested by the analysis here. These two types of alienation may in fact be 
difficult or impossible to distinguish in practice, but in theory they should be seen as separate potential 
motivations for abstention. Some implications of expressive alienation, modeled as negative utility in the D 
term, are discussed below. See Callander and Wilson for a formal model of specifically expressive 
alienation, demonstrating how it decreases turnout, increases polarization, and also “has a dramatic impact 









kinds of things that make the vote valuable” (Schattschneider 1960, 102). Accordingly, in 
place of indifference resulting from an apparent convergence of parties or candidates, it 
more commonly results from efforts to induce alienation among certain individuals and 
groups, as candidates and parties aim to dissuade these potential voters from participating 
by attempting “to make the vote meaningless” for these citizens (103). Schattschneider 
thus concludes, “Abstention reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that 
reflect the needs of the nonparticipants” (105), which he refers to as the displacement of 
political conflict.  
Schattschneider’s displacement theory holds that the perceived benefits of voting 
are structured by the organization of partisan alignments along certain ideological 
cleavages, which regulate the nature and scope of political conflict and thus determine the 
value of participating in an election. An instrumentally rational decision to vote implies a 
finding of significant difference in utility between the ballot options, with lines of 
political cleavage raising issues that resonate with the individual’s desires and 
preferences. Conversely, a decision to abstain is explained by the boundaries of political 
conflict being drawn far enough away from the individual’s core concerns that the 
outcome is perceived as irrelevant. Abstention, according to Schattschneider, is thus not 
best understood through observations of the qualities and characteristics of the nonvoting 
public on the “demand side,” but is rather better explained by the “supply side” 
manipulation of the benefits of voting by those with power to set the terms of political 
debate. This represents a unique perspective on abstention that has important 
consequences for normative democratic theory. In place of focusing on demographic 
characteristics that distinguish voters from non-voters (e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980), or focusing on how electoral rules and regulations may increase voting costs in a 





under this approach is seen as a logical response to limitations being imposed on the 
context and scope of political conflict.12 Rather than reflecting some motivational or 
informational deficiency on the part of non-voters, abstention can instead be seen as “the 
outcome of a reasoned, thoughtful political position” that results from the lack of a 
perceived benefit to participating (Zipp 1985, 59; see also Plane and Gershtenson 2004, 
88).  
However, the main point of emphasis from the perspective of the calculus is that 
this type of B-based abstention is only instrumentally rational when alienation leads to 
functional indifference regarding the electoral outcome. As indicated, if two candidates 
are positioned far away from the individual’s ideal point, with both predicted to provide 
negative utility, there is still an instrumental benefit to voting for the perceived lesser evil 
if that candidate is seen as providing somewhat less negative utility than the other. In 
fact, voting against a lesser evil should not necessarily be viewed as theoretically 
problematic, as situations of being forced to choose between evils are arguably quite 
common, and at least from an instrumentally rational perspective there would seem to be 
nothing wrong with having to make such a choice. As implied by Brody and Page, a 
decision to abstain under such circumstances could actually be seen as decidedly 
irrational from the perspective that it might “lead to the victory” of the greater evil. In 
the absence of functional indifference, voting for of a lesser evil could in fact conceivably 
take the form of a moral obligation. If one accepts the sociotropic interpretation of B in 
the voting calculus, and one believes that an election could be close enough for the value 
of p to be near or equal to one (meaning one’s vote is virtually certain to affect the 
                                                
12 This is not meant to imply that demographic variables aren’t good predictors of turnout, which they of 
course continue to be (Smets and van Ham 2013), or that demographic biases in turnout are not 
normatively important, which they will be as long as socioeconomic inequality continues to influence 
turnout and political responsiveness (APSA 2004; Gilens 2005; Solt 2010). Furthermore, the effects of 





outcome), then it seems a short step to derive a moral obligation to do what is within 
one’s power to prevent the greater evil from taking hold.13  
This perspective on the ethics of electoral participation is well suited to Eric 
Beerbohm’s conception of democracy as a “system of shared liability” (Beerbohm 2012, 
29). According to Beerbohm, “No matter how vanishingly small our individual 
contribution…we still are answerable to individuals who face the terms that we play 
some role in setting.” This approach to democratic ethics underlies an instrumental 
motivation for voting even under conditions of alienation, as Beerbohm asserts, “We can 
share in the job of governance while finding the ensuing laws to be odious and even 
alienating to our basic convictions” (29). Maintaining a sociotropic perspective on the 
benefits of voting, Beerbohm thus outlines the basis for a moral obligation to cast one’s 
vote in opposition to a perceived greater evil: “To be a citizen is to be put into a moral 
relation with millions of other individuals…. Failing to play a contributory role in 
defeating political injustice, under certain conditions,14 makes [citizens] accomplices to 
the state’s wrongdoing” (63). Clearly, this is an ethics of voting that places great 
responsibility on democratic citizens. 
It is worthwhile to contrast this instrumentally derived duty to vote that emerges 
from the interpretation and assessment of B with another perspective on democratic ethics 
                                                
13 This of course assumes that the costs of voting are not prohibitively high, and it also assumes the 
absence of any competing moral duty to abstain for expressive reasons, as discussed below. 
14 Beerbohm qualifies his argument for moral complicity in democratic outcomes by indicating that 
individuals who have no opportunity to achieve meaningful representation due to circumstances of 
socioeconomic and political inequality may have no ethical duty to participate, asserting: “If some of the 
poorest citizens have no observable power over their representatives…we cannot insist that they have a 
strong reason to vote” (Beerbohm 2012, 77). This qualification, however, does not preclude the possibility 
of an instrumentally derived duty to vote against a perceived greater evil even among highly marginalized 
and alienated citizens. In fact, Beerbohm describes his theory of shared liability as resting in part on 
expressive, rather than instrumental, motivations: “The very idea of complicity…relies on a conception of 
action as having partly expressive or symbolic value that is morally distinct from its production value” (75). 





that derives a moral duty to abstain based on valuation of the benefits of voting. Jason 
Brennan argues that “citizens have an obligation not to vote badly. They should abstain 
rather than pollute democracy with bad votes” (Brennan 2011a, 68). More specifically, 
Brennan holds that individuals have a duty to refrain from what he terms “unexcused 
harmful voting,” which “occurs when people vote, without sufficient reason, for harmful 
policies or candidates likely to produce harmful policies” (69). Like Beerbohm, Brennan 
maintains a sociotropic perspective on voting’s benefits, yet he reaches the exact opposite 
conclusion on the likely direction of any moral obligation, stating, “Voters should 
justifiedly believe that the policies or candidates they support would promote the 
common good. Otherwise they should abstain from voting” (91). In effect, Brennan 
argues that individuals who are not well informed about politics and policy lack the 
requisite “epistemic and moral credentials” (101) for electoral participation, and they are 
therefore likely to create social disutility through their votes, given that their decisions are 
largely motivated by ignorance and bias (see also Caplan 2007).  
This is of course a very different approach to interpreting the benefits of voting. 
Beerbohm’s potential duty to participate is based on a subjective individual assessment of 
the value of B, consistent with the framework of the calculus, while Brennan’s approach 
seems to hold voters to a more objective standard of utility assessment. Yet the two 
perspectives are not necessarily wholly inconsistent. Like Beerbohm, Brennan’s approach 
to electoral ethics also places a great deal of individual responsibility on democratic 
citizens, though it arguably demands too much—and may even be conceptually 
incoherent—in requiring voters to abstain when they somehow know that their vote is 
likely to yield more social benefit than harm.15 Moreover, while it is presumably true that 
                                                
15 Brennan admits that it could seem trivial (or “self-effacing”) to require that individuals cast their votes in 
a manner justified in promoting the common good, since people generally seem implicitly to believe that 





abstention would be rational for individuals who believed their votes were likely to result 
in social harm, in formal terms of the calculus this would imply a preference for voting in 
favor of a candidate expected to provide less utility, which of course does not seem very 
reasonable (barring a strategic motivation). In effect, Brennan appears to argue that 
prospective voters who know they lack the requisite qualifications to vote in favor of the 
common good should always value B at zero, adopting a stance of functional indifference 
due to their inability to make the right decision. This is a complex normative claim that 
may or may not be defensible, but from the subjective perspective of individuals who do 
in fact perceive a utility differential, and thus are not functionally indifferent, and who 
additionally believe they are qualified to make a justified decision, even Brennan might 
be forced to admit the possibility of a moral obligation to participate.16 What is clear is 
that Brennan believes the potential value of voting to be extremely high, given his 
position that “harmful voting” may result in great collective disutility. The potential duty 
to vote discussed here thus rests on foundations similar to those Brennan employs in 
                                                                                                                                            
intentionally do things they know are wrong, and that the effects of such “vices” may be minimized 
through a process of self-realization (Brennan 2011a, 90-91). For an argument against the notion that 
individuals knowingly make wrong voting decisions (engaging in “willful perversity”), see Bennett and 
Friedman (2008, 206-212); Friedman (2013a). Also see the response to Brennan’s abstention argument by 
González-Ricoy (2012). 
16 It is of course possible to dispute Brennan’s normative claim, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In fact, 
Brennan would likely argue against a duty to vote even under these circumstances, if only because he 
believes the value of p is always negligible. He devotes nearly an entire chapter of his book, The Ethics of 
Voting, to arguing that individual votes in a large election can never have instrumental value or causal 
efficacy (Brennan 2011a, 17-34). Yet he subsequently spends several pages arguing for an ethical duty to 
refrain from “harmful voting” notwithstanding the fact that “a bad vote has vanishingly small disutility” 
(71-76). Whether his position on the negligibility of individual votes is consistent with the assertion of an 
instrumentally based duty to abstain is perhaps an open question, as Brennan himself seems to admit (12). 
It is, however, interesting to note his admission that in some cases an individual could be justified in voting 
for a lesser evil, as he illustrates: “We can imagine scenarios under which voting for the equivalent of 
Mussolini is the best alternative as compared to abstaining from voting or voting for the equivalent of 
Hitler” (76, emphasis added). The question to him is whether voting for the lesser evil should be described 





arguing for a duty to abstain, namely, the expected instrumental utility associated with 
electoral participation. 
c) Ambivalence 
Besides alienation and indifference, another motive for B-based turnout decisions 
is ambivalence, which can be defined as “endorsement of competing considerations 
relevant to evaluating an attitude object” (Lavine 2001, 915). Much of the growing 
political science research dealing with this psychological condition builds on the work of 
John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, who suggest that in place of having what one might 
call “true attitudes,” individuals are often internally conflicted regarding particular issues 
or choices, causing them to exhibit apparently contradictory opinions in their responses to 
political survey questions (Zaller and Feldman 1992, 609-610). In the basic spatial model 
of vote-choice, this type of ambivalence could be characterized by the individual’s 
preferred position falling at a point equidistant—but relatively close17—to the two 
candidates, as in Figure 2.4, which illustrates the basic situation where the prospective 
voter’s preferences might pull equally in opposite directions. 
 
    
Figure 2.4: Basic Ambivalence 
One could also conceive of ambivalence arising out of a more dynamic situation 
that incorporates the possibility of changes in the individual’s preferred position and/or 
the perceived positioning of the candidates. This might occur, for example, as a result of 
information being acquired and deliberation taking place as an election campaign 
                                                
17 Note that if the individual’s ideal point falls between two candidates whose positions are perceived as 
both quite distant, it could result in (expressive) alienation, as well as functional (instrumental) indifference 









progresses over time. A prospective voter might thus go back and forth between 
preferring different candidates over time, possibly resulting in an overall attitude of 
ambivalence, as depicted in Figure 2.5.  
 
      Time 1 
     
      Time 2 
 
Figure 2.5: Ambivalence over Time 
 
Ambivalence could further arise when moving from a simple one-dimensional model to a 
more complex but somewhat more realistic model where prospective voters can have 
potentially conflicting preferences over several different ideological or value-based 
dimensions (see Carmines and D’Amico 2014, 8). For example, one candidate might be 
preferred on grounds of character or leadership qualities, while another candidate could 
be preferred on specific public policy issues (Buttice and Stone 2012). A prospective 
voter who might in fact hold “true attitudes” on two or more different dimensions could 
thus be pulled in opposite directions by these cross-cutting preferences, again resulting in 
a state of ambivalence, as shown in Figure 2.6.  
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One might initially assume that ambivalence of any type should lead to 
abstention, since the ambivalent individual appears to have no rational basis for deciding 
how to vote. In terms of the turnout calculus, ambivalence could be said to create an 
obstacle in specifying the B term, which might lead an individual to value it at zero, 
resulting in a decision to abstain (assuming that D < C). This would imply that 
ambivalence, like alienation, causes what is in effect just another form of indifference. 
However, as with alienation, there may be reasons to think that a decision to abstain 
under conditions of ambivalence may not be the normatively best choice, or even 
necessarily the most rational one. Ambivalence is fundamentally different from 
indifference in that ambivalent individuals do have preferences that carry affective 
valence, even if their preferences fail to result in fixed and well-formed attitudes. 
Ambivalent individuals also presumably have acquired substantial information about the 
electoral choices. However, their preferences seem to conflict, and these individuals may 
thus understandably have a very difficult time reconciling them in order to reach a final 
decision. As indicated, ambivalent individuals do attach value and meaning to the 
election outcome, and the positions of the candidates are presumably close enough to 
their own positions to avoid an attitude of alienation. Such individuals should indeed be 
expected to have trouble deciding how to vote, given the complexity of the electoral 
choice from their perspective, but they should not necessarily be expected to abstain from 
voting.  
In fact, empirical evidence does not support abstention arising as a direct result of 
ambivalence. Diana Mutz examines the effects of exposure to “cross-cutting networks” of 
opposing political ideas, which she theorizes could lead to an attitude of ambivalence by 
activating a psychological process of “intrapersonal conflict” (Mutz 2002, 840). Mutz 





propensity to vote, but she indicates that these effects result not from internalized 
ambivalence, but rather from an externally oriented desire to avoid the risk of social 
conflict that comes with political disagreement.18 Even more to the point, Sung-jin Yoo 
disaggregates the turnout effects of ambivalence and indifference, finding that ambivalent 
individuals—those who display conflicting attitudes rather than lacking attitudes 
altogether—are in fact no less likely to vote than committed partisans (Yoo 2010). 
Discussing the Downsian differential, Yoo points out that the instrumental benefit of 
voting could be calculated at zero for at least two possible reasons: 1) because an 
individual has zero expectation of utility from either candidate—perhaps due to lack of 
information that results in indifference, or 2) because the non-zero expected utilities for 
each candidate happen to balance out evenly, which leads to ambivalence. Ambivalent 
individuals should therefore not be compared to those who are indifferent, for as Yoo 
states, “It is plainly wrong to treat those with equal feelings about parties and candidates 
the same as those without any feelings” (173). Yoo even concludes, “The high turnout of 
ambivalent citizens makes this group critical for deciding the electoral outcome (174).”  
Ambivalent individuals can in fact be seen to epitomize the politically critical 
group of “persuadable” voters, who in a competitive election come to be the “swing” 
vote. These voters may actually make up a substantial percentage of the expected 
electorate, as high as 25 percent at the earlier stages of a U.S. presidential campaign 
(Jacobson 2014, 41-42). Targeting ambivalent voters can therefore be crucial to 
                                                
18 Mutz initially hypothesizes that if cross-cutting exposure reduces participation as a direct result of social 
pressure, and not internal ambivalence, then negative effects should only be observed with forms of 
political participation that are publicly observable, to the exclusion of voting which takes place in private 
(at least with respect to vote choice). When she finds, to the contrary, that cross-cutting exposure also 
significantly reduces the propensity to vote, she suggests that the act of voting may also involve “social 
accountability” (Mutz 2002, 849; see also Pattie and Johnston 2009, 283). Note that the fact that Mutz’s 
exposure effects are attributed to social pressure and not ambivalence implies that these effects are modeled 





campaign strategists, as the vote choices of these individuals are effectively pivotal to the 
outcome in an electorate that appears otherwise evenly divided. Swing voters have 
actually been found to have increased influence on policy outcomes (Griffin and 
Newman 2013), so notwithstanding a differential value that would formally appear equal 
to zero, ambivalent individuals might conceivably value B even higher than partisan 
voters with well-defined preferences. Moreover, from a normative perspective, there may 
be good reasons for valuing ambivalence and encouraging this attitude in the approach to 
vote choices. Mutz alludes to the idea that ambivalence is associated with an approach 
that reflects more “balanced judgment” and the recognition of complexity in political 
issues (Mutz 2002, 840). More broadly, Howard Lavine, Christopher Johnston, and 
Marco Steenbergen advocate for moderating the tendency toward unreasoned 
partisanship with a more principled attitude of ambivalence, which they state “provides 
fertile ground for learning and open-mindedness and…a willingness to assume the 
cognitive burden of deliberative political thought” (Lavine et al. 2012, xiv). Ambivalence 
could thus be particularly valuable to deliberative theorists, who are inclined to view 
decisions based purely on partisan attachments as lacking in full democratic legitimacy 
(e.g. Fishkin 2009; Landemore 2013a).  
A recent paper by Scott McClurg and Phillip Garee nicely ties together empirical 
and normative insights into ambivalence. McClurg and Garee discuss how ambivalence 
implies a degree of cognitive complexity in being able to accommodate intensely held but 
conflicting attitudes, and they find that intense ambivalence predicts turnout separately 
from, and at least as strongly as polarized partisanship (McClurg and Garee 2015, 12). As 
opposed to the chronically indifferent who have no interest at all in election outcomes, 
the ambivalent are more likely to have invested in acquiring information and to have 





attributes of the choices. Despite their apparent difficulty in reaching a decision, these 
ambivalent participants nevertheless perceive the decision as extremely important. While 
their expected utilities from the candidates may appear to balance out more or less 
evenly, they should not be assumed to value B at zero, and they will not necessarily be 
“frozen by indecision” and abstain (13). McClurg and Garee in fact suggest that  
“ambivalence is its own form of political engagement,” concluding that the difficulty 
these voters experience in reaching a decision shows how they are the ones who “must do 
the heavy lifting in democratic politics” (14).  
However, this begs the question of how ambivalent individuals decide how to 
vote, which McClurg and Garee do not directly address, and it takes for granted the 
deeper normative question of what it even means to make a decision under conditions of 
ambivalence. Do ambivalent voters simply choose randomly? In that case they might be 
seen at best as unnecessary to democratic outcomes, or at worst as “polluting the polls” 
(Brennan 2009a) by voting in an insufficiently reasoned manner and likely relying on 
irrational biases (e.g. Caplan 2007). On the other hand, there may be good reasons for 
valuing the participation of more independently-minded swing voters who shun reflexive 
partisanship and who acquire and use political information in ways presumed to lead to 
more deliberatively informed democratic outcomes. How then should we understand 
what goes on in the minds of ambivalent voters when they make their choice? This is a 
complex and important question that cannot be completely addressed here in the detail it 
deserves, but some suggestive directions for a response are suggested by Ruth Chang’s 
work discussing the philosophical implications of hard choices. Chang provides a 
normative framework for understanding what it means to make difficult but important 





broader meaning and implications of ambivalence as it relates to the instrumental benefits 
of voting. 
Chang’s earlier work adds conceptual clarity to the fundamental difference 
between ambivalence and indifference, as she distinguishes between the types of hard 
choices that are “at the root of moral dilemmas” and more generic situations where the 
available alternatives seem to offer more or less equal utility (Chang 2002, 659). She 
illustrates as follows: In comparing any two alternatives—X and Y—one might think 
there are only three possible relations: X is better than Y, Y is better than X, or X and Y 
are equally good (or bad). However, Chang argues that there is in fact a fourth possible 
relation between the alternatives; namely, X and Y may be “on a par,” and she contends 
that hard choices presenting moral dilemmas may be instances of “parity, not ignorance, 
incomparability, or indeterminacy in comparison” (661-662, emphases added). 
According to Chang, “[T]he possibility of parity shows the basic assumption of standard 
decision and rational choice theory to be mistaken: preferring X to Y, preferring Y to X, 
and being indifferent between them do not span the conceptual space of choice attitudes 
one can have toward alternatives” (666). Without explicitly mentioning ambivalence, 
Chang’s conception of parity among alternatives, and the “perplexity” it engenders (682), 
closely mirrors the attitude of ambivalent voters who may perceive that the value of B is 
substantial, but their conflicting preferences create difficulty in making a decision. 
Accordingly, she indicates that situations of parity often result in “superhard” ethical 
problems with significant real-world consequences, which are not the types of choices 
that could reasonably be decided by some “arbitrary stipulation” like flipping a coin 
(685). Nevertheless, decision-making in these cases is still “within the reach of practical 





possible between items that are on a par” (666). This is a matter she takes up in 
subsequent work. 
As an example of the type of hard choice that could present a situation of parity, 
Chang considers someone struggling with a major life-altering choice between two 
alternate career paths. The essence of the problem inheres in the fact that abstention is not 
an option, and yet it still seems impossible to reason one’s way to a definitive decision: 
“Sometimes the reasons in a choice situation fail to determine what one should do…. 
Still, one must make a choice” (Chang 2009b, 248). In this situation one’s reasons for 
making a decision appear to have run out, as Chang explains: “Reasons run out when 
they fail to deliver a univocal answer to the question, ‘What should I do?’” (249). Again, 
she indicates that picking randomly doesn’t seem right for a decision as important as a 
career choice, and neither she says does “plumping” a decision, which would involve 
choosing not randomly but for no specific reason at all (250). When one’s reasons have 
run out, continuation of rational deliberation—as conventionally understood—is unlikely 
to help in reaching a decision, but Chang indicates that “further ‘deliberation’ of a 
different kind can lead to a rationally determined choice” (253). She explains that 
deliberating over a hard decision is actually a two-stage process: At the first stage, 
deliberation involves evaluating the “given” normative reasons for or against a choice, 
which is the conventionally understood process of rational decision-making. However, 
when given reasons have run out because they appear to be a par, a second stage of 
rational deliberation emerges, one that involves creating “voluntarist” reasons for 
choosing through “an act of will” (256-257). Chang’s novel claim is that “willing a 
consideration to be a reason is part of the process of making oneself into a distinctive 





This is a somewhat mysterious and potentially profound assertion that cannot be 
fully explored here, but the essential idea is as follows: For Chang, creating one’s rational 
identity implies deliberation over one’s “normatively ideal self—a loosely unified way of 
understanding the reasons that justify doing what [one has] most reason to do” (261). She 
admits that it might initially seem paradoxical to allow rational actors to voluntaristically 
create their own reasons for choosing one alternative over another, for “if being rational 
is responding appropriately to our reasons, it is not clear how we can get enough distance 
from our reasons to be able to make ourselves into one kind of distinctive rational agent 
rather than another” (260). To resolve this problem, the ethical decision theory she 
proposes is one of "hierarchical voluntarism,” in which given reasons are always 
evaluated first, and only when these reasons have run out do voluntarist reasons come 
into play. If given reasons are insufficient for choosing either alternative—because they 
seem to be on a par—then “you can create for yourself a voluntarist reason that may then 
give you all things considered most reason to choose one alternative over the other” 
(265). Chang refers to this as allowing for a “space of rational freedom,” which denotes 
how individuals can (rationally) create their own voluntarist reasons for choices that seem 
to fall beyond the normative reach of given reasons.19 
Chang further asserts that this ethical approach may also apply to resolving 
difficult problems in social choice, suggesting that “many—and the most interesting—
social conflicts of the simple form have parity as their structure” (Chang 2009a, 154).20 
                                                
19 Chang’s novel approach requires—and deserves—a close reading for full appreciation of its insight into 
the nature and meaning of rational decision-making. She writes, “We are authors not only of our actual 
lives but also of our ideal rational lives—of the best that we can be, rationally speaking. The governing of 
our ideal rational selves is arguably the central—and most exalted—exercise of rational agency” (Chang 
2009b, 262); and furthermore, “This crafting of our distinctive rational identities is, in a way, what life is 
all about” (267).   
20 The “simple form of practical conflict,” according to Chang, involves a choice between two alternatives 





Hence, societies might also be able to collectively create their rational identities through a 
voluntaristic reasoning process that seeks to answer the question: “What kind of society 
should we be?” (156). Chang indicates that elections will generally be ineffective for 
responding to this question, though she does not specify exactly how else such a process 
could take place.21 The implications of applying her normative framework at the societal 
level are indeed provocative,22 but returning to the individual-level decision of the 
calculus, Chang’s normative framework provides a crucial insight into how ambivalent 
voters should decide—and what it means for them to decide—when they perceive the 
alternatives to present a situation of parity. The decision of how to cast one’s vote is 
perhaps not as much a major life-altering decision as a career choice, but it could 
certainly be perceived as extremely important and not appropriate for randomly picking 
or plumping—nor for abstaining, particularly assuming an altruistic interpretation of B in 
a highly salient, competitive election. When reasons for choosing one alternative over 
another appear to have run out, Chang’s theory counsels ambivalent voters to deliberate 
over a voluntaristic vote choice in the knowledge that they thereby act in a way that 
contributes to forming their rational identities with regard to politics.23 
                                                
21 According to Chang, “[M]ajority voting, which permits self-defeating cycles, is an inappropriate means 
to self-governance” (Chang 2009a, 156-157). As with individual-level choice, she suggests that creating a 
rational identity at the societal level involves deliberation, and she thus broadly associates this process with 
theories of deliberative democracy (157).  
22 Chang explains how hierarchical voluntarism could apply at the societal level as well, suggesting that “in 
so far as we want to achieve certain values, we should deal with political conflict in a way that is 
reasonable in light of those values, and in so far as we want to do what’s rational given the [parity] 
structure of the conflict itself, then we should…self-govern.” Political decision-making would accordingly 
involve “two distinct and autonomous normative domains” (158). Interestingly, this perhaps resembles a 
distinction between constitutional level decision-making, where choices are based on (at least purportedly) 
given reasons, and the societal space of rational freedom in regular democratic politics, where voluntaristic 
social choice may take place. 
23 Chang’s theory also provides a cogent response to Jeffrey Friedman’s expansive attack on voluntaristic 
ethics in liberal theory, and particularly his argument that voluntarism in essence implies an ethically 
incoherent “right to do wrong” (Friedman 2013a, 39). Friedman describes a conventional logic of choice 
which presumes that “normative distinctions can be made among actions, such that one choice emerges as 





This extended discussion of the question of vote choice under conditions of 
ambivalence has led away from the original discussion of the decision to vote or 
abstain.24 Returning to the turnout calculus, the key point here is that ambivalence may 
also arise with respect to the decision of whether to vote or abstain in a situation where 
instrumental and expressive motivations are in conflict. Chang’s ethical approach might 
thus help resolve this critical—and presumably fairly common—dilemma, which is 
associated with an ambivalence that might arise under conditions of alienation. As 
discussed previously, an individual who perceives even a very small instrumental 
difference between two “bad” candidates (providing a net positive value for B) might 
strictly speaking still have sufficient motivation to cast a ballot in favor of the “lesser 
                                                                                                                                            
“Inaction…is the only other alternative—apart from mechanical determination—to normative 
determination…. An agent stuck in this familiar position would be like the legendary Buridan’s Ass, which 
starved because it was unable to choose among what seemed to it identical bales of hay” (68). Friedman 
thus denies not only the possibility of a rationally determined choice under conditions of parity, but even 
the possibility of free will under such conditions, stating that free choice “cannot take place in the absence 
of a perceived advantage for one option over the others…. If one could choose without ranked antecedent 
perceptions of the good, one’s ‘choices’ would (by the principle of sufficient reason) have to be determined 
by mechanical causes, not free will” (68-69). Chang’s approach to voluntaristic choice is clearly in strong 
tension with Friedman’s logic, and she specifically excludes the possibility of a “right to do wrong” 
through her hierarchical normative approach that allows for voluntaristic choice only after given reasons 
have run out (see Chang 2009b, 269).  
24 Before leaving vote choice completely, one more insight that emerges from Chang’s approach relates to 
the normative understanding of the choices of committed partisans. These individuals obviously have no 
trouble perceiving a differential value of B and making their choice, but as indicated previously, their 
decisions are often assumed to be normatively deficient for lacking foundations in a sufficiently 
deliberative reasoning process (e.g. Landemore 2013a). However, Chang’s hierarchical framework also 
helps explain how personal commitments can be seen as voluntaristically rational “exercises of our 
normative powers, the power to confer reason-giving force on something through an act of will” (Chang 
2013, 75). Extending her theory of commitment to political partisanship raises complex issues, particularly 
since her approach allows voluntaristic choice only after given reasons have run out, which may or may not 
apply to the formation of political commitments. It may be interesting to note how Chang indicates that 
commitments can arise without a conscious decision, and that they “need not be compelled by reasons,” 
although they “give rise to special reasons we might not otherwise have” (79-80). More generally, Chang’s 
description of the basic features of a commitment seems to reflect how many political partisans would 
describe their attachment to party. Nevertheless, her hierarchical ethic would seem to require at least a 
loosening of partisan ties to the extent that voluntaristic commitments should never override given reasons. 
This perhaps resembles the attitude of “ambivalent partisanship” advocated by Lavine, Johnston, and 
Steenbergen (2012). For further normative defense of partisan commitment see Rosenblum (2008); also see 





evil.” However, there might also be an expressive motivation to abstain (a negative value 
in D) since both candidates are positioned relatively far away from the individual’s ideal 
point—the definition of alienation. This could lead to ambivalence given that a choice 
must be made between the instrumental motivation to participate and the expressive 
motivation to abstain. For this type of hard choice, Chang’s hierarchical approach 
arguably requires that instrumental (given) reasons take precedence over expressive 
(voluntaristic) motivations, and the individual should therefore vote rather than abstain. 
This conclusion can be seen as making good ethical sense, especially assuming an 
interpretation of high social benefits in B (and a high value for p), for it essentially holds 
simply that one should not give precedence to one’s own expressive motivations over 
other people’s instrumental utility. This ties back to the earlier argument regarding how 
instrumental motivations could give rise to a moral obligation to vote even under 
conditions of alienation. 
To conclude, the foregoing has shown that while the Downsian differential may 
be useful for modeling indifference and (instrumentally-based) alienation, it is not 
necessarily coherent for cases of ambivalence, where ascribing a value to B through 
subtraction of expected utilities leads to a dubious prediction of abstention. The 
conventional manner of modeling the instrumental benefits of voting in order to assess 
the motivations for turnout can thus sometimes lose its meaning, as reflected in Chang’s 
critical approach, which asserts that—at least for some cases—“it is unclear how the 
rationality of preferences could be adequately modeled by standard utility functions” 
(Chang 2002, 666).25 Nonetheless, while comparison of alternatives may be more 
                                                
25 Chang continues, “Thus the approach to rational choice favored by mainstream social scientists will, at 
the very least, require reexamination” (Chang 2002, 666). Chang’s approach perhaps suggests that in some 
cases the assessment of instrumental benefits from alternatives on the ballot may be additive, rather than 





complex than initially contemplated by Downs, expectations of instrumental benefits in 
voting do still have crucial implications for turnout choices and for practical voting 
ethics. An instrumentally rational assessment of benefits is in fact often directly relevant 
to the decision to vote or abstain, and this realist perspective helps underscore the ethical 
implications of choices between perceived political evils, as well as providing the 
beginnings of a case for a moral obligation to vote under some circumstances. 
Furthermore, conceptions of instrumental benefits are also important when they must be 
weighed against their expressive counterparts, where the argument has been made—
based on Chang’s innovative approach—that instrumental benefits should always take 
precedence. A comprehensive approach to the interpretation of B should also take into 
account its potentially deep existential implications for personal, political, and rational 
identity. In sum, perceptions of the instrumental benefits of voting are crucial to the 
turnout decision in some very complex and significant ways, and they deserve greater 
attention than they have received thus far. Furthermore, a focus on the value of B in the 
calculus has important policy implications, as it points out specific directions for electoral 
reforms that aim to increase the perceived benefits of voting in order to boost voter 
turnout. 
 
4) ELECTION LAW AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 As demonstrated, instrumental benefits are critical to the motivations for voting, 
so finding ways to enhance perceptions of these benefits seems to present an obvious 
pathway for efforts to raise turnout.26 To the point, as Matthew Streb writes in his wide-
                                                                                                                                            
appear more or less equal, but may instead result in the intense ambivalence associated with a need to make 
a difficult yet important decision. 
26 Certainly not everyone agrees that increasing turnout is an important public policy objective, but for 





ranging book on U.S. elections, “[I]f the goal is expanding the electorate…, the best way 
to do so is to convince people why they should vote, not simply make it easier for them to 
do so.” Streb accordingly emphasizes the importance of finding “ways to increase the 
benefits citizens see in voting.” He concludes, however, “How this can be done is 
difficult to say” (Streb 2011, 29). As noted, this indeed is a complex problem given that 
individuals can hold such widely varying opinions on whether participation seems 
instrumentally valuable or not in any particular election. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
broadly outline some of the ways in which election law and policy can be used to address 
the key attitudes that lead to abstention based on comparative assessments of the 
candidates or parties. The primary focus here is thus on avenues of reform that aim to 
reduce indifference and alienation as likely causes of B-based abstention, and on possible 
means of facilitating ambivalence to the extent that it is framed as an attitude that makes 
a decision to participate more likely.  
The problem of indifference receives a great deal of attention in the voting 
literature, as it relates directly to the highly contentious topic of political 
knowledgeability. As indicated earlier, lack of information about the options on the 
ballot—or more precisely about the differences between them—is a more likely source of 
indifference than an informed perception that candidate positions are substantially 
equivalent. This should be especially evident in the current “hyperpolarized” (Pildes 
2011) political environment in the U.S., where any convergence of party platforms 
toward the position of a median voter seems particularly absent, and so the bulk of 
genuine indifference is presumably traceable to information deficiencies. Richard Pildes 
in fact indicates that a potentially positive consequence of polarization—and the clear 
                                                                                                                                            
of whether higher turnout is normatively desirable is considered Chapter 3, with particularly reference to 





lack of convergence between the two main political parties today—is that it should make 
it easier for voters to use party affiliation to distinguish between candidates and thereby 
cast a more informed vote (329).27 Electoral reforms to address indifference might 
therefore focus on the use of party cues or related heuristics to provide more information 
to prospective voters about the options on the ballot (Elmendorf and Schleicher 2013; 
Boudreau et al. 2015).28 
In federal or major state elections, where party labels generally appear alongside 
candidates on the ballot, abstention due to genuine indifference should arguably not be 
that widespread.29 The larger problem of such information-based indifference arises in 
elections conducted on a formally nonpartisan basis, which include some down-ballot 
state races and most local elections (see e.g. Schaffner and Streb 2002; Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2007, 88). Acquiring information about candidates in the absence of party 
cues is much more costly, particularly given greatly reduced media coverage and 
campaign spending in these lower profile contests. Providing a party cue on the ballot 
                                                
27 Pildes identifies this approach as harkening back to earlier electoral theories of “responsible party 
government” (Pildes 2011, 329, citing Schattschneider (1942) and Raney (1954)). However, he also notes a 
major downside to polarization in that it makes effective governing through coalitional compromise much 
more difficult (Pildes 2011, 331). Along these lines, polarization may also contribute to alienation and 
functional indifference in individuals who identify as moderates but perceive both candidates as positioned 
far away from their ideal point (see supra n. 17).  
28 There is a forceful debate over whether cues and heuristics can facilitate more informed decision-making 
and increase the overall competency of the electorate (e.g. Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998), or 
whether these types of informational shortcuts are unable to compensate for fundamental deficiencies in 
political knowledge (e.g. Somin 1998; Hardin 2004). The working assumption for present purposes is that 
party cues can at least provide some useful information to counteract instrumental indifference, and that 
voters are in general “capable of providing useful feedback when armed with clear party labels”  
(Elmendorf and Schleicher 2013, 383). The basis for such an assumption is a matter for Chapter 3. 
29 This is not to suggest that instrumental indifference due to lack of information never leads to abstention 
in the presence of party labels. To the contrary, individuals without a coherent conception of the ideological 
positioning of the parties, or of their own ideal point, might still abstain as a result of genuine indifference 
in some federal or statewide elections with party labels. For example, Wattenberg et al. (2000) find that 
voters in presidential elections who “roll-off” in concurrently held House races are likely to do so as a 
result of lack of information. They find that up to 6 percent of presidential voters abstained in House races 
in California in the 1990s (239), while in one election in Los Angeles County almost 50 percent of voters 





reduces information costs while providing increased opportunity to perceive benefits 
associated with the outcome, so it could be doubly likely to motivate a decision to 
participate. Focusing on the perceived value of B in the calculus is thus particularly 
useful for models of turnout in “second-order” elections, which can be seen as attracting 
lower levels of participation due to their perceived lower political stakes, as indicated 
previously (Percival et al. 2007; Blais 2000, 43).30  
Turnout in local elections is in fact exceptionally low, and the composition of the 
electorates at these lower levels of government is far more likely to be demographically 
biased by unequal participation among different socioeconomic groups (Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2005). There are many factors that influence the low levels of turnout in these 
races, including most prominently their “off-cycle”—separate from federal elections—
scheduling, which requires greater benefits to offset the added costs as compared to when 
they are scheduled “on-cycle” (Anzia 2014; Wood 2002, 228).31 However, low turnout in 
these elections can be partially attributed to the absence of party labels (Schaffner et al. 
2001; Schaffner and Streb 2002; Garlick 2015). Allowing for partisan elections at lower 
levels of government, or at least providing some sort of ballot notations that function as 
“party-label substitutes” (Elmendorf and Schleicher 2013, 417), could boost turnout by 
reducing indifference-based abstention that results from lack of information.32 As 
                                                
30 See supra n. 5 and accompanying text. As suggested, one might also think that the perceived benefits of 
voting should be greatest in local elections, given an assumption that “local government is closest to the 
people and has the most direct and obvious impact on citizens’ lives” (Wood 2002, 210; see also Anzia 
2014, 235 n. 3). However, under the altruistic/social benefit view it perhaps makes more sense for B to be 
perceived as higher in larger elections that affect greater numbers of people. 
31 Chapter 3’s focus on voting costs argues that state and local elections should generally be scheduled 
concurrently with federal races in order to reduce overall substantive (though not informational) costs of 
participation. A complementary argument implied here for on-cycle scheduling is that lower overall 
benefits are then required to motivate individuals to turn out, although of course this does not mean they 
will participate in all races (see Aldrich 1993, 261). 
32 Extending national party brands to subnational levels can be problematic, and there might be good 
reasons for keeping some second-order elections nonpartisan. Elmendorf and Schleicher (2013, 412-416) 





Christopher Elmendorf and David Schleicher explain, laws that dictate how candidates 
appear on the ballot can be crucial in determining the informational costs of voting; 
correspondingly, it is also worth recognizing how these laws can have significant effects 
on perceptions of voting’s benefits.  
While genuine indifference based on lack of information is likely to be common 
in second-order elections and down-ballot races, the functional indifference that may 
arise as a result of alienation is presumably a more widespread cause of abstention even 
in first-order elections. As discussed previously, alienation can make any instrumental 
differences between options on the ballot seem negligible or meaningless, and generally 
unworthy of any participatory response. This type of indifference is probably not 
associated with any informational deficiency. Alienated abstainers in American elections, 
for example, may have more than enough information to distinguish between candidates 
of the two major parties, yet they perceive both candidates to be positioned so far away 
from their own ideal point that any differences are discounted as inconsequential. Since B 
seems effectively equal to zero, it would not be instrumentally rational to participate even 
if voting were completely costless (C=0). Alternatively, alienated individuals may have 
strong expressive reasons for not participating in particular elections, perhaps based on 
normative ideals of democratic theory that they find contravened by the existing political 
structure. As a result, any small but positive value in B is likely to be outweighed by a 
significantly greater negative value in D. These individuals may arrive at conclusions of 
functional indifference and/or expressive disdain through many different routes, but they 
share a common belief that the broader political structure surrounding the election makes 
the choice presented on the ballot essentially meaningless, and voting is thus completely 
                                                                                                                                            
local levels. Streb maintains that a partisan affiliation should be indicated in all races on the ballot, although 





useless—or at least highly ineffective—as a means of democratic participation. This 
belief, if widespread enough, arguably presents a much greater policy problem than 
indifference due to lack of information, as it potentially challenges core democratic 
legitimacy. How might this deeper problem be addressed within a reform framework 
focused on perceptions of the benefits of voting? 
One way would be to focus on the “supply side” of alienation by looking for 
institutional reforms to counteract what Schattschneider refers to as the displacement of 
political conflict. Such reforms would aim generally at redrawing lines of political 
cleavage in a more inclusive manner by framing electoral choices in a way that 
incorporates the concerns of greater numbers of citizens. A far-reaching approach to 
addressing alienation this way could include systemic reforms to replace 
majoritarian/winner-take-all institutions with more “consensual” forms of constitutional 
design—such as proportional representation in elections, and perhaps even a 
parliamentary executive or other institutional reforms to facilitate political coalitions and 
increase the viability of smaller parties (see Lijphart 2012). However, such a drastic 
approach seems highly impractical for the United States, as institutional reforms this 
extreme are presumably unlikely to occur—at least in the near term—given the deep 
entrenchment of majoritarian democratic norms in this country. A movement toward 
ranked choice (or “instant-runoff”) voting, in which a majority winner is determined by 
having voters rank-order preferences for ballot options, is perhaps somewhat more 
realistic. These electoral systems could potentially reduce alienation-based abstention by 





cast votes for these candidates without “wasting” their vote or perhaps increasing the 
likelihood that a lesser preferred candidate could win (see Streb 2011, 155-156).33  
While these types of electoral system reforms might help reduce functional 
indifference as a cause of alienation, they likely would fail to address more expressive 
reasons for abstaining, such as perceptions of pervasive corruption and fundamental 
unfairness in the political system. Robert Post explains how “electoral integrity” requires 
a general sense of “public trust that elections select officials who are responsive to public 
opinion,” because all democratic participation seems effectively meaningless under 
conditions of political inequality with politicians seen as responsive only to wealthy 
individuals and interests (Post 2014, 60). Post thus advocates for basic changes in 
campaign finance law from a perspective of constitutional interpretation that aims at 
increasing the perceived benefits of voting by counteracting alienation from politics and 
instilling a greater sense of trust in American democracy.34 This is perhaps a salutary 
goal, but again it appears somewhat impractical—at least in the short term given current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Furthermore, eliminating corruption and unfairness—or 
the appearance thereof—to the satisfaction of alienated citizens is perhaps an impossible 
undertaking. Are there any prospects for addressing alienation-based abstention within 
the current system as it stands?  
                                                
33 Streb also advocates relaxation of ballot access laws to make it easier for outside candidates to gain 
access to the ballot (Streb 2011, 185). The practice of including “none of the above” as a ballot option—as 
in the state of Nevada and a few countries around the world—could provide another outlet for expressive 
alienation (see Damore et al. 2012). However, adding this option fails to address functional indifference, as 
it doesn’t affect the instrumental benefits of voting, and choosing this option is in fact formally equal to 
abstention. More importantly, this reform fails to target the deeper policy problems posed by alienation. 
34 Dennis Thompson’s broad conception of upholding “free choice” in elections can also be seen to aim at 
improving perceptions of the benefits of voting and addressing sources of functional and expressive 
alienation. Thompson endorses sweeping reforms to campaign finance as well as electoral system and 





As Streb suggests, more attention can be paid to the policy problem of finding 
ways “to convince people why they should vote” (Streb 2011, 29). Hence, difficult as it 
might seem, it may be important to focus also on the “demand side” of political 
alienation. What type of motivations could possibly influence the turnout decisions of 
highly disaffected citizens in the absence of institutional reform? The answer suggested 
by the turnout calculus calls attention to the fact that any difference in negative expected 
utilities yields a positive value in B, and even if that differential seems extremely small, it 
may in fact amount to a major effect on the welfare of vast numbers of people.35 This 
argument thus emphasizes the exactingly rational logic of choosing a lesser evil when 
faced with a decision in which all viable options seem bad. As discussed, even when 
candidates from the two major parties both seem downright detestable, it may 
nevertheless be instrumentally irrational to abstain in a competitive election where not 
voting could conceivably contribute to a perceived greater evil taking hold. This 
argument highlights how democratic politics in practice often requires making the best of 
bad conditions and remaining realistically pragmatic, even coldly calculating when 
necessary.36 More broadly, this principle reflects how everyday life often forces 
individuals to make choices they would rather not make, and it indeed takes serious 
intellectual and emotional rigor to face up to these difficult decisions in a rational manner 
aimed at furthering one’s life goals.  
                                                
35 Admittedly, there is not much that can be done to convince a deeply alienated but narrowly self-
interested individual who does not allow for a sociotropic interpretation of B. In any event, such a homo 
economicus would probably hold strictly by pivotal theory and believe that an individual vote can never 
affect the outcome of a large election (i.e., p is always infinitesimal), which moots the entire discussion of 
instrumental benefits. 
36 Thompson indicates that being forced to choose among evils amounts to an abridgment of the 
democratic value of free choice in elections (Thompson 2002, 70). Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
political choices must often be made under less than ideal conditions. Incidentally, the importance of lesser 
evil voting can perhaps be seen in the prevalence of negative campaigning, which basically expresses the 





Beyond cold rationality, however, the further implication of this argument is that 
there may sometimes be a moral obligation to vote even under conditions of extreme 
alienation; moreover, by failing to participate an individual may incur moral culpability 
in the event that the greater evil prevails. As discussed, this involves extending the 
sociotropic interpretation of B to derive a responsibility-based approach to turnout and 
vote choice, as suggested by Beerbohm’s conception of democracy as a system of shared 
liability. This approach recognizes how the perceived value of voting can be enormously 
high, and that there may be potentially onerous responsibilities associated with 
democratic elections. This does not imply that individuals should vote when they are 
truly indifferent, either through lack of information or through alienation, for any vote 
choice under such conditions would certainly not seem very rational.37 Nevertheless, the 
argument here draws attention to the need to distinguish between forms of instrumental 
indifference and expressive alienation, and it emphasizes the very hard choice that may 
be posed when instrumental and expressive motivations conflict. If Chang’s normative 
argument is correct, then instrumental motivations for voting (positive value in B) should 
generally prevail, while expressive motivations for abstaining (negative value in D) must 
sometimes go unheeded. In other words, as a responsible democratic citizen—and more 
broadly as a mature adult—one must occasionally “hold one’s nose” and do what seems 
right for the greater good.  
Finally, the implications of this approach for attitudes of ambivalence are not 
directly associated with efforts to make partisans act more independently and be more 
deliberatively ambivalent with their vote choices. While promoting more reasoned 
                                                
37 There might even be a duty to abstain under conditions of true indifference, as discussed in Chapter 4 
regarding the limits of a civic duty to vote. As discussed, however, indifference must be distinguished from 
ambivalence, under which it may in fact be possible to make a voluntaristically rational choice, as Chang 
asserts. Whether there should ever be a duty to vote (voluntaristically) under conditions of ambivalence 





judgment among committed partisans may be commendable, these are obviously not the 
types of individuals likely to abstain from voting. Instead, the emphasis here should be on 
trying to convince those who are alienated to be more ambivalent about their motivations 
for abstaining. This requires drawing attention to the distinction between instrumental 
and expressive value in voting, which is in fact a basic lesson of the turnout calculus. By 
distinguishing conceptually between these two kinds of expected utility, the framework 
of the calculus sets the stage for a normative argument that may require subordinating 
one’s personal expressive inclinations, based on a recognition of the potentially far-
reaching societal effects of even small instrumental differences between major candidates 
on the ballot. At the very least, such an argument would advise alienated individuals to be 
more ambivalent when choosing between these conflicting motivations, with the 
suggestion that such conflict could create a hard choice that might present a situation of 
parity between the alternatives. In such case, one might make a voluntarist decision about 
one’s rational identity with respect to politics: One can define oneself as someone who 
places the instrumental welfare of others in front of personal values and ideals about 
politics and democracy, or as someone who insists on expressing those principles by 
abstaining from voting notwithstanding the potential harm to others.38 
Admittedly, this approach may require alienated individuals to reconsider some of 
their basic ideas about purpose and meaning in democratic politics. One might say it 
requires a willingness to relinquish certain democratic dreams and devotions, while 
instead taking a less “romanticized” view of the role of elections in the democratic 
process (Pildes 2014), and perhaps abandoning some aspects of democratic “faith” 
                                                
38 This formulation of the decision is admittedly biased in favor of Chang’s theory, which requires giving 
precedence to instrumental reasons, but it is not meant to imply that the choice between instrumental and 
expressive motivations should be an easy decision to make. See Hafer an Ran (2016) for a discussion of the 





(Deneen 2005). In general, this approach suggests the need for a more minimalist and less 
“radical” democratic theory (Gardner 2003), which entails an embrace of mass 
representative democratic forms even if they appear to fall short of deliberative epistemic 
ideals (Chambers 2009).39 This requires a realism that acknowledges how democracy in 
practice often generates very difficult decisions in the form of “tragic” choices or 
tradeoffs (Gardner 1996, 451; Pildes 2014, 850). Perhaps most importantly for present 
purposes, this approach grounds an appreciation of voting as a fundamentally valuable 
form of democratic participation notwithstanding any of its alleged deliberative 
deficiencies (see Mackie 2011). The aim is thus to coax even highly alienated individuals 
into admitting that the policy choices made by different elected officials from different 
political parties really can and do affect the day-to-day lives of great numbers of ordinary 
people, for better or for worse. The basic argument is simply that elections matter.  
In sum, exploring the instrumental benefits of voting through the framework of 
the rational choice calculus points toward several reforms aimed at increasing turnout 
through electoral system design and ballot structure, but perhaps the more novel aspects 
of this analysis have to do with the ethics of abstention and the possibility of a moral duty 
to participate.40 Although the suggestions here for conceptualizing alienation and 
ambivalence do not amount to concrete proposals for reform, they do offer a well-
reasoned normative framework around which to formulate electoral policy. This is 
essential, because sound democratic practices demand sound democratic theory. Even 
where there is profound disagreement as to theoretical foundations, as there is bound to 
                                                
39 Chapter 3 explores the requirements and implications of a more participatory approach in democratic 
theory as it relates to conceptions of voting competence and their links to election law and policy.  
40 This analysis of the instrumental benefits of voting is also critical for building a theoretical foundation to 
justify a legal regime of compulsory voting (see Hill 2014, 177). The broad question of whether voting 





be in this area, these disputes call out for more principled public debate, for the 
alternative is to allow elections to stay subject to the vagaries of partisan manipulation. 
Indeed, many important policy problems—particularly in the area of voting and 
elections—cannot be solved through empirical analysis alone, as they require some 
affirmation of basic theoretical principles. The normative ideals of democratic politics are 
part and parcel of election law and policy, and they are worthy of more focused attention 
in legal and political science scholarship. 
 
5) CONCLUSION 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes in The Social Contract, “As soon as any man says 
of the State, What does it matter to me? The State may be given up for lost.” (Rousseau 
1920 [1762], 83). The perceived benefits of participating in democratic elections are 
certainly a critical part of individual judgments about whether and how the state matters, 
and the formation of such judgments is an important topic of study. This chapter has 
outlined a general approach to the difficult problem of conceptualizing the instrumental 
benefits of voting by utilizing the rational choice calculus of turnout to frame an inquiry 
into the expected utility differential from a comparison of ballot options. Distinguishing 
and clarifying three typical attitudes that tend to influence the perceived value of B in the 
calculus—indifference, alienation, and ambivalence—has helped to identify directions 
for law and policy to address perceptions of benefits with the purpose of preventing 
abstention and increasing voter turnout.  
The first point has been that in contemporary American elections, true 
instrumental indifference—a zero value for B based on a perception of no actual 





of information. This condition essentially precludes any engagement with the turnout 
calculus, or the electoral process at all for that matter. Policy reforms have therefore been 
suggested to reduce indifference by providing informational cues on the ballot, 
particularly through party labels in second-order elections where basic information seems 
most lacking. Alienation, by contrast, is generally not related to lack of information, and 
there may be potentially good reasons for alienated individuals to decide to abstain. 
Modeled spatially as the perception of great distance between the individual’s ideal point 
and the points of both candidates/parties, alienation often results in what has been termed 
functional indifference, where any observed distinction between the candidates/parties is 
interpreted as effectively meaningless. Looking to the “supply side” of alienation, 
reforms have been suggested to improve perceptions of meaningful electoral choice, but 
they generally involve fairly radical changes to the electoral system or to constitutional 
design and interpretation. From a practical perspective, attention must turn to the 
“demand side” of alienation, with efforts to promote a conceptual distinction between 
functionally indifferent alienation, which is instrumentally relevant, and the expressive 
elements of alienation, which by definition are not. This leads to a discussion of the 
ethics of voting for lesser evils, and the possibility of a moral obligation to participate 
even under conditions of alienation, given a high enough potential for collective utility or 
disutility associated with an election outcome.  
Finally, with regard to ambivalence, the rational choice model of B in the calculus 
has been shown to have limits as an explanation of voter turnout. In particular, the 
Downsian differential does not account for the possibility of conflicting assessments of 
expected benefits that pull in opposite directions with regard to vote choice, but which do 
not necessarily result in any hesitation regarding the turnout decision. In fact, 





how to vote, they are in fact likely to be highly informed and engaged with electoral 
politics, and their decision to vote will seldom be in doubt. An inquiry into the question 
of how vote choice can be resolved under conditions of ambivalence led into a discussion 
of the rationality and the ethics of facing up to hard choices. The emerging theory of 
voluntaristic decision-making touches on deep and complex issues of personal and 
political identity, with broad implications for the ambivalence that may result from the 
clash of instrumental motivations to vote with expressive motivations to abstain. In 
general, ambivalence has been portrayed in a more positive light than indifference or 
alienation, as it not only suggests a more reasoned and deliberative attitude toward a 
particular decision, but promoting ambivalence may also be particularly useful in 
attempts to persuade alienated individuals to reconsider a decision to abstain. 
A primary focus of this approach has dealt with the ethics of interpreting B under 
democratic norms of shared liability, with the aim of motivating participation based on a 
suggestion of moral culpability that may derive from a responsibility to prevent bad (or 
worse) outcomes. Yet it is also worth emphasizing how this evaluation of instrumental 
benefits also implies opportunities for doing real collective good and conceivably earning 
a share of civic pride and deserved praise for contributing to a positive democratic result 
(see Beerbohm 2012, 282; see also MacMullen 2014, 78). Admittedly, such opportunities 
might not seem too common, and many of the most alienated individuals will likely never 
perceive anything but negative utility associated with election outcomes, at least under 
the current U.S. electoral institutions and political system. As indicated, the approach 
advocated here does imply some fundamental normative assumptions relating to the 
limitations of democratic elections, and it may often require a certain stoic realism and 
lowering of expectations for political processes and outcomes. This is not a particularly 





an approach that many democratic theorists would likely endorse. As Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse and John Hibbing (2005, 227) write, “Good citizens need to learn that democracy 
is messy, inefficient, and conflict-ridden.” They therefore conclude, “The route to 
enhancing meaningful civic life is not badgering people to become engaged because 
politics is fun and easy; it is asking people to become engaged because politics is dreary 
and difficult” (245).  
More generally, this approach draws on a minimalist line of theory that traces 
back to Schumpeter and finds more recent expression in works like Bernard Crick’s 
Defence of Politics (1993), which frames the electoral process as simply a venue for 
fairly facilitating the peaceful conciliation of social groups with fundamentally 
conflicting interests or beliefs. This is diametrically opposed to the view that elections 
can be modeled as ideal decision-making processes designed to meet certain epistemic 
criteria, which as discussed in Chapter 3, is a view that seems doomed to yield skepticism 
and cynicism regarding the potential value of voting. The view here thus advocates for a 
general reassessment of attitudes of indifference, alienation, or ambivalence before any 
decision to abstain from voting based on a judgment of insufficient instrumental benefits. 
Crick writes of this eloquently in a passage that touches on all these attitudes:  
“Many people…think that they are not interested in politics, and even act as if 
they are not; but they are probably few compared to the many who think that 
politics is muddled, contradictory, self-defeatingly recurrent, unprogressive, 
unpatriotic, inefficient, mere compromise, or a sham or conspiracy by which 
political parties seek to preserve some particular and peculiar social systems 
against the challenge of the inevitable future, etc.” (Crick 1993, 16).  





Likewise, we can arguably do much worse than to honor “mere” voting, and to 
pursue law and policy reforms in that spirit. This work thus forms a key part of an overall 
defense of voting as an exceptionally valuable—and perhaps quintessential—form of 
political participation. Other ways of participating in politics may well be important and 
useful, but electoral participation will always occupy a place of primacy in democratic 
theory and practice, which necessitates attention to the perceived value of voting. This 
clearer understanding of instrumental benefits within the framework of the calculus has 
paved the way for studying the costs of voting, as well as crucially important perceptions 
of non-instrumental, or expressive benefits, and the wide-ranging problems of law and 
policy relating to the effects of electoral institutions on voter turnout. By drawing 
attention to these important issues, this work can hopefully make a valuable contribution 
to the ongoing critical evaluation of the theory and practice of electoral democracy in the 








Chapter Three: The Costs of Voting—Bridging Theory and Practice 
 
“The greatness of democracy is that it denies nothing and renounces nothing of humanity.”  
–Victor Hugo (1987 [1862], 517) 
 
“Democracy was made for the people, not the people for democracy.” 
–E. E. Schattschneider (1960, 135) 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
What are the costs of casting a vote, and how and why do these costs matter? 
Employing the framework of the calculus of voting, this chapter examines the legal and 
policy implications of varying theoretical perspectives on the costs of participating in 
democratic elections. Assessments and interpretations of the costs of voting not only 
implicate important practical problems in election law and policy; they simultaneously 
involve crucial normative issues in democratic theory. This chapter seeks to integrate 
these two perspectives through a unified analytical focus, which it does by employing the 
concept of voting costs as a link between electoral institutions and the norms of liberal 
representative democracy. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, and as 
discussed below, theory and practice in election law and policy appear to be suffering 
from something of a “disconnect,” as evidenced on the one hand by the intense partisan 
conflict surrounding electoral rules and procedures, and on the other by the dearth of 
guidance from existing legal doctrine concerning individual voting rights and government 
responsibilities for election administration. This work represents an attempt to address 




The costs associated with the act of voting—represented by the C term of the 
voting calculus—can be difficult to measure or assess, and they are subject to wide 
variation and uncertainty from at least three sources: First, voting costs vary significantly 
as an empirical matter related to institutional differences in election law and policy, as 
implemented through particular rules and procedures of election administration. Second, 
the evaluation of voting costs and their effects on turnout decisions in the calculus is a 
function of the subjective perspective of individuals deciding whether to participate in a 
given election, which may involve highly idiosyncratic assessments. Third, the normative 
characterization of voting costs—and in particular the interpretation of the costs of voting 
“well,” or at least competently—is a matter of contentious debate, and so any attempt to 
describe what these types of costs actually entail in theory or in practice will not be 
simple. 
The costs of voting can be divided into two general categories: substantive costs 
and information costs (Aldrich 1993, 248; Dowding 2005, 446). Substantive costs 
represent the administrative and logistical burdens of electoral participation, including 
registering as required, accessing the polling place or otherwise obtaining and casting a 
ballot, as well as any time or opportunity costs attributed to the act of voting. Information 
costs, on the other hand, reflect the evaluative and decisional burdens faced by 
individuals in obtaining and using information to assess the options on the ballot and 
choose how to vote. These are the types of costs that were first formulated by Anthony 
Downs as subject to the now well-known theory of “rational ignorance” (Downs 1957a, 
246). The costs of information are generally considered more significant from the 
perspective of normative theory, even if they are not viewed empirically as strongly 
determinative of turnout decisions within the calculus (see Dowding 2005, 447; Somin 




issues, for interpretations of these costs implicate intense and long-running debates about 
whether mass democratic electorates have the knowledge and reasoning abilities deemed 
necessary for competent use of the ballot.  
This chapter explores opposing schools of democratic theory that frame the 
dominant approaches to understanding the functions and abilities of voters under modern 
political conditions. The fundamental dispute about the purpose and meaning of mass 
electoral participation is shown to motivate opposing positions in the voter competence 
debates, yielding wide differences of opinion about the costs of casting a reasonably 
informed vote. The chapter will then proceed to demonstrate how these fundamentally 
different views about information costs have important policy implications for current 
problems in election law and administration related to substantive costs. These range 
from constitutional level issues involving institutions of representational versus direct 
democracy and voting rights; to the so-called “nuts and bolts” (Lowenstein 1999, 1202; 
Hasen 2001, 378) of election administration, including registration and documentation 
requirements, convenience voting reforms, and other rules and procedures that affect the 
costs of casting a ballot; to procedural problems particular to “second-order” elections, 
such as whether to hold local races concurrent with or separate from higher-turnout 
national contests. These theoretical debates over the information costs of mass democracy 
may also illuminate the ongoing political battles over the rules for voting in U.S. 
elections—what Richard Hasen has termed, “The Voting Wars” (Hasen 2012).  
As discussed in this dissertation’s introduction, the issues raised by a focus on 
voting costs are clearly highly charged politically, particularly in the polarized 
environment currently dominating American politics, where changes to electoral rules are 
generally perceived as intended to influence the outcomes of elections and the 




James 2011, 225-227). Furthermore, beyond the partisan struggles over the 
implementation of specific voting costs there is a more principled debate over where the 
power to determine the rules for voting should reside. State and local authorities continue 
to fight to maintain the historically “hyper-decentralized” (Tokaji 2009b, 146) 
administration of American elections against perceived federal encroachment (see Hasen 
2012, 7), while scholars consider whether greater uniformity should be established 
through new federal laws and administrative procedures (Hasen 2005, 969; Tokaji 2014, 
100-104; Ewald 2009).1 This debate may in fact date back to the founding era, as 
demonstrated by the somewhat ambivalent Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
which gives initial authority to the states to regulate the “Times, Places, and Manner” of 
federal elections, but then gives Congress the power to “at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations.”2 
It might thus seem pointless to probe for foundational normative principles 
underlying these complex and highly politicized debates. However, while understanding 
that reaching consensus may be difficult or even impossible, these issues are nevertheless 
important to study and discuss. There may even be some reforms to which opposing 
theoretical schools can agree (see Cain 2015, 199-200), or opportunities for partisans to 
reach political compromises (Tokaji 2014; Hasen 2005, 969). Scholars should not evade 
these important issues simply because they are politically sensitive or philosophically 
contentious. The central premise of this chapter—and indeed of this dissertation as a 
whole—is that electoral institutions represent democracy in action, and that research in 
                                                
1 Hasen and Tokaji suggest new federal standards to provide increased uniformity (see infra n. 82), while 
Ewald generally defends existing patterns of decentralization and local control over the administration of 
elections. 
2 Article I, Section 4. The case of Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) emphasizes 
the broad federal power to preempt state regulations under the Elections Clause, but see infra n. 82 for 




law and policy may be particularly well suited to bridging the gap between democratic 
theories and practices (see Gardner 2012, 690). Election laws and policies—from 
Supreme Court doctrine down to the actions of state and local administrators—are 
inevitably linked to basic democratic values and ideals, and so any critical evaluation of 
electoral institutions requires fundamental normative assumptions about the meaning and 
purpose of voting in a system of representative democracy (Thompson 2002, vii-viii; 
Gardner 1997, 897; McCaffery et al. 2004, 9).  
While political scientists have extensively examined electoral institutions in the 
United States and elsewhere for empirical effects on voting behavior and political 
outcomes, they have focused far less on exploring how basic assumptions in democratic 
theory serve to undergird the choices of rules and procedures for participating in elections 
(Gardner 2012, 691). The primary emphasis of institutional analysis in political science 
has thus focused mostly on how and whether institutions “matter” to political outcomes, 
rather than exploring their normative foundations (e.g. Norris 2004; Przeworski 2004).3 
Political theorists have been somewhat more open to the idea that democratic theory 
should have consequences for the design of electoral institutions (e.g. Estlund 1990, 402; 
Kelly 2012, 97; Rehfeld and Schwartzberg 2013, 56; Beitz 1989, 4), but they too have 
often failed to draw clear connections between normative ideals and specific institutional 
reforms (see Waldron 2013, 6; Peonidis 2013, 37; Beitz 1989, ix). Those who do suggest 
reforms often focus mainly on campaign finance or high-level institutional design (e.g. 
Kelly 2012, 97-120; Rehfeld and Schwartzberg 2013, 58-60),4 or they may suggest 
                                                
3 But see March and Olsen (1986), as well as Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 187), in support of a more 
normative focus for institutional analysis in political science. 
4 Kelly advocates for increasing the number of political parties and for campaign finance reform, as well as 
robust judicial review and reforms in public education, while Rehfeld and Schwartzberg recommend 
alternatives for the design of electoral constituencies and new non-electoral forms of accountability. See 




relatively extreme changes that reach beyond the existing institutional framework of 
liberal representative democracy (e.g. Landemore 2013, 117; Peonidis 2013, 38-47; 
Fishkin 2009, 13-15; Beerbohm 2012, 257-274).5 The essential relationship between 
different schools of thought in democratic theory and specific democracy-implementing 
institutions of election law and policy is thus an understudied area in both positive and 
normative scholarship on electoral institutions.6 
Legal scholarship has generally focused more attention on these gaps between 
democratic theory and practice, presumably because the need for normative fundamentals 
has been so readily apparent to scholars analyzing and critiquing judicial decisions on 
election law (Michelman 1989, 444; Pildes 2001, 696; Charles 2002, 1107; Gardner 
2015, 62). Many—if not most—election law scholars thus explicitly fault the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence for lacking the doctrinal coherence necessary for principled 
application of the “law of democracy” (Karlan 1993, 1708; Issacharoff and Pildes 1998, 
644; Gerken 2002, 1413; Charles 2007, 602; Schultz 2014, 7; Gardner 2015, 61).7 
However, the relatively few efforts to offer more comprehensive theories and 
                                                                                                                                            
redistribution—including campaign finance reform, reducing veto points, and proportional representation—
as well as “political antitrust measures” that include nonpartisan regulation and administration of elections. 
5 Landemore, as discussed later in this chapter, endorses random selection of political representatives—or 
sortition—as preferable to holding elections, while Peonidis suggests direct democratic participation in 
legislation through randomly selected citizen assemblies, and also partially endorses sortition, in addition to 
other reforms. James Fishkin famously advocates for new institutions of deliberative democratic 
participation over traditional institutions said to yield “debilitated” or “unrefined” public opinion, and 
Beerbohm goes even further in suggesting non-secret voting, advisory citizen juries, and other non-
electoral forms of participation, while also discussing limits on judicial review and its supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation. 
6 Thompson (2002) provides a notable exception as a work of political theory that draws specific 
implications for various issues in election law and policy. See also Cain (2015) on the implications of 
“pluralist” versus “populist” reform agendas for different aspects of voting rules and procedures. 
7 A few scholars do maintain it is better for the Supreme Court to avoid “lockins of particular theories of 
representation” (Cain 1999, 1590), or that the Court should avoid precise legal standards in cases that 
involve a “controversial… normative political theory” (Hasen 2002, 1473; see also Lowenstein 2002, 283). 





accompanying institutional arrangements have tended to address the so-called “second 
generation” of voting rights issues (see Guinier 1991, 1094; Karlan 1998, 122), which 
involve aggregate or “structural” representational interests—such as gerrymandering or 
other forms of vote dilution—or to focus generally on campaign finance and other 
candidate-oriented areas of election law (e.g. Issacharoff and Pildes 1998; Gerken 2001, 
Charles 2007; Gardner 2009; Post 2014).8 Somewhat neglected have been the theoretical 
underpinnings for cases raising “new vote denial” issues (see Tokaji 2006, 691-692)—
such as challenges to voter identification laws or other administrative procedures claimed 
to burden voting rights. These issues are seen as representing a return to “first-
generation” claims involving interests in participation (Tokaji 2006, 718), which invite a 
more individualized approach to rights adjudication than the structural interests at stake 
in vote dilution cases (see Fishkin 2011, 1290). In particular, the literature is largely 
lacking any coherent normative theory of vote denial that would entail stricter protection 
of the right to vote at the individual level, and which could lend support to electoral 
reforms aiming to minimize substantive costs in order to raise turnout and broaden 
electoral participation.9  
In fact, scholarship in election law and policy contending that major reforms to 
U.S. election law and policy are needed to increase and equalize voter turnout may 
appear to have neglected somewhat the need to fully explicate normative theories in 
                                                
8 Issacharoff and Pildes set forth a competition-based “structural” theory of democratic politics and draw 
implications for ballot access, campaign finance, and vote dilution, while Gerken discusses normative 
theories of vote dilution and structural conceptions of voting rights, and Charles develops and applies a 
theory of institutional distortion caused by gerrymanders. Works by Gardner and Post deal mostly with 
theoretical foundations for campaign finance and other regulatory issues involving candidates and parties. 
9 Joseph Fishkin appears to be one of the few legal scholars to have formulated a comprehensive theory 
that supports the individual interest in electoral participation, which he derives from norms of inclusion and 
equal citizenship (Fishkin 2011, 1333). Other proposals for normative theories applying to cases alleging 
vote denial rely mainly on structural concerns related to election outcomes, rather than individual-level 




support of their participatory proposals (see e.g. Overton 2006; 14-15, 168-169; Wang 
2012, 1-13; Sample 2015).10 Suggestions for reform of judicial procedure in election law 
cases or accountability-based policy reform may also appear to have overlooked the need 
for normative theory (see e.g. Hasen 2009; Gerken 2009).11 In particular, proponents of 
reforms to reduce the administrative burdens of casting a ballot have not adequately 
addressed counter-arguments for higher voting costs intended generally to improve 
democratic competence—arguments that potentially militate against a strongly protected 
individual interest in participation. Those who favor making the voting process easier 
may tend to summarily dismiss such arguments out of hand, claiming that raising costs to 
improve competence is structurally inequitable or motivated by partisanship (Wang 2012, 
7-8; Hasen 2005, 971; Cain 2015, 175). In fact, Hasen goes as far as asserting that “little 
can be said” against arguments for higher costs in the name of voting competence, as 
differences on this issue seem to represent “an irreducible ideological divide” (Hasen 
2005, 972).12 However, even if consensus on this topic remains elusive, there is still 
                                                
10 The works by Overton and Wang each describe administrative burdens on participation and argue for 
law and policy reforms to increase turnout, but they provide only limited theoretical background for their 
analyses and proposals. Sample likewise proposes participatory reforms without detailed discussion of 
normative foundations. Overton has in fact written elsewhere of how “inclusionary” versus “merit-based” 
assumptions in democratic theory support different legal approaches to the administrative burdens on 
participation; however, he identifies merit-based approaches with an “individualized focus,” which he 
rejects because it “fails to recognize that politics involves not simply individual rights but also associational 
and structural concerns” (Overton 2001, 473-480). In contrast, the argument of this chapter is that merit-
based approaches can and should be rejected on individual rights grounds, and that an individualized focus 
can also support inclusionary practices in law and policy. 
11 Hasen argues for a canon of statutory construction in favor of voter enfranchisement, but he appears to 
omit discussion of any basis in democratic theory for this rule of judicial interpretation. Similarly, Greken’s 
work proposes performance measures to rank state and local administrative procedures, but it does not 
seem to discuss theoretical foundations for any standards of best practices. See Elmendorf (2010, 1058); 
Kang (2009, 795). 
12 Hasen elsewhere refers to a conflict between liberals and conservatives about the purpose of voting in a 
democracy, stating, “Conservatives see voting as about choosing the ‘best’ candidate or ‘best’ policies… 
and liberals see it as about the allocation of power among political equals” (Hasen 2014). This substantive 
distinction comes close to the approach of this chapter, as detailed below, but it is not so clear that this 
division separates neatly along conservative/liberal lines, notwithstanding the clear partisan rift on these 




much that can—and arguably must—be said to counter proposals for higher costs in the 
name of democratic competence. It is important to recognize that such proposals may 
actually draw support from empirical research on political knowledge levels and from 
prominent theories of the role of voting in democratic theory.13 Opposition to such 
arguments ought therefore not be taken for granted; their underlying reasons and 
principles should be directly addressed.   
In sum, there is a pressing need—in the courts, in the academy, and in the general 
public discourse—for increased attention to the normative foundations of election law 
and policy. This chapter points in that direction through its focus on individualized 
assessment of the costs of voting in the calculus of turnout. In seeking foundational 
principles behind varying interpretations of voting costs, this work engages in a broader 
project of analyzing electoral rules and procedures through what Dennis Thompson calls 
institutional political theory, which “seeks principles informed enough by actual practice 
to connect to political agents, but detached enough to provide a critical perspective on 
their actions” (Thompson 2002, ix). Regardless of whether it may ever be possible to 
reach consensus on the normative principles or the legal and policy implications 
suggested in this chapter, this approach of this work could still prove useful. In 
Thompson’s words: “[T]he point of institutional theorizing is not to force choices 
                                                                                                                                            
represent a conservative—even a reactionary—position does has a sound basis in historical perspective, 
given the extended record of voting restrictions in the U.S., and the slow, unsteady progression toward the 
universal franchise in this country (see Keyssar 2000).  
13 See generally Sections 3 & 4 below. For a specific discussion of how legal theory may support ensuring 
competence through voting rules, see Michelman 1989 (450-452, 480-485), describing “dialogic” 
conception of deliberative democratic politics, and its possible support for standards of competence to 
ensure the “constitutive value” of voting as engagement in political dialogue. See also Ortiz (2004, 210, 
221-222), suggesting that higher voting costs may be useful for “discouraging unthoughtful participation,” 
but concluding that this approach is problematic from a structural perspective, since the resulting electorate 




between theories, but to facilitate interpretations of the principles themselves” (id.).14 In 
this manner, focusing on the institutional implications of differing interpretations of 
voting costs could contribute to a more deliberative conversation about election law and 
policy, perhaps even with the potential to transcend some of the entrenched partisan 
positions and interests in this area (see Thompson 2002, 186-187; see also Ewald 2012, 
196).15 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a background on the 
varieties of substantive voting costs in American elections and reviews some of the 
political science literature on their empirical effects. Although substantive costs are 
subject to wide variation in practice, and their empirical effects on voter turnout are 
matters of debate, these costs have generally not been viewed as highly determinative to 
the calculus of voting, and their normative significance has not been fully explored. 
Information costs, which are discussed in Section 3, have generally been viewed as more 
important from a theoretical perspective, as indicated above. While these costs also 
exhibit wide variation, they are subject to a more fundamental assessment problem due to 
underlying normative uncertainty about what the informational costs of voting actually 
entail. The discussion of these costs thus proceeds with a view toward debates on voter 
competence and how information costs are characterized by different strands of research 
on the political knowledge and reasoning abilities of American citizens.  
In order to address the fundamental question of what kind of knowledge, and how 
much of it, is needed to vote competently, Section 4 explores the role of information in 
                                                
14 See also Beitz (1989, xi), stating, “Although it would be naive to expect a philosophical theory, by itself, 
to resolve controverted questions of institutional design, an adequate theory should at least identify the 
central values at issue and provide a structure that informs their application.”   
15 Ewald in fact specifically states that “the language of cost is useful” in addressing politicized arguments 




two broadly opposing democratic theories, drawing on William Riker’s seminal 
distinction between “liberalism” and “populism.” The populist interpretation of voting, 
which relies on an epistemic assumption of independent standards for judging the 
substantive correctness of voting decisions, is shown to be associated with deliberative 
democratic theory and its overall skepticism about mass electoral participation due to 
competency concerns. As an alternative to epistemic-deliberative populism, this chapter 
elaborates and extends Riker’s liberalism into a general theory that incorporates the value 
of participation within a framework of competitive democratic theory, while also 
allowing for the expression of deliberative values. Although weak epistemic standards are 
retained under this approach, mass democratic competence is shown to be viable through 
a more procedural epistemology of voting decisions based on perceptions of political 
character and leadership, and through choices of representation based on value 
congruence that entail lower information costs. This provides the normative foundation 
for analyzing particular impositions of substantive voting costs in Section 5, which 
discusses some institutional implications of the opposing theories in three areas: 
constitutional design, election law doctrine, and electoral policy reform. The approach in 
this work lends support to legal arguments for stricter standards of judicial review in 
cases alleging individual rights-based claims of vote denial, as well as supporting policy 
reform proposals that aim to minimize substantive voting costs. The broad standard of 
electoral competence articulated here thus frames the relationship between information 
costs and substantive costs in a way more consistent with efforts to realize an inclusive 





2) SUBSTANTIVE VOTING COSTS 
As indicated previously, the substantive costs of voting in American elections 
vary widely. At the lower end, the act of voting might entail simply spending some free 
time in the evening completing a ballot that was delivered by mail to the voter’s home, 
and then returning the ballot by mail—at the cost of a postage stamp—or otherwise 
delivering the ballot to election officials in a timely matter. At the other extreme, voting 
could conceivably involve the following drawn-out process: first traveling to a 
government records office during business hours, waiting and paying a fee to obtain 
documentation of eligibility—such as a birth certificate, for example; then traveling, 
waiting, and likely paying a fee at another government office to obtain an official 
identification card—such as a driver’s license, possibly registering to vote during that 
process, but if not making sure to register as required, which could involve more travel; 
then traveling to the polls during opening hours and perhaps waiting in line—conceivably 
for a long time—until finally reaching the point of completing and casting a ballot.  
On average, the sum of substantive costs should generally fall somewhere 
between these two extremes, presumably closer to the lower end for most prospective 
voters, but the examples illustrate some of the sources of potential variation. As 
indicated, the distribution of voting costs is a function of a combination of factors: First 
are the institutional differences in election law and administration in different states and 
localities, a consequence of the hyper-decentralization of control over American 
elections. In some states all registered voters can vote absentee without ever having to 
appear at a polling place, or they may vote early in person, while in other states voters 
have no choice but to appear on Election Day in order to cast a ballot.16 In some states 
                                                
16 As of the 2016 elections, no-excuse absentee balloting (by request), along with options for early voting, 




voters must register separately in advance of voting, while in others they may register and 
vote simultaneously.17 Some states require voters to provide an official identification 
document before voting, while others allow simply a signature or other attestation of 
identity.18 There is also the matter of the scheduling of elections: Substantive costs for 
voting in local elections are largely determined by whether they are administered together 
with races for higher office, just as the costs for voting in state elections are strongly 
affected by whether they are scheduled together with federal races or held separately in 
odd calendar years.19 When local and state elections are consolidated with higher races it 
yields “economies of scale” (Aldrich 1993, 261) that reduce the substantive costs of 
voting in down-ballot races essentially to zero—apart from any added time needed to 
mark the ballot, while holding these elections separately greatly increases costs by 
imposing a wholly separate calculus on prospective voters.  
Another source of variation in substantive costs results from the interaction of 
electoral rules with individual situations and circumstances. Thus, only a prospective 
                                                                                                                                            
valid excuse for voting absentee. Oregon, Washington, and Colorado use all-mail voting, or vote-by-mail 
(VBM), in which registered voters automatically receive absentee ballots for all elections. There were 13 
states allowing neither early voting nor absentee balloting without excuse. See NCSL (2016a). 
17 As of 2016, “same-day” registration (SDR), including Election Day registration (EDR), was provided in 
11 states and in the District of Columbia, while 3 more states had enacted SDR but not yet implemented it. 
The state of Maryland permitted SDR during the early voting period, but not EDR, while Ohio allowed for 
5 days of SDR at the beginning of the 35-day early voting period. See NCSL (2016b). 
18 There were 17 states and D.C. with no documentary identification requirements for voting in 2016. At 
the opposite extreme, 11 states enforced “strict” voter ID laws that required individuals without specified 
forms of ID to vote by provisional ballot and to provide an acceptable document within a few days after the 
election in order to have their votes counted. The remaining 22 states enforced “non-strict” identification 
requirements with provisions for allowing individuals lacking proper ID to have their votes counted with no 
additional action required. See NCSL (2016c). 
19 Data on the scheduling of local elections are somewhat scarce, but Anzia reports that about 80 percent of 
municipal elections in the U.S. are held separately from even-year general elections in November (Anzia 
2012a, 24). According to Berry and Gersen (2010, 38), “The timing of local government elections can only 
be described as chaotic.” The scheduling of state elections is easier to assess, with 34 states holding regular 
gubernatorial elections together with off-year congressional races, while 11 states hold them in presidential 
election years (including Vermont and New Hampshire, which hold gubernatorial elections biennially). 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Virginia hold gubernatorial elections in odd years. See 




voter who lacks the required official documentation will bear the costs of obtaining it 
where required. More generally, the time and opportunity costs of casting a ballot will 
vary greatly depending on how individual conditions interact with the administrative 
arrangement; for example, an individual’s transportation resources and availability of free 
time interact with the location of polling places and early voting opportunities to 
influence the overall cost of voting (Dyck and Gimpel 2005). Individual and institutional 
factors may then further interact with other external factors, such as perhaps the weather 
(Gomez et al. 2007). Furthermore, as expressed by the framework of the voting calculus, 
the C term represents an individual assessment of perceived costs and willingness to bear 
them. Such highly idiosyncratic evaluations of negative utility are difficult to quantify, 
and this subjectivity presumably provides another significant source of variation in voting 
costs.  
Despite all this potential variation, however, the dominant view on substantive 
costs appears to be that in practice they are relatively minimal for the average voter 
(Niemi 1976, 115; Blais 2000, 87; Dowding 2005, 446). These types of costs might 
therefore be seen as not representing significantly determinative factors in the voting 
calculus (Highton 2004, 508; Dowding 2005, 446).20 Furthermore, political scientists 
emphasize that substantive voting costs in American elections seem clearly to have 
declined substantially over the past few decades (e.g. Berinsky 2005, 483; Leighley and 
Nagler 2014, 92). Accordingly, John Aldrich concluded back in the early 1990s that 
registration and voting costs were “relatively low and getting lower,” referencing the 
liberalization of voting laws as a result of congressional legislation and Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1960s and 1970s (Aldrich 1993, 261). Given further reforms under the 
                                                
20 But see Aldrich (1993, 261), indicating that because voting is a “low-cost, low-benefit action… [s]mall 




National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (also known as the “Motor Voter Act”),21 and 
the more recent popularization of the various forms of convenience voting in many states, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that the overall process of registering and voting in U.S. 
elections is now easier than it has ever been in modern times (Highton 2004, 511). 
Substantive costs might thus be expected to have little weight in the contemporary voting 
calculus.   
Nevertheless, Aldrich notes, “This is not to say that the costs of registration and 
voting are low in some absolute sense or that they are equally low for all people…. 
[L]aws may still be manipulated to regulate who is more and who is less likely to vote” 
(Aldrich 1993, 262, n. 17). There is indeed substantial evidence that differences in 
substantive costs affect voter turnout, both in the aggregate and at the individual level 
(Dowding 2005, 444-445; Harder and Krosnick 2008, 528-530; Smets and van Ham 
2013, 352).22 In fact, a few early studies found a significant correlation between measures 
of substantive costs and the propensity to vote, challenging the notion that these costs are 
negligible to the calculus (Sigelman and Berry 1982; Sanders 1980).23 Additionally, the 
comparative turnout literature has demonstrated that turnout differences between the U.S. 
and other established democracies are predominantly explained by variation in 
substantive voting costs—most notably the voluntary registration regime that exists in 
most of the U.S. but is absent in other democracies, where voter registration is generally 
undertaken by the government (Burnham 1971, 337; Powell 1986; Wolfinger et al. 1990; 
Tokaji 2008, 503). Furthermore, at the state level within the U.S., studies have 
                                                
21 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511. 
22 But see Blais (2006, 116), indicating that while making voting easier does generally raise turnout, which 
specific electoral rules to facilitate voting have significant turnout effects—as well as the size of any 
effects—remains unclear. 
23 The cost variable in Sanders’ study includes proxies for both substantive and information costs (Sanders 




consistently found that the closing date of registration is a significant factor influencing 
turnout, both individually and in the aggregate (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 78; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 208; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995, 195; Highton 2004, 512, 
n. 32).  
More recently, focus has converged on Election Day registration or same-day 
registration (EDR or SDR) as a significant factor in turnout differences between U.S. 
states (Brians and Grofman 2001; Fitzgerald 2005, 856; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; 
Burden et al. 2014; Leighley and Nagler 2014, 101). There is somewhat less consensus, 
however, regarding the effects of convenience voting reforms, including vote-by-mail 
(VBM), no-excuse absentee balloting, and early in-person voting, with several studies 
finding positive effects on turnout  (Southwell and Burchett 2000; Berinsky et al. 2001; 
Gerber et al. 2013; Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Leighley and Nagler 2014, 115), but 
others finding little or no effects from these types of reforms (Fitzgerald 2005; Gronke et 
al. 2007, 643; Gronke and Miller 2012).24 There is also an ongoing dispute about the 
turnout effects of strict voter identification laws, with some studies finding negative 
effects on turnout (Alvarez et al. 2008; Hood and Bullock 2012; Hajnal et al. 2017), 
while other have failed to find any statistically significant effects from these requirements 
(Mycoff et al. 2009; Ansolabehere 2009; Erikson and Minnite 2009, 96-97).25  
Perhaps more important than aggregate or individual-level turnout effects is the 
question of how substantive cost allocations affect the composition of the electorate. This 
is in fact what Aldrich alludes to in mentioning the possibility of manipulating electoral 
laws through attempts to “regulate who is more and who is less likely to vote” (Aldrich 
                                                
24 For early voting in particular, most of these studies have found a null or even a negative effect on 
turnout. See also Giammo and Brox (2010). 
25 The empirical methods of Hajnal et al. (2017) have also recently been challenged by Grimmer et al. 




1993, 262, n. 17). The prevalence of demographic bias in the American electorate is well 
established (see e.g. Leighley and Nagler 1992), and some argue further that registration 
rules in this country have been systematically exploited to demobilize lower 
socioeconomic groups in pursuit of partisan political gains (Piven and Cloward 1988; 
2000). However, the dominant view among political scientists is that any differences in 
turnout produced by variation in registration and voting procedures have little to no 
effect—or in some cases the opposite intended effect—on the demographic bias of the 
electorate. Earlier empirical studies are skeptical about the compositional effects of more 
lenient registration rules such as later closing dates (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 83; 
Mitchell and Wlezien 1995, 179). More recent research reports only minimal 
compositional effects from EDR (Knack and White 2000; Brians and Grofman 2001, 
170; Hanmer 2009), and no significant change—or even a possible increase—in turnout 
inequality as a result of convenience voting reforms like VBM, no-excuse absentee, and 
early voting (Berinsky et al. 2001, 178; Karp and Banducci 2001, 190; Berinsky 2005). 
Nevertheless, a few studies disagree, finding some evidence that cost-reducing electoral 
rules—with the notable exclusion of early voting—may in fact be associated with 
reduced socioeconomic inequality in the electorate (Avery and Peffley 2005; Rigby and 
Springer 2011; Franko and Tolbert 2010).  
This issue forms part of a broader debate as to whether the preferences of actual 
voters are fairly representative of the voting-eligible population in the U.S., a question of 
crucial concern at the crossroads of empirical and normative political science. If the 
views of non-voters are in fact fairly well represented by those who turn out to vote, there 
is presumably less need to worry about the implications of low turnout for the democratic 
system, and there would be less justification for electoral reforms aimed at reducing 




different electoral—and ultimately political and policy—outcomes, this could potentially 
pose a problem for democratic legitimacy, and it would provide more support for 
electoral reform. Here again, the prevailing wisdom seeks to allay the normative concern 
and mitigate the demand for reform by demonstrating that non-voters are in fact 
reasonably well represented by those who vote, at least in major elections. Several studies 
have thus concluded that even a dramatic increase in turnout—counterfactually or 
prospectively—would be unlikely to yield significant changes in political outcomes, 
since the opinions and preferences of nonvoters appear to be substantially similar to those 
of voters (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 111; Bennett and Resnick 1992, 799; Gant 
and Lyons 1993, 199; Nagel and McNulty 1996, 793; Highton and Wolfinger 2001, 192; 
Sides et al. 2008). However, other studies do find evidence that non-voters differ from 
voters in significant ways and that electoral outcomes might indeed change under higher 
turnout (Martinez and Gill 2005, 1270; Hansford and Gomez 2010; Leighley and Nagler 
2014, 175).26 Many scholars thus continue to argue that low turnout and demographic 
biases in the electorate have important consequences for both politics and policy (Hill et 
al. 1995; Martin 2003; Avery and Peffley 2005; Griffin and Newman 2005; Franko et al. 
2016).  
The question of how political outcomes might differ under elections with higher 
and more equal turnout is exceedingly complex. For one thing, even if data show non-
voters to be fairly similar on average to voters, the non-voters who would decide to 
                                                
26 Notably, even the more skeptical studies do generally find evidence of differences between voters and 
nonvoters, but they characterize these differences as slight and insufficient to alter results except in very 
close elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 111; Bennett and Resnick 1992, 799; Highton and 
Wolfinger 2001, 185; Sides et al. 2008, 523). Moreover, almost all of these studies examine presidential 
elections; Nagel and McNulty analyze senatorial and gubernatorial races, and they do find evidence of 
turnout effects in non-presidential years (Nagel and McNulty 1996, 785). Similarly, Citrin et al. find in 
senatorial elections that “there are indeed meaningful differences in the partisan leanings of voters and 
nonvoters,” emphasizing that their result at least partially “departs from…previous scholarship maintaining 




participate under higher turnout might not necessarily represent non-voters on average 
(Grofman et al. 1999, 371). More fundamentally, the overall political context could be 
altered significantly if politicians and parties changed their campaign strategies in 
response to new patterns of turnout (Lijphart 1997, 4). Attempting to extend the causal 
chain from elections through to policy outputs presents additional analytical challenges. 
Furthermore, even if the prevailing wisdom proved correct about turnout effects in major 
elections, scheduling state or local elections separately, which results in greatly reduced 
turnout, makes it more likely that the preferences of non-voters might differ significantly 
from the preferences of the electorate (Hajnal and Lewis 2003, 661; Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2005, 517; Streb 2011, 13; Sides et al. 2008, 536). There is therefore more 
reason to worry that extremely low turnout in separately scheduled “second-order” 
elections may have critical consequences for politics and policy (Anzia 2012).27  
The timing of second-order elections—which, as indicated previously, is an 
important factor in the allocation of substantive voting costs—represents another key 
element of institutional design having both empirical and normative implications (see 
Dunne 1997; Wood 2002, 228; Meredith 2009; Anzia 2014, 3-4). One might thus 
generally ask, are there good reasons for instituting voting rules and procedures that elicit 
different turnout levels in elections at different levels of government? This directly 
implicates the larger question of whether substantive costs should ever be used to 
regulate the quality of the electorate. Perhaps the scheduling of local elections separate 
from higher-order races might seem reasonable even to those who reject the imposition of 
                                                
27 But see Berry and Gersen (2011, 129), failing to find significant policy effects from timing of school 
board elections in California, and indicating that these findings “support the conventional view that 
outcomes would not change importantly if everyone voted.” Elsewhere, however, these same authors 
express a somewhat different view, stating, “Off-cycle elections generate systematically lower turnout[,] 
and shifts in electoral timing produce identifiable shifts in voter participation and ultimately changes in 




administrative burdens for the ostensible purpose of increasing voter competence. Indeed, 
one of the main reasons cited by state and local officials against consolidating their 
elections with federal races is that “only those citizens who care enough to inform 
themselves will vote” in these elections (Streb 2011, 15).28  
In sum, as a policy matter, and as a matter of legal theory and doctrine, how 
substantively easy or hard should it be to cast a ballot? Should the logistics of voting be 
set up in such a way as to encourage participation, discourage it, or perhaps somehow 
treat it neutrally? As should be clear by now, the relationship between substantive voting 
costs and voter turnout raises crucial issues for both empirical political science and for 
political theory. As indicated, however, while there has been abundant research into the 
practical effects of electoral institutions, there has been far less examination of their 
normative foundations. Moreover, even empirical political scientists may acknowledge 
that the notion that “turnout matters” should not necessarily depend on evidence of 
institutional effects on political outcomes (Leighley and Nagler 2014, 156).29 Much of the 
empirical literature thus seems implicitly to assume that higher and more 
demographically equal turnout is normatively preferable. This assumption may be 
justified by participatory democratic theory, but it does require justification, and other 
schools of democratic thought may in fact challenge that premise—a challenge that must 
                                                
28 Streb himself concludes that “while in a democracy the quality of a person’s vote is always a concern, 
separating state and local elections from federal elections is not a guarantee of smart voting; and it is not a 
reason to purposely lessen voter turnout” (Streb 2011, 15). See also Ortiz (2004, 221), discussing—though 
ultimately rejecting—the argument that raising voting costs by holding local elections separately ensures 
more competent voting. But see Orr (2013, 426), discussing the “deliberative benefit” of scheduling 
elections separately for different levels of government. It is worth noting that separate scheduling of local 
elections was originally a Progressive Era reform, among other reforms made in the name of “good 
government” in the early 20th century (see Anzia 2012a, 24; Bernstein 2014). 
29 According to Leighley & Nagler (2014, 156), “The substantive conclusion that it does not matter who 




be answered. To begin doing so, the focus now shifts from the substantive costs of voting 
to the costs of information. 
 
3) INFORMATION COSTS 
As indicated previously, the information costs of voting are the evaluative and 
decisional burdens associated with examining the options on the ballot and choosing how 
to vote. Any discussion of information costs generally begins with the well-known theory 
of rational ignorance, which Downs first formulated as follows:  
[I]t is irrational for most citizens to acquire political information for purposes of 
voting…. The probability that [one’s] vote will determine which party governs is 
so low that even a trivial cost of procuring information outweighs its return. 
Hence ignorance of politics is…a highly rational response to the facts of political 
life in a large democracy (Downs 1957b, 147).  
The theory of rational ignorance thus emerged from the problem associated with a 
purportedly minuscule value of p in the voting calculus—the so-called “paradox of 
nonvoting,” which is grounded in the assumption that an individual vote matters to an 
election outcome only to the extent that it might be pivotal to breaking (or making) a 
tie—a vanishingly small probability in even the most competitive of large elections 
(Owen and Grofman 1984). According to Downs, this results in a collective action 
problem that deters acquisition of the information needed for the public good of 
democracy, because “it is rational for every individual to minimize [the] investment in 
political information, in spite of the fact that most citizens might benefit substantially if 




This application of the pivotal vote problem to information costs is often cited as 
a critical weakness of mass participatory democracy. Russell Hardin, for example, 
indicates that while many people seem to overcome the pivotal vote problem with respect 
to participating, “the problem of investing in enough knowledge to vote intelligently may 
well be the more fundamentally serious issue in democratic theory” (Hardin 2002, 225).30 
Public choice scholarship in particular has seized on the pivotal vote problem as a major 
obstacle to rationally informed decision-making in politics. Brennan and Buchanan have 
famously argued that if individual votes in large elections have no instrumentally 
efficacy, there is no logical connection between electoral choices and voter preferences 
over outcomes, which provides “widespread scope for electoral irrationality of the most 
basic kind” (Brennan and Buchanan 1984, 199). Ilya Somin extends this argument by 
applying rational ignorance even to altruistic voters with idealistic motives, concluding 
that the lack of incentive to become well informed “stands as a particularly imposing 
obstacle to effective democratic control of government” (Somin 1998, 436). Bryan 
Caplan appears to take rational ignorance to its logical conclusion in his account of 
“rational irrationality,” which asserts that since individual votes have no instrumental 
efficacy, it is actually rational to vote based on any beliefs that are psychologically 
satisfying, even if such beliefs happen to be based on clear factual errors (Caplan 2007, 
123-126). Notably, however, these concerns about the quality of electoral participation 
are not exclusive to scholars in the public choice tradition of economic approaches to 
politics (see Hauptman 2001). James Fishkin, for example, also relies on pivotal theory 
and rational ignorance in his criticism of mass electoral democracy for its failure to meet 
deeper deliberative ideals (Fishkin 2009). As a result of the Downsian collective action 
                                                
30 Hardin traces the modern treatment of the information problems of mass democracy not only to Downs, 
but also to Schumpeter (Hardin 2002, 217). See also Somin (2006, 256-257), indicating that rational 




problem associated with acquiring political information, Fishkin concludes that “if we 
include everyone, it seems that we are unlikely to get a thoughtful public input from our 
democratic institutions” (7).31  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation argued for rejecting pivotal theory and resolving the 
apparent paradox of instrumentally motivated turnout through an alternate interpretation 
of the causal efficacy of individual votes—an interpretation that allows the probability of 
an individual vote contributing to an election outcome to be quite high, at least in 
competitive elections. This argument, if accepted, fundamentally undermines the 
conventional theory of rational ignorance, which as indicated, is founded upon the 
existence of the pivotal voting problem.32 However, even if ignorance about politics were 
no longer considered perfectly rational in theory, empirical evidence of ignorance about 
politics might continue to pose a serious normative problem. Accordingly, the deeper 
difficulty for democratic theory, as Jeffrey Friedman suggests, is not that political 
ignorance is rational, but simply that it is prevalent—and not as a result of calculated 
decisions to remain under-informed about politics, but more likely as a direct result of the 
profound complexity of modern government (Friedman 1998, 407-409; 2013b).  
The literature describing the political knowledge of average Americans is vast and 
enduring, and the evidence of informational deficiencies appears overwhelming at first 
glance (e.g. Berelson 1952; Converse 2006 [1964]; Luskin 1987; Delli Karpini and 
Keeter 1996; Somin 2004). There are generally two schools of thought, however, in 
                                                
31 Fishkin also apparently agrees with Somin that rational ignorance is a problem even if voters have 
altruistic motives, stating, “This problem—that there is little rational motivation for citizens to deliberate 
about public issues in mass democracies—does not depend on citizens being selfish or merely self-
interested” (Fishkin 2009, 49). 
32 At the very least, a rejection of pivotal voting theory limits the application of rational ignorance to 
situations where the cost of acquiring information outweighs other elements of the calculus, such as where 
the pB term is valued at zero because an election is perceived to be uncompetitive and/or because the 




interpreting the implications of this evidence for democratic theory: The first approach 
argues that democracy can succeed notwithstanding these apparent deficits of 
information, either because individuals supplement their low levels of knowledge using 
various forms of cues or heuristics (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Popkin 1991; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998; Druckman 2001; Marietta and Baker 2007), or because some form of 
collective rationality or aggregate efficiency can emerge despite informational 
deficiencies at the individual level (Feld and Grofman 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Wittman 1995; Landemore 2013). The second school of thought takes the abundant 
evidence of shortcomings in political knowledge as a more critical concern for the 
functioning of democracy, and resists the notion that information shortcuts or any 
“miracle of aggregation” could eliminate the problem of missing—or mistaken—
information (Bennett 1996; Kuklinski et al. 2000; Somin 2006; Caplan 2007). Thus, 
while the first approach essentially concludes that the information costs of mass 
democracy are not effectively that high, the alternative view holds that these costs are in 
fact quite substantial, and likely prohibitive in many cases. 
The conclusions of the more pessimistic school are bolstered by evidence of 
“information effects” in survey responses, suggesting that significant deficits in political 
knowledge have practical consequences for public opinion and voting decisions, and 
ultimately on public policy outcomes (Delli Karpini and Keeter 1996, 219; Bartels 1996; 
Gilens 2001; Althaus 2003; Arnold 2012).33 On the other hand, research in political 
                                                
33 These studies generally simulate an objective standard of fully informed opinion—or so-called 
“enlightened preferences”—by imputing the surveyed opinion of highly informed individuals to 
demographically similar individuals with less information. Note that the simulation of enlightened 
preferences may be subject to criticism on methodological grounds, as Althaus himself cautions against 
overconfidence in its results, stating, “The simulation assumes that the opinions of the relatively more 
knowledgeable… indicate the ‘correct’ views, against which all other opinions of similar people should be 
judged. It is easy to see where this assumption might prove untenable” (Althaus 2003, 141). Along these 
lines, Lau and Redlawsk (1997) evaluate vote choice by a more subjective individual standard, and they 




psychology may provide reasons for doubting the pessimistic view. A fundamental 
challenge comes from the psychological concept of ambivalence, which was discussed in 
Chapter 2. If individuals may sometimes simultaneously hold conflicting opinions, this 
state of uncertainty could appear as an absence of clear preferences or “true attitudes” on 
political issues, which would result in survey response patterns that seem to indicate lack 
of knowledge, but that in fact reflect merely ambivalence (see Zaller and Feldman 1992; 
Lavine 2001). In contrast to the pejorative overtones of choices labeled “incorrect” or 
“uninformed,” the concept of ambivalence is more nuanced and less normatively 
charged, reflecting the realistic challenge of “reconciling strongly held but conflicting 
principles and considerations simultaneously present in the political culture” (Lavine 
2001, 915).34 Similarly, the psychological model of “on-line” information processing 
(Lodge et al. 1995), in which individuals maintain a running tally of cognitive 
assessments, suggests that inability to recall factual information in response to survey 
questions does not necessarily imply the incapacity for informed choice or responsive 
political judgment.35 These psychological constructs may raise their own normative 
problems, but they are not problems of low knowledge resulting from high costs of 
information; they are instead problems that arise in information-rich environments as 
well.36  
                                                
34 Notably, even the “voting correctly” approach of Lau and Redlawsk (1997) remains susceptible to the 
problems raised by the possibility of ambivalence.  
35 There are also other methodological objections to the measurement of information effects through 
analysis of survey responses, which may underestimate the quality of actual knowledge (see e.g. Achen 
1975; Mondak and Davis 2001; Prior and Lupia 2008; Levendusky 2011); but see Luskin and Bullock 
(2011), responding to some of these objections. 
36 In fact, in formal analytical terms, increased access to political information will not always yield 
improved vote choice, as additional information could reduce the perceived benefit differential between 





Overall, these arguments about information and its effects can be framed as 
fundamental debates about electoral competence and the role of voters in a mass 
democracy, as reflected in these conflicting interpretations of the implications of political 
knowledge levels for democratic functioning. As with substantive costs, the real and 
perceived costs of information may exhibit significant variation, but there is a more basic 
measurement problem caused by an underlying normative uncertainty about what the 
informational costs of voting actually entail: What kind of information—and how much 
of it—is necessary in order to cast a “well-informed” vote? Is there an independent 
standard by which to judge the quality of a voting decision and to assess whether it is 
sufficiently reasonable or well enough informed? To address these questions, the 
essential elements of democratic competence—which the political knowledge and 
information effects literatures often seem to take for granted—must be defined with 
greater clarity.37 This requires a deeper investigation into underlying interpretations of the 
meaning of voting in democratic information theory.  
 
4)  INFORMATION THEORY FOR REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Near the dawn of the modern-day empirical findings of sizable political 
information deficits among the American public, E. E. Schattschneider stated, “The 
significance of this widespread ignorance about public affairs depends largely on what 
we think democracy is” (Schattschneider 1960, 135). Likewise, conceptions of 
democracy are inextricably tied to characterizations of the information costs of voting, 
since the amount and type of information needed to make competent voting decisions 
                                                
37 There are some who oppose use of the normative concept of democratic competence, arguing that it is 
either too elitist or too vague to be theoretically useful (Smiley 1999; Weissberg 2001; Lupia 2006). 
Others, however, assert that the concept of competence may be useful for institutional design, particularly 




depends on basic interpretations of the meaning and purpose of democracy (Kelly 2012, 
61). It is therefore important to begin by observing that in contemporary democratic 
theory and practice, and particularly in the American democratic tradition, the primary 
institutional focus is on representative, not direct, democratic forms (see e.g. Levinson 
2012, 76; Serota and Leib 2013, 1599).38 Representative democracy may in fact be the 
archetypal institutional response to the perceived problem of mass democratic 
competence. When James Madison advocated for an American republic—by which he 
specifically meant, “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place,” his 
famously stated purpose was “to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens” (Madison 2001 [1787], 46). Madison 
thus believed that the body of elected representatives would tend to make decisions “that 
are more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves” 
(id.). This of course does not mean that elected representatives will always make 
decisions that are fully consonant with the public good, as Madison readily admitted (47), 
but the ideal model is one that aims at improving democratic competence through this 
institutional “scheme.” 
Nevertheless, there may be reasons to doubt whether the masses can ever acquire 
sufficient information to achieve democratic competence even under an ideal 
representative democracy. There are of course many different ways of understanding the 
meaning and function of political representation (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 2003), and 
these distinctive understandings may entail different standards of knowledge 
requirements for democratic competence (Disch 2011). According to Ilya Somin, voters 
                                                
38 A discussion of the information costs of direct democracy is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it may 
generally be seen to have higher informational requirements, so that if voters are seen as incompetent for 
electing representatives, they could a fortiori be presumed incompetent for direct democracy (Burnett & 




are generally incompetent for representative democracy even under representational 
theories with the least demanding informational requirements (Somin 2013, 38). The 
theory of retrospective voting—in which voters are seen as empowered simply to decide 
whether to retain or replace incumbents—is the least demanding representational theory 
in Somin’s view; however, he argues that considerable political knowledge is required to 
competently judge the performance of elected officials—including, he says, at least a 
basic understanding of the formation of public policy, and the ability to accurately 
evaluate particular policy implementations (40-41). Likewise, Somin contends that the 
second least demanding theory—Burkean trusteeship—requires voters to have basic 
knowledge of the functions of particular government offices and the qualifications of 
candidates for those positions (43-44).39 In a similar vein, Russell Hardin discusses the 
high informational demands of effective representation, stating, “If we wish to assess the 
morality of elected officials, we must understand their function as our representatives and 
then infer how they can fulfill this function” (Hardin 2004, 76). For informational 
skeptics like Somin and Hardin, doubts about democratic competence are not allayed by 
the Madisonian scheme of representation. Arguably, this is because they subscribe—in 
the tradition not of Madison, but rather Rousseau—to what William Riker calls the 
                                                
39 Although Somin’s ordering of representational theories has Burkean trusteeship with greater knowledge 
requirements than retrospective voting (38), the level of policy understanding he indicates is necessary for 
competent retrospective voting arguably seems more demanding than the requirements of trusteeship 
theory, which he indicates is “concerned more with the personal qualities of political leaders than with their 
policies or issue positions” (44). Furthermore, Somin writes in a footnote that “few modern theorists fully 
subscribe to the Burkean trusteeship model,” citing Pitkin on the problematic assumption that 
representatives can determine the “‘true’ interests” of their constituents in an “‘objective’ and unbiased 
manner.” (213, n. 26) Pitkin indeed criticizes Burke’s model of representation for assuming that “political 
questions have right answers that can be found” through a process of “rational deliberation,” as Pitkin states 
that for most modern theorists, “political questions are inevitably controversial ones without a right 
answer” (Pitkin 1967, 189). However, Somin’s indication that trusteeship theory is concerned with the 
personal qualities of political leaders seems to challenge that characterization, and moreover, the 
assumption that right answers to political questions might be found by rational deliberation seems to be one 




populist interpretation of democratic voting; namely, that the popular will of the people 
should be embodied in its political representatives (Riker 1982, 11).  
a) Riker’s Populism and Epistemic Democratic Theory 
According to Riker, it is only under the populist interpretation of voting—which 
subscribes to an ideal of representation in accordance with an identifiable popular will—
that there is an objective standard for judging the quality or correctness of electoral 
outcomes (Riker 1982, 11). In contrast, under what Riker terms the liberal interpretation 
of voting, he states that “it is not assumed that the electorate is right,” nor is there any 
basic assumption of “popular competence” (10). In place of voting outcomes expressing 
the popular will, Riker’s liberalism requires only that “the electorate can change officials 
if many people are dissatisfied or hope for better performance” (11).40 For populism to 
function, there is a need for a reliable mechanism to aggregate individual preferences into 
an expression of the popular will; however, Riker’s essential assertion is that no voting 
system is able to perform this aggregation function fairly and accurately, and he thus 
                                                
40 Schattschneider employs an apparently similar distinction, contrasting what he calls the classical ideal of 
“government by the people” with democracy defined as “a political system in which the people have a 
choice among alternatives created by competing political organizations and leaders” (Schattschneider 1960, 
141). For an updated version of this theoretical dichotomy, see (Beerbohm 2012, 27-28), describing 
competing conceptions of democracy as “self-rule” versus “answerable rule.” Bruce Cain’s distinction 
between populist and pluralist democratic design strategies may also be seen as generally tracking this 
conceptual distinction, particularly with regard to his understanding of the goal of populism as “perfect 
representation of individual preference” (Cain 2015, 200). Achen and Bartels also distinguish between 
populist democratic theories and models based on “leadership selection,” but they conclude—along with 
Somin and Hardin as discussed above—that empirical research casts doubt on the prospects of individual-
level competence even just for choosing leaders (Achen and Bartels 2016, 2-4). Instead, Achen and Bartels 
advocate for democratic theory based in what they consider more “realist” conceptions of group identity 
(311-313). Riker’s dichotomy might also be seen as corresponding somewhat with the classical liberal 
versus civic republican paradigm, to the extent that republicanism may be viewed as supporting the 
existence of a “substantive common interest or good,” while “liberal pluralism” is associated with the 
denial of any objectively identifiable common interest (Michelman 1989, 445). However, Michelman’s 
more nuanced framework of conceptions of democracy in constitutional discourse shows that the traditional 
republican versus liberal dichotomy does not necessarily track other dimensions of normative distinctions 
(450-452). Riker’s liberalism should therefore not be equated with liberalism more generally, nor his 




argues that populism must be rejected, “simply because we do not and cannot know what 
the people want” (Riker 1982, 238).41 The more important point for present purposes, 
however, is that rejecting populism also has the effect of alleviating concerns about 
democratic competence that arise from apparent deficits of political information. Riker 
actually goes as far as arguing that even ostensibly random decision-making by voters 
“does not really matter for the liberal hope of preventing an official’s abuse of office and 
authority” (243).42 What remains therefore is clearly a very minimal vision of democracy, 
as Riker readily admits: “The kind of democracy that thus survives is not, however, 
popular rule, but an intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular veto” (244). 
This limited conception of the meaning and purpose of democracy, which clearly 
echoes the minimalist theory of Joseph Schumpeter (2003 [1942]), has been considered 
unsatisfactory to many—if not most—democratic theorists. As Coleman and Ferejohn 
have argued in response to Riker, if conclusions about the meaninglessness of voting 
outcomes were taken to their logical extreme—if the removal of officials were really 
random—it would in fact seem to threaten the foundations even of Riker’s minimalist 
liberal democracy (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, 22).43 A purely random decision 
method—such as rule by coin toss—might be a fair way of making decisions, but it 
would not be a democratic procedure, which presumably aims at better than random 
                                                
41 Riker’s overall argument employs the voting paradox associated with Arrow’s theorem (not to be 
confused with the paradox of “nonvoting” associated with pivotal theory), along with the existence of other 
opportunities for manipulating the conditions of social choice, to conclude that “the outcomes of voting are 
not necessarily fair and true amalgamations of voters’ values,” and that in fact “these outcomes may be 
meaningless” (Riker 1982, 233). 
42 “Indeed,” states Riker, “an official who faces an electorate knowing that it sometimes works randomly 
and may ‘unfairly’ reject him or her has a powerful motive to try even harder to avoid offending voters” 
(243). 
43 More substantively, Coleman & Ferejohn challenge Riker’s conclusion that voting outcome are 
meaninglessness, and they argue that formal problems such as cycles and agenda-based control are in 
practice less common and pervasive than Riker assumes (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, 15, 23-24). See also 




outcomes (Estlund 2008, 6).44 Coleman and Ferejohn thus argue that democratic 
legitimacy cannot be purely procedural—there is a need for some substantive content or 
instrumental purposes in order for democratic decision-making to have any real 
normative meaning (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, 22).  
Accordingly, Coleman and Ferejohn defend populism from Riker’s challenge by 
proposing the possibility of an “epistemic” theory of democracy, in which voting is seen 
as “consisting in judgments—which can be either true or false—rather than in 
expressions of preferences—which are neither” (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, 15-16). 
Joshua Cohen elaborates this epistemic interpretation of voting, stating that it consists of 
three basic elements: 1) “an independent standard of correct decisions”; 2) “a cognitive 
account of voting,” in which individuals vote in accordance with beliefs about the given 
standard of correctness; and 3) “an account of decision-making as a process of the 
adjustment of beliefs…in light of evidence about the correct answer that is provided by 
the beliefs of others” (Cohen 1986, 34). Cohen thus concludes, “What the epistemic 
populist claims is that, when there is a general will, and public deliberation is guided by 
the principles that define that will, the decisions of majorities about which policies to 
pursue can provide good evidence about which policies are in fact best” (id.). 
Pessimists about the prospects for democratic competence due to informational 
problems can be seen as generally committed to this epistemic interpretation of voting, 
which assumes the existence of correct—or at least better and worse—answers to 
political questions. These theorists therefore tend to reject “normative skepticism” and 
instead presume the existence of “independent standards against which we must evaluate 
                                                
44 Note that pessimists about democratic competence worry that voting decisions may be worse than 




the correctness of our judgments” (Kelly 2012, 36).45 Moreover, epistemic assumptions 
may extend to democratic optimists as well. Hélène Landemore, whose work is generally 
more confident about the prospects for democratic competence, retains an epistemic 
assumption affirming that “at least for some political questions there are right or correct 
answers” (Landemore 2013, 208).46 The roots of this epistemic assumption can likewise 
be seen in more optimistic analyses of democratic competence appealing to the 
Condorcet jury theorem, which requires as a basic premise the existence of an objectively 
correct answer to whatever question is put to a vote (Grofman and Feld 1988, 569).47  
This confidence of epistemic approaches to democracy in the existence of more or 
less correct answers to political questions—of essentially true or false political ideas—
leads to institutional approaches that emphasize informational issues, which fall generally 
under the umbrella of deliberative democratic theory.48 James Fishkin’s work typifies this 
approach, distinguishing between institutions designed to express “raw” public opinion 
formed under “debilitated conditions,” and institutions that facilitate a more “refined” 
expression of “deliberative public opinion” (Fishkin 2009, 13-14). Similarly, Cohen’s 
ideal deliberative procedure distinguishes between the institutional implications of voting 
                                                
45 In fairness, Kelly indicates only that independent standards for judging the correctness of decisions must 
exist “at least some of the time” (Kelly 2012, 36). Similarly, Coleman and Ferejohn state, “The epistemic 
populist begins by distinguishing between those electoral issues in which there exists a general will and 
those in which there is no reason to believe that there is a general will or disposition” (Coleman and 
Ferejohn 1986, 16). 
46 Landemore’s approach—which she terms “political cognitivism”—is particularly flexible in allowing for 
weaker and stronger epistemic approaches (213), and even for the possibility of an epistemic theory in 
which the standard of correctness is “socially and culturally determined” (217).  
47 The Condorcet jury theorem ensures that a majority voting decision of a large group will almost always 
reflect the “correct” answer to a binary question, assuming that voters have at least a 50 percent chance of 
identifying the correct answer, and each voter decides independently—and votes sincerely (Grofman and 
Feld 1988, 569-570). See also Landemore (2013, 71). 
48 The epistemic deliberative democracy discussed here may be distinguished from what Kelly calls “deep 
deliberative democracy,” a purely procedural theory holding that the process of deliberation is intrinsically 
valuable, independent of its effects on outcomes (Kelly 2012, 48). Kelly concludes that deep deliberative 




under conditions of a commitment to providing “reasons persuasive to all,” and voting 
viewed as the aggregation “of non-deliberative preferences” (Cohen 1989, 23). 
Landemore’s deliberative theory, perhaps somewhat more flexibly, focuses on the 
epistemic appeal of inclusiveness and cognitive diversity, arguing that “deliberation 
among inclusive groups is likely to produce better results” (Landemore 2013, 90).49  
A potential problem with epistemic approaches in deliberative democratic theory, 
however, is that they generally fail to provide much support for broadly participatory 
institutions. This is perhaps most explicit in Fishkin’s “trilemma of democratic reform,” 
which describes three primary values that modern democratic institutions aim to express: 
1) political equality, 2) deliberation, and 3) mass participation (Fishkin 2009, 32).50 The 
“trilemma” arises because according to Fishkin it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy 
all three democratic values.51 The primary emphasis is on the apparent conflict between 
participatory and deliberative values—and more specifically, on the defects of what 
Fishkin terms “raw” public opinion under conditions of mass participation that lack 
adequate procedures for deliberation (47-52). While acknowledging the historical 
trajectory of democratic institutional development in the direction of expanding and 
equalizing the suffrage, Fishkin nevertheless laments how “opening up political processes 
                                                
49 Kelly is apparently somewhat more skeptical about the epistemic properties of deliberation, indicating 
that epistemic theories of deliberative democracy may be subject to challenges based on “framing effects 
and other cognitive pathologies” (Kelly 2012, 89). Much of the criticism of deliberative theory in fact 
emerges from an epistemic perspective, offering both empirical and theoretical arguments that deliberation 
fails to deliver on its promises of finding right answers (Thompson 2008, 498-499; Pennington 2010; 
Somin 2010). 
50 Fishkin later adds a fourth value, non-tyranny—which is concerned with limitations on majority rule and 
is said to apply not to the democratic process itself but to the outcome of that process (60). 
51 See also Ortiz (2004, 211), indicating that conflict between the value of “thoughtful” choice and the 




to facilitate mass participation has had the unexpected effect of lessening the realization 
of…deliberation” (48).52  
It is easy to see why epistemic theorists are tentative about endorsing mass 
participation in elections, as there is indeed a certain contradiction in insisting that 
democracy should have strong epistemic properties, while at the same time endorsing 
participation by what appear to be severely uninformed and perhaps even irrational 
citizens. An extreme demonstration of this tension is evident in the work of Jason 
Brennan, who argues earnestly in favor of replacing universal suffrage with “a moderate 
epistocracy, in which suffrage is restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence” 
(Brennan 2011b, 700). Brennan’s proposal for restricted suffrage presumably falls 
beyond the pale of contemporary democratic norms, but in fact it seems to follow 
logically from the core assumption in epistemic theory of an independent standard of 
correctness. As Coleman and Ferejohn suggest in their account of epistemic theory, “The 
desirability of a voting rule will…depend on its reliability—the extent to which the 
collective judgments it generates converge with what is in fact the correct judgment” 
(Coleman and Ferejohn 1986, 16-17).53 A certain ambivalence about mass participation is 
likewise detectable even in less extreme proponents of epistemic theory. David Estlund, 
for example, indicates that rule by the knowledgeable few could in principle confer more 
normative legitimacy than mass electoral participation, but he indicates that such an 
epistocracy should be rejected for procedural reasons arising from the inability to agree 
on “a justification that could be accepted by all qualified points of view” (Estlund 2008, 
                                                
52 This is not to say that Fishkin advocates a return to reduced or restricted suffrage; rather, he aims to fill 
the epistemic gap in democratic institutions by incorporating more opportunities for deliberation (25-31). 
See also Ackerman and Fishkin (2004), advocating for a national holiday to facilitate deliberation prior to 
elections. 
53 Coleman & Ferejohn admit there are conceptual difficulties in identifying the reliability of any voting 




33). Landemore, on the other hand, provides substantive reasons against epistocracy 
(Landemore 2013, 52), but in order to ensure cognitively diverse deliberation she 
advocates a system of sortition in place of mass electoral participation, concluding that 
“random selection is preferable to elections as a selection mechanism for representatives” 
(117).  
There is thus a real conflict between epistemically-based conceptions of 
deliberative democracy and contemporary notions of mass electoral participation. 
Without seriously entertaining arguments for suffrage restrictions, epistemic democratic 
theory could nevertheless make a reasonable case for higher substantive voting costs, and 
it might likewise offer general normative legitimation of lower turnout elections (see 
Rosema 2007).54 The question then for participatory theorists is whether there can be a 
coherent alternative to epistemic theory: Is there any interpretation of voting capable of 
supporting the ideal of mass electoral participation without sacrificing democratic 
meaning? Epistemic theorists have proceeded as if it were self-evident that any non-
epistemic interpretation of voting would be overly minimalist and therefore 
insupportable. Might there, however, be a meaningful theory of democracy that is able to 
avoid strong epistemic interpretations of voting? Is it possible to justify the notion that 
there are no right or wrong answers to voting decisions without drifting into pure 
proceduralism? Can institutions of broad electoral participation be embraced without 
completely sacrificing the democratic value of deliberation? In other words, might there 
be a solution to Fishkin’s trilemma?  
                                                
54 According to Rosema, low turnout may be a “blessing in disguise,” since those who do participate are 




b) A Non-Minimalist Alternative to Epistemic Theory 
Fishkin begins by asserting that there is no one unified conception of democratic 
theory, rather there are several competing theoretical approaches to understanding 
democracy. He thus divides prevailing theories into four categories of ideal types, 
labeled: 1) competitive democracy, 2) elite deliberation, 3) participatory democracy, and 
4) deliberative democracy. According to Fishkin, the trilemma arises because none of 
these theories can simultaneously satisfy all the democratic values of participation, 
equality, deliberation, and non-tyranny (Fishkin 2009, 65-66).55 If, however, there were a 
way to incorporate all of these values in democratic institutional design, this would not 
only resolve the purported trilemma, but it could also form the basis for a more 
comprehensive unified theory that effectively combines the four prevailing approaches. 
In fact, Fishkin’s own analysis sets out a framework for constructing a more expansive 
theory along these lines. In an appendix entitled, “Why We Need only Four Democratic 
Theories,” he argues that any attempt to satisfy all the democratic values is a “utopian” 
pursuit destined to fail, because it ignores the “difficult trade-offs” posed by the trilemma 
(198). However, the competing ideal theories that Fishkin outlines can in principle be 
seen as broadly consistent, and all four democratic values can arguably be combined into 
a coherently unified theory that does not warrant the pejorative designation of 
minimalism.  
Fishkin’s review of ideal theoretical types begins with competitive democracy, 
which he identifies as originating in Schumpeterian minimalism (66).56 The basis of 
competitive theory is simply that democratic elections should provide opportunities for 
                                                
55 As indicated above, Fishkin adds a fourth democratic value of non-tyranny subsequent to his formulation 
of the “trilemma” (see supra n. 50).  
56 Fishkin also cites more recent examples of competitive theory in the work of Richard Posner and Ian 




peaceful alternation in government, and that there should be some basic constitutional 
restraints on government authority. Echoing Riker’s rejection of populism, Fishkin states 
that under competitive theory, “to expect the will of the people to mean much, if anything 
at all, is a delusion” (67). According to Fishkin, the main democratic value that 
competitive theory satisfies is non-tyranny, but he states that the ideal type of this theory 
is best understood as integrating basic claims to equality as well. The first question in 
trying to outline a unified theory is thus whether competitive theory can also be 
interpreted in a way that integrates the value of participation, notwithstanding the fact 
that competitive theorists have been generally skeptical regarding mass participation, as 
Fishkin indicates (69).  
Fishkin himself answers this question affirmatively, stating that a joint 
commitment to participation, equality, and non-tyranny “is best seen as a variant of 
competitive democracy that adds a concern for mass participation,” which he concedes is 
“a reasonable alternative for anyone concerned with competitive elections” (200). In fact, 
Riker explains his theory of liberal democracy as based upon three principles: 
participation, equality, and liberty—which he states cohere together through a focus on 
voting as “the central act of democracy” (Riker 1982, 5).57 Indeed, according to Riker, 
“The crucial attribute of democracy is popular participation in government” (id.). Under 
Riker’s liberalism, whether a democratic outcome is “correct”—not epistemically, but in 
a sense of normative legitimacy—could thus crucially depend on high levels of 
participation. Under populism, as reflected in the epistemic interpretation of voting, low 
participation might be seen to engender a legitimate outcome if it represents an informed 
                                                
57 Riker’s concept of liberty, which he associates with individual freedom and autonomy (Riker 1982, 6), 
does not exactly track Fishkin’s value of non-tyranny, although there is clearly some resemblance. Riker 
states that constitutional restraints against tyranny are compatible with his theory of liberalism, and in 




decision that is more likely to be correct than it would have been had more citizens 
participated. However, when conceiving of democracy as a competition for mass 
approval, or avoidance of a popular veto, outcomes produced under conditions of low 
participation could be seen as lacking in normative legitimacy. This would of course be 
particularly true if increased participation might have altered the result, but even if 
outcomes are not dependent on turnout levels, competitive theory might still be 
interpreted to require high turnout to the extent that participation is seen as constitutive of 
democratic legitimacy, as opposed to merely reflecting an instrumental constraint (see 
Michelman 1989, 451).58 
What then remains in order to construct a more comprehensive unified theory of 
democracy on Fishkin’s terms is only to incorporate the value of deliberation. Here it is 
important to note how Fishkin divides the ideal theoretical types emphasizing 
deliberation into two separate categories of “elite deliberation” and “deliberative 
democracy.” According to Fishkin, elite deliberation is essentially just representative 
democratic theory in the Madisonian tradition, while the category of true deliberative 
democracy is reserved for deliberation “by the people themselves” in what appear to be 
more direct democratic forms (Fishkin 2009, 70-73). However, representative democracy 
with the value of deliberation satisfied mainly at the elite level is fully consistent with 
competitive theory, and it is also fully consistent with mass participation. Fishkin is 
critical of Madisonian theory as lacking in the value of political equality, arguing that it 
institutionalizes deliberation “for the people,” but not deliberation “by the people,” since 
it “does not offer each voter an equal chance of being decisive on substantive decisions” 
(73). However, the election of representatives surely does implicate important issues of 
                                                
58 Michelman states that the constitutive—as opposed to instrumental—value of participation has generally 
been associated with deliberative ideals in American constitutional discourse, but he indicates that this 




participatory equality, and it thus seems wrong to criticize elite deliberation on this basis, 
unless one means to reject representative democratic forms in their entirety. Furthermore, 
if deliberation is valued for its epistemic properties, shifting this function to elected 
representatives should seem attractive. Of course, epistemic problems may arise at the 
elite level as well, but representative assemblies may—at least in principle—be able to 
avoid these problems by serving as what Fishkin calls “deliberative microcosms” for 
making informed decisions about public policy.59 In other words, Fishkin has not proved 
why deliberation “by” the people is an absolute necessity. Deliberation “for” the people 
does not exclude the possibility of “government by the people,” again, unless one means 
to question the foundations of representative democratic theory.60 
Incorporating the value of deliberation at the elite level thus allows for a coherent 
unified theory that comprehensively embraces all the democratic values identified by 
Fishkin. Nevertheless, the value of deliberation under this theory need not be isolated 
exclusively to the realm of elites. The existence of opportunities for deliberation by 
citizens at the mass level is certainly not inconsistent with a competitive/participatory 
approach to democratic theory, even when rejecting the epistemic assumption that voting 
decisions should be evaluated by an independent standard of correctness. The deliberative 
theory of Bernard Manin illustrates this well: According to Manin, the competing norms 
involved in political debate are not subject to an independent standard of correctness by 
which they can be judged either true or false; however, politics is “not reduced to pure 
arbitrariness because a norm can be more or less justified” (Manin 1987, 354). It is this 
                                                
59 This obviously echoes the Madisonian ideal of representation to “refine and enlarge the public view.” It 
also seems closer to the Burkean understanding of trustee representation, which as noted previously, Pitkin 
identifies with the epistemic assumption that “political questions have right answers” (see supra n. 39). 
60 However, it may be noted that Schattschneider indicates that a literal interpretation of the ideal of 




process of argumentative justification taking place in the public sphere that forms the 
basis for Manin’s version of deliberative democracy.61 Manin stresses that this concept of 
deliberative legitimacy is consistent with the Schumpeterian understanding of democracy 
as a competition for political power, and with voting understood as a necessary 
aggregative mechanism to conclude the process of public deliberation (Manin 1987, 359-
359).62 Furthermore, Manin’s also suggests the need for high levels of participation in 
order to legitimate democratic decision-making, stating as follows: “The deliberative 
principle is both individualistic and democratic. It implies that all participate in the 
deliberation, and in this sense the decision made can reasonably be considered as 
emanating from the people” (352).63 In Manin’s view, it is essentially the participation of 
the masses—not the correctness of its decisions—that confers normative democratic 
legitimacy. 
This discussion still begs the question of whether the masses can indeed be 
viewed as competent to engage in meaningful deliberation or voting in the context of 
representative democratic institutions. It remains to be seen whether information costs 
under the theory outlined here are low enough that most—if not all—citizens should be 
willing and able to pay them. In order to respond to skeptics about democratic 
                                                
61 Note that Manin’s conception of political deliberation, which he contrasts with Rousseau’s view, opens 
the way for rhetorical forms of justification that may include value-based arguments about character and 
appeals to emotion, in addition to more rational modes of argumentation (Manin 1987, 346). In a similar 
vein, Yack (2006, 418) characterizes Aristotelian deliberation as relying on “appeals to character and 
emotion, as well as the giving of reasons.” See also Chambers (2009) discussing the role of “deliberative 
rhetoric” in democratic politics. 
62 Similarly, Richard Pildes states that “deliberation and competitive theories…are not logically 
incompatible” (Pildes 2004a, 691). Dennis Thompson likewise indicates that the deliberative value of 
informed decision-making is “no less central to conceptions that are often contrasted with deliberative 
theories, such as competitive theories” (Thompson 2013, 372). Thompson calls generally for a more 
“restrained” approach to deliberative theory in the context of election law (378). 
63 Manin actually indicates that what is required is not actual participation by all, but rather only “the right 
of all to participate in deliberation” (352). However, he does not clarify why the mere right to participate, 
even if unexercised by a substantial proportion of the citizenry, should be sufficient to ensure that a 




competence and to more fully justify participatory democratic institutions, greater 
specificity is needed regarding the minimum informational requirements of voting under 
this unified liberal democratic theory.  
c) Epistemic Theory in its Right Place 
Even if the basic assumption of the epistemic interpretation of voting—the 
existence of independent standards of correctness—is rejected, electoral decisions should 
still be expected to retain some epistemic qualities. Contrary to Riker, it seems clear that 
completely uninformed or random voting cannot be viewed as meaningful under any 
democratic theory. Accordingly, there should presumably be some minimum standard of 
cognitive capacity required to vote, which would justify, for example, the exclusion of 
children and adults judged lacking in basic mental abilities.64  
Furthermore, even competitive theorists generally accept the fundamental value of 
informed over uninformed decision-making (see Thompson 2013, 372), notwithstanding 
disagreement about what it means to be informed enough to make a competent voting 
decision. At the very least, voters should be making decisions based on what they think or 
know to be true. This might be described as a weaker, more proceduralist, epistemology 
of voting, which echoes Robert Talisse’s conception of “folk epistemology” (Talisse 
2010). Talisse’s approach entails a minimalist conception of belief that demands only that 
                                                
64 This is a very low standard in epistemic terms. Prevailing legal rules generally state that persons may be 
judged incompetent to vote only if they “lack the capacity to understand the nature and effect of voting 
such that they cannot make an individual choice.” Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D. Me 2001). 
Based on this standard, psychiatrists have developed a Competency Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V), 
which tests for basic knowledge of how elections work, and for the ability to formulate a preference 
between candidates based on stated policy positions (Appelbaum, et al. 2005). Note that although this 
standard of mental competence can justify the exclusion of young children up to an indeterminate age, the 
exclusion from the franchise of all minors under the age of eighteen, as well as the exclusion of non-





“[w]hen we believe something, we believe that it is true, as established by what we take 
to be good evidence and sound reasoning” (284). This subjective epistemic standard sets 
a much lower bar for competent voting, with essentially no room for incorrectly held 
beliefs, for as Talisse points out, “thinking that a belief is false is inconsistent with 
maintaining that belief” (id.). This approach can therefore form the basis for a theory of 
democratic legitimacy that is “consistent with decidedly negative assessments of the 
deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens” (291). After thus discarding the stronger and 
more substantive epistemic premise regarding the existence of objectively correct and 
incorrect voting decisions, the boundaries of minimal competence may be extended much 
further, obviating many of the concerns of information-based skeptics. 
Applying Talisse’s folk epistemology to an interpretation of voting under the 
unified theory of liberal democracy, voting should be viewed as an exercise of popular 
control over the substance of public policy, with the high informational demands that 
would be required by such control. Instead, the purpose of voting is limited to the 
practical problem of selection and rejection of political representatives. This approach 
thus builds upon Riker’s liberalism, but it seeks to extend and ground his theory in 
response to its epistemic critics. What is missing from Riker’s theory is a plausible 
conception of minimal epistemic standards for making decisions about whether to retain 
or replace representatives. An elaboration of the basis for such a conception is provided 
by some of those who have responded to democratic competence skeptics.  
David Ciepley, for example, appeals to Max Weber’s understanding of 
democracy, which holds that “the general problem is not one of securing popular control, 
but of securing responsible and effective leadership” (Ciepley 1998, 192). Summarizing 
the knowledge requirements of this Weberian approach, Ciepley states that “what is most 




character” (222). Ciepley outlines the basic qualities of political character in Weber’s 
view (215-220), but arguably these types of judgments must be allowed as idiosyncratic 
and perhaps somewhat opaque even to those making them. What are the essential 
requirements and qualifications for identifying a good political representative? In the 
emphatic words of Schattschneider, who would presumably agree with the Weberian 
approach, “This is a problem of leadership, organization, alternatives and systems of 
responsibility and confidence” (Schattschneider 1960, 138). This approach no doubt 
raises complex and challenging issues, but what should be clear is that judgments 
regarding political character and leadership in general are subjective matters that cannot 
be identified as objectively correct or incorrect.  
Considerations of leadership and fitness for office are thus easily detached from 
strong epistemic conceptions of correctness, and such judgments do not necessarily entail 
high information costs, since decisions on these matters can often be made on a heuristic 
basis with relatively little information. Justificatory arguments within a context of 
conflicting norms and values—fitting Manin’s conception of a deliberative process that 
legitimates democratic decisions—are commonly made regarding these considerations. 
With control over policy thus left to government officials, the model of representation 
that emerges is much closer to Burkean trusteeship than the more populist delegate model 
in which representatives are expected to reflect the (majority) policy preferences of their 
constituents. Voters surely do need some information about candidates in order to vote 
competently under these weaker epistemic standards, but they might not need a great 
deal, and they almost certainly do not need as much as some of the competence skeptics 
have assumed. For example, voters may not need to understand the specific functions and 
responsibilities of various elected officials within the policy process, as Somin suggests is 




one trusts in the essential character and leadership capabilities of a candidate (or perhaps 
at least mistrusts that candidate less than the opposition), there is arguably much less 
need to understand the minutiae of that candidate’s official activities and responsibilities 
if elected.   
Moreover, it is not necessary to completely exclude substantive considerations of 
policy and issue voting from the weaker epistemology of voting under this 
representational theory. Policy positions themselves can be seen as projecting particular 
images of political character and styles of leadership, and they can thus serve—in a 
manner that does not demand high levels of political knowledge—as additional sources 
of information about electoral candidates. Furthermore, in the words of Morgan Marietta, 
“A policy proposal also reveals a value priority” (Marietta 2010, 317). Identifying the 
“value meaning” of proposed policies does not entail high information costs in terms of 
policy knowledge, for as Marietta states, “It is not incumbent upon citizens to translate 
their values into the appropriate policies if they are to be represented; they must only be 
able to translate proposed or enacted policies into the values they represent” (323). In this 
manner, beyond aiding in overall assessments regarding character and leadership, the 
positions of candidates and parties on specific policy issues serve as heuristics for 
identifying distinct sets of values. The deficiencies in political and policy knowledge 
cited by competence skeptics do not preclude informed voting for representatives under 
this system of “value representation,” which according to Marietta, “constitutes an 
answer to concerns about citizen competence, both empirically and normatively” (325). 
Absent an understanding of the details of how the political system functions, or the 
complexities of evidence for and against specific policy proposals, voters may 
nonetheless be competent to select their representatives based on sincerely held beliefs 




They may then trust their elected officials to formulate and implement public policies in a 
way that generally reflects these values—or they can seek to replace them at the next 
election.65  
Some information is therefore necessary for ensuring competent voting decisions, 
but it is the type of information that should be easily accessible to the mass of citizens, at 
least in most major elections. This does not mean that processing available information is 
necessarily easy, or that overall information costs will always be low. However, the 
location of the most significant costs in a voting decision could shift from problems of 
political knowledge to problems of political attitude. As discussed earlier, some of what 
appears as lack of political knowledge could actually reflect psychologically ambivalent 
attitudes of individuals who have conflicting preferences that they have difficulty 
resolving. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, political decisions can often involve 
complex ethical issues that generate conflict between competing values, so an attitude of 
ambivalence should not imply incompetence, especially from the perspective that there 
are no fundamentally right or wrong answers. Indeed, according to Manin, “It is 
unrealistic, and, more importantly, unjustified, to assume that individuals faced with the 
necessity of having to make a political decision already know exactly what they want” 
(Manin 1987, 363-364). Rather, through a potentially taxing process of not just public but 
also private deliberation,66 someone with an ambivalent attitude might eventually reach a 
decision. There is thus no good reason to assume that ambivalent individuals are 
                                                
65 This is obviously an ideal theory to which there may be many objections, not the least of which are 
issues connected with representation of minorities and other problems of constituency definition, as well as 
issues of political responsiveness. However, these are more general problems in representational theory, 
and they pose serious difficulties for strong epistemic approaches as well. Moreover, the direction of 
democratic reform suggested by the approach advanced here will differ in many ways from the direction of 
reform under stronger epistemic approaches, as discussed in the following section.  
66 See Goodin (2000) for a discussion of the importance of an “internal-reflective” form of deliberation to 
enhance democratic functioning and legitimacy, as opposed the more common “external collective” 




incompetent to vote—in fact, one might argue that ambivalence is associated with 
increased competence to the extent that it might demonstrate less ideological rigidity and 
more openness to deliberation.67 Manin thus states that an “attitude of constant 
questioning is surely the warranted one” from a perspective of deliberative legitimacy; 
yet he emphasizes that in the end, “decisions must be made and conflicts resolved” 
(Manin 1987, 362). The fact is that political decisions can be very difficult and 
complicated, and often there will be no easy answers. 
In sum, the weaker epistemic requirements for voting that survive under this more 
expansive information theory for representative democracy are relatively minimal. This 
does not mean, however, that this theory should be described as minimalist, given how it 
embodies a jointly competitive, participatory, and deliberative vision of liberal 
representative democracy. Moreover, the unified theory advanced here allows for 
stronger epistemic assumptions regarding the (elite) deliberation of representative bodies, 
which is where the process of informed decision-making may appropriately be held to 
higher standards, and where detailed understanding of specific public policies is rightly 
demanded. Epistemic assumptions may also apply to constitutional level decision-making 
that sets limits on political outcomes based on substantive standards of justice or other 
                                                
67 Note that ambivalence also raises a potentially serious problem with regard to testing for minimal voting 
competence, and possibly with the underlying legal standard, at least to the extent it is interpreted to require 
a clear expression of choice. As indicated, the prevailing standard is that individuals may be judged 
incompetent only if they “lack the capacity to understand the nature and effect of voting such that they 
cannot make an individual choice” (see supra n. 64). The CAT-V tests the ability to “make an individual 
choice” by providing a hypothetical of two candidates with opposing positions on health insurance and 
government spending. Subjects who express a clear preference between candidates receive full credit, while 
subjects who express a choice that is “ambiguous or vacillating” receive only half credit, and subjects who 
state they are unable to make up their mind receive no credit (Appelbaum, et al. 2005, 2099). In addition to 
the fact that there could be areas other than health care policy and government spending in which subjects 
could have clearer preferences, the deeper problem is the possibility that ambivalent attitudes will be 
interpreted as evidence of incompetence. A better test might perhaps try to determine whether an apparent 
inability to choose is truly a product of failure to understand “the nature and effect of voting,” as the legal 
standard would seem to require, and not simply a failure to formulate a clear preference in response to a 




normative ideals that are presumed objectively true or correct. In both these areas there is 
arguably room for reform aimed at improving the epistemic quality of decision-making.68 
However, the place where strong epistemic assumptions should not be welcome, and 
where the correctness of individual decisions should not be open to question, is in the 
rules and procedures for voting, as discussed in the following section.  
 
5) IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTION LAW AND POLICY  
As emphasized in the introductory section, and in the introduction to the 
dissertation, democratic theory is not just theoretical; it has important implications for the 
law of democracy and for policy choices that establish the rules and procedures for the 
administration of elections. This section discusses implications of the unified theory 
advanced above with regard to three areas of democratic electoral institutions: a) high-
level constitutional design, b) Supreme Court election law doctrine, and c) electoral 
policy reform in general.  
a) Constitutional Design Implications  
To begin, the distinction between epistemic-populist theory and the unified theory 
of liberal democracy advanced here has important implications for constitutional design 
at the highest levels. A principal implication has already been alluded to earlier in 
discussing the information requirements of representative democracy, as follows: In 
seeking to ensure that the popular will is embodied in government decisions, the 
                                                
68 For example, proposals for campaign finance reform and other procedural regulations to limit the 
influence of moneyed interests on the political process can be viewed as principally aimed at improving the 
epistemic qualities of the deliberation of representatives. In constitutional decision-making, the focus is on 
disputes over the substance of epistemic standards of justice or moral truth that should be removed from 
democratic electoral control, although there of course deep disagreements about these matters. See also 




epistemic-populist interpretation of voting—and deliberative democratic theory more 
generally—makes demands that are more closely associated with direct than 
representative democracy. Such epistemic-populist demands might be also consistent 
with representative institutions under a stronger, delegate model of representation, but the 
overall affinity for direct democratic forms can be seen clearly in Fishkin’s distinction 
between elite deliberation and his conception of true deliberative democracy with 
decision-making “by the people” (Fishkin 2009, 73). The unified liberal theory, on the 
other hand, is firmly grounded in representative institutions, and though it might not 
necessarily exclude some features of direct democracy, these could actually remain more 
open to doubts about mass competence.  
Moreover, the theory advanced here is not only grounded in representative 
institutions, but it also clearly entails a specifically electoral vision of democracy, since it 
values and relies on mass participation to confer normative legitimacy. This precludes 
attempts to fashion epistemically ideal deliberative conditions through random selection 
of representatives—or sortition—in which a representative sample of citizens is selected 
by lottery to serve as legislators. The proposal to eliminate the election of political 
representatives, which has been considered specifically as a response to Fishkin’s 
trilemma (Levinson 2012, 129-130), is motivated largely by epistemic anxieties about the 
competence of the masses to elect the best representatives (see e.g. Landemore 2013, 
117). Elections are necessary, however, under the theory advanced here, in order to 
satisfy the value of participation that confers normative legitimacy on the selection of 
representatives, which sortition fails to provide.69 
                                                
69 From the perspective of improving the outcomes of representative assemblies, where the theory 
advanced here does allow for strong epistemic assumptions, a system of sortition could arguably be 
justified as a reform that works to “ensure that bad reasons are unable to affect a decision” (Stone 2009, 
375). However, as Stone explains, sortition also ensures that potentially good reasons cannot affect a 




The inclination toward sorition is an example of the desire among deliberative 
theorists to manufacture democratic “microcosms” through systems of random selection, 
which Simone Chambers describes as an overall approach in which “the mass public is 
abandoned in favor of mini-publics” (Chambers 2009, 324). This is deeply problematic, 
according to Chambers, for the belief that such randomly selected mini-publics provide 
the only opportunities for “genuine” deliberation implies a rejection of the “broader 
democratic public sphere as a place to pursue reasonable politics” (330-331). In this 
sense, deliberative theory—with its epistemic-populist interpretation—can be seen as a 
theory that “moves the heart of democracy away from the vote” (Chambers 2003, 311). 
In contrast, the unified liberal theory, which views elections primarily as competitive 
mechanisms for more or less reasonable decision-making about political power and 
leadership, allows for a stronger normative embrace of broad electoral participation, and 
thus brings the “heart” of democracy back to the vote, where it arguably belongs. 
Furthermore, this theoretical approach also tends to weaken arguments on the 
merits of “foot voting” over “ballot box voting” (Somin 2013, 114), which likewise 
seems to discount the foundational value of electoral participation. Somin’s argument on 
this point in fact relies heavily on epistemic conceptions of mass ignorance and 
incompetence, and on (see 121-126).70 Responding to political conditions by moving to 
another jurisdiction—if feasible—certainly has its place in an liberal democratic society, 
                                                                                                                                            
selected citizen is likely to lack. This raises complex issues beyond the current scope, but it seems safe to 
conclude that deliberative deficiencies in current representative institutions might be addressed by other 
reforms (see supra n. 68), short of disbanding them and moving to a system of sortition. See also Chapter 4 
(n. 80 and accompanying text) for a discussion of how sortition fails to account for voting as an expression 
of popular sovereignty. 
70 Somin bases his argument on the purported disincentive for information acquisition associated with the 
pivotal voting problem and the theory of rational ignorance (121). Somin’s further arguments for a more 
limited national government with increased decentralization of power (139-143), as well as his arguments 
in favor of strong judicial review (155-164), are beyond the scope of this chapter, but they also rely heavily 




but foot and ballot box voting should not be viewed as “realistic alternatives” to one 
another, as Somin frames them (120). Opportunities for voting with one’s feet might 
indeed be a valuable complement to electoral democracy, but the primacy of electoral 
participation should not be minimized based on dubious assumptions of mass democratic 
incompetence.  
b) Implications for Election Law Doctrine 
The unified theory’s emphasis on the essential value of mass electoral 
participation, with its rejection of strongly epistemic interpretations of voting, has 
important implications for election law issues relating to the substantive costs of voting. 
As indicated in this chapter’s introduction, most normative theories in election law 
scholarship are motivated by structural approaches aimed at second-generation voting 
rights issues, which generally fail to provide strong foundations for the protection of an 
individual-level participatory right in cases involving claims of vote denial.71 Some 
election law scholars have expressed skepticism about enforcement of the right to vote 
using traditional individual rights analysis, and have argued explicitly against the notion 
that voting costs should be reduced in the name of participatory interests backed by 
individual-level claims (Elmendorf 2008; Flanders 2013).72 What is largely missing is a 
                                                
71 In fact, the fundamental value of participation may be seen as contested in American constitutional 
jurisprudence. Tushnet, for example, has argued against the claim that “participation is the basic value 
embodied in the Constitution,” and more generally against “enshrining participation in a constitutional 
theory” (Tushnet 1980, 1046, 1048). Michelman has observed that while “constitutive valuations of 
political participation rights” are present in the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence, such values are 
“never unanimously and always obliquely” suggested (Michelman 1989, 459). 
72 According to Elemendorf, courts should adopt “an expressly structural understanding of the right to vote, 
while scaling back the individual right to vote free from burdens that are not shared by others” (Elmendorf 
2008, 644). Flanders states, “Someone who is subject to inconvenience or delay is not being denied his 
right to vote; he still has the ability to participate. So there is no violation of the fundamental value of 
participation” (Flanders 2013, 65). But see Douglas (2013, 83), stating, “The broader concept of voting and 
participation as a foundational right places an affirmative duty on governments to create an easy voting 




coherent normative vision capable of supporting highly participatory electoral institutions 
with low substantive costs enforced through an individual rights-based approach to 
claims of vote denial.73 Abandoning epistemic conceptions of voting in election law 
allows for such a participatory democratic vision.  
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Northampton 
Election Board,74 which affirmed the constitutionality of literacy tests based on the 
state’s interest in promoting “intelligent use of the ballot,” provides a classic example of 
the operation of epistemic theory in the rules for voting. While the Court has never 
explicitly overruled this case, Hasen expresses doubts about whether the constitutional 
ruling of Lassiter remains good law75—apart from the prohibition of such tests under the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments;76 however, Hasen admits that a 
literacy test “is not wholly irrational if one views voting as a means for choosing the best 
candidates” (Hasen 2003, 83). Hasen himself indicates that such assessments of voting 
                                                                                                                                            
indicates that voting rights should be seen as having both individual-level and structural components (84, n. 
11). 
73 As indicated, Joseph Fishkin’s (2011) work is a notable exception on this point (see supra n. 9). Note 
that none of the above is meant as an argument against structural theories of voting rights for cases 
involving vote dilution and gerrymandering, but as Fishkin indicates, cases of vote denial require the 
development of a theory of “how disenfranchisement harms individuals” (Fishkin 2011, 1332); see also 
Ellis (2014, 550), stating that current election law jurisprudence “fails to fully recognize a complete notion 
of harm toward the voter.” 
74 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
75 Hasen indicates that the holding of Lassiter may have been implicitly overruled by Kramer v. Union 
Free School District No. 15 (395 U.S. 621 (1969)), but he also suggests that the majority in Kramer may 
have intentionally avoided overruling Lassiter (Hasen 2003, 26, 64). Michelman also raises the question of 
whether literacy tests remain constitutionally permissible after the Court’s invalidation of state poll taxes in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (383 U.S. 663 (1966)), and he associates the potential acceptability 
of literacy tests with a “deliberative-politics premise” that is “republicanly grounded” (Michelman 1989, 
480-481). 
76 The original version of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited the use of any “test or device” in 
covered jurisdictions, and effectively precluded the use of English literacy tests nationwide with respect to 
individuals who had completed the sixth grade (Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, §§4(a), (e)). In 1970 the 
prohibition on all tests or devices was made universally applicable for a period of five years (VRA 
Amendments of 1970, §201), and in 1975 the Act was amended to make permanent the nationwide 
prohibition on tests or devices (VRA Amendments of 1975, §102). The VRA is currently codified at 52 




competence are objectionable from the perspective that “politics is about the division of 
power among political equals; it is not a ‘test’ to find the ‘best’ candidate” (id.).77 
However, the meanings and implications of political equality are of course highly 
contested, and Hasen does not directly address the epistemic-populist arguments in favor 
of higher costs intended to ensure more competent voting. The unified liberal theory 
advanced here provides a much stronger foundation for overruling Lassiter, by explicitly 
rejecting the epistemic-populist conception of objective standards for voting decisions.  
The status of the holding in Lassiter is probably a mostly hypothetical point, for it 
appears unlikely that competency exams will be reinstated in the U.S., notwithstanding 
calls from some quarters for instituting such qualifications to ensure a more informed 
electorate (Brennan 2011b; Harsanyi 2016).78 However, the normative approach 
advocated here would not only exclude such seemingly reactionary reform proposals 
based in epistemic assumptions; it would also preclude arguments that higher substantive 
costs should be allowed for the purposes of improving the quality of democratic 
outcomes. More generally, this approach provides guidance with regard to the standard of 
review for vote denial cases and the constitutionality of various aspects of the “nuts and 
bolts” of election administration. A focus on low-cost access, enforced under traditional 
individual rights analysis, entails a perspective that requires the government to bear most 
of the costs of administering elections, and not to shift these costs unnecessarily to 
individual citizens in way that burdens their participation. This suggests a stricter 
                                                
77 Hasen elsewhere associates this distinction with liberal versus conservative perspectives on the franchise 
(see supra n. 12). However, it should be clear from the discussion of how deliberative theory is associated 
with epistemic-populist ideas that it is not just political conservatives who express concerns about the 
quality of voting decisions and the problems of political information deficiencies. 
78 David Harsanyi argues that voters should be required to pass the U.S. naturalization exam. Somin states 
that he is sympathetic in principle to these types of proposals to ensure intelligent voting, but he withholds 
his support due to practical concerns of bias in the implementation of any competency exam (Somin 2016; 




standard of review for election administration than has been applied in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence to date, which has generally allowed “reasonable 
nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voting if the state interest is judged on balance to be 
“sufficiently weighty.”79  
As scholars have pointed out, this balancing approach does not compel the type of 
strict scrutiny analysis conventionally applied to claimed infringements of fundamental 
rights, but rather appears to reflect a somewhat lower standard of review (Elmendorf 
2007, 394; Douglas 2008, 151-157). By contrast, the normative approach to voting costs 
advocated here supports arguments for application of strict scrutiny to any administrative 
procedure that directly burdens the individual right to vote in a manner not narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling state interest (Douglas 2008, 175-177). Importantly, this 
standard entails an emphasis on requiring the government to show that its voting 
regulations represent the least restrictive means of satisfying its compelling interests, and 
it would allow voters challenging these regulations to suggest alternative procedures for 
meeting those interests (186-195). Furthermore, this approach also supports arguments 
that a state or local government’s proffered interests in voting regulations should not be 
accorded much deference by courts (Douglas 2015; Schleicher 2016; Tolson 2015).  
This of course does not mean that governments can never demonstrate that their 
voting regulations are necessitated by genuine concerns for administrative efficiency 
and/or electoral integrity. However, strict voter identifications laws, for example, are not 
likely to be justified under this standard if there are examples of other states that are able 
                                                
79 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008), citing standards articulated in 
Burdick v. Takushi 504 U.S. 428 (1992) and Norman v. Reed 502 U.S. 279 (1992), and the balancing 




to meet those compelling interests using less stringent identification procedures.80 
Furtherore, the common practice in most states of closing the registration rolls prior to 
Election Day might not pass constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny test. Requiring 
prior registration undeniably represents a burdensome substantive cost—as is clear from 
empirical research demonstrating the turnout effects of EDR and SDR—and given that 
many states have successfully implemented these procedures, the added cost of requiring 
separate registration prior to voting would likely fail to meet the least restrictive means 
prong of the strict scrutiny test.81 At the very least, partisan manipulation of electoral 
rules will obviously never provide a compelling interest, and thus a clear showing of 
partisan intent should be sufficient to strike down any burdensome administrative 
practice (Foley 2013).  
c) Implications for Electoral Policy Reform  
In terms of electoral policy more generally, the work of scholars with a broadly 
participatory agenda receives much needed support from the rejection of epistemic-
populist interpretations of voting. For example, Spencer Overton has argued for an 
“inclusionary vision of democracy,” which “values widespread participation and looks to 
remove criteria or conditions that act as barriers to such participation” (Overton 2001, 
                                                
80 See the dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer in Crawford, arguing to invalidate Indiana’s voter ID law 
based on evidence that other states had implemented less restrictive procedures (553 U.S. 181, 239-240 
(2008)); also see Douglas (2008, 194). 
81 The prevailing Supreme Court decisions on registration requirements are apparently still Marsten v. 
Lewis 410 U.S. 679 (1972), and Burns v. Fortson 410 U.S. 686 (1973), both of which approved a 50-day 
registration cutoff in the interests of administrative efficiency and fraud prevention. Given the considerable 
advancements in information technology since the early 1970s, combined with the successful 
implementation of EDR and SDR in several states, it would seem unreasonable to assert that any prior 
registration requirement would still be justifiable today, unless a state can show otherwise. The VRA 
provides for a maximum 30-day cutoff for registration in presidential elections (VRA Amendments of 
1970, §202(d)). See also James (1987, 1617), arguing that any requirement of advance registration “is a per 




474). He contrasts this approach with a “merit-based vision,” which he argues is 
problematic from a structural—rather than individual rights—perspective (480), but 
Overton seems never directly to confront the underlying epistemic assumptions of this 
“merit-based” approach to voting in democratic theory. Similarly, Tova Wang advocates 
for a “voter inclusion principle” in election law and policy on the basis that it 
“strengthens the very concept of democracy, both as a collection of institutions and for 
the individual voter” (Wang 2012, 10), yet again, she does not seem to elaborate any 
theoretical basis for favoring this participatory principle over strong epistemic 
conceptions. The unified theory advanced here can thus help to shore up the normative 
foundations for these types of policy arguments for participatory-based reforms that aim 
generally to ease access by reducing the substantive costs of voting.  
More broadly, a stricter standard of judicial review for substantive cost allocations 
would likely lead to greater uniformity in election administration among states, perhaps 
paving the way toward new federal legislation of minimum standards for voting access, 
which might include nationally applicable identification and registration requirements 
(Hasen 2005, 969; Tokaji 2014, 100-104).82 In fact, federal legislation setting minimum 
                                                
82 Hasen advocates for a federal system of government initiated universal registration, including provision 
of federal voter identification cards, while Tokaji advocates government initiated registration at federal and 
state levels, with federal mandates for online and same-day registration as well as uniform identification 
requirements. See also Hasen (2012, xii, 198), and Cain (2015, 198-200), arguing generally for national 
standards to provide more uniformity in election administration. Federal authority under the Constitution 
might actually be somewhat unclear in this area, given unresolved interpretative questions about whether 
administering registration and identification requirements should be viewed as part of regulating the 
“manner” of voting, and thus within the authority of Congress under the Elections Clause of Article I, 
Section 4, or rather a part of voter “qualifications,” which are subject to state control under Article I, 
Section 2 (and under the 17th Amendment). As Derek Muller explains in his analysis of Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council, the Court in that case confirmed that regulations related to voter registration are generally 
within the scope of “Times, Places, and Manner” in the Elections Clause, but the opinion left open the 
question of whether aspects of the registration process, such as requiring proof of citizenship, as well as 
identification requirements, could be seen as implicating the authority of the states to enforce voter 
qualifications (Muller 2014, 316-317, 319-320). See also HLR (2013, 203-207), discussing the Court’s 
failure in Arizona v. Inter Tribal to clarify the distinction between federal power under the Elections Clause 




national standards for election administration has been suggested as a replacement for the 
anti-discrimination approach of the Voting Rights Act (Pildes 2006b, 756), and support 
for this new approach may be gaining force after the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
Section 4 preclearance procedures in Shelby County v. Holder83 (see Issacharoff 2013).84 
With regard to the various forms of convenience voting, including early and absentee 
options, the evidence on participatory effects is still preliminary and mixed, so continued 
experimentation at the state level may be justified notwithstanding a presumption in favor 
of expanding opportunities for low-cost access. Further state-level experimentation with 
government-initiated systems of “universal” or “automatic” registration may also be 
justified before attempting to implement this type of reform at the federal level (see 
Tokaji 2008, 502-504).85 But the testing in the “laboratories of democracy” must at some 
point stop and take account of its experimental results (see Tokaji 2009a, 267), and the 
findings seem fairly clear at least with regard to EDR and SDR: Eliminating registration 
as a separate cost can improve participation without compromising efficiency or integrity.  
The normative approach advanced here also has implications for electoral policy 
in second-order state and local elections, which are subject to more significant 
participatory problems, as discussed previously. The issues surrounding the timing of 
state and local elections are complex, but the mandate for low-cost participation should 
                                                                                                                                            
considered a voter qualification, strict scrutiny could nevertheless trigger invalidation of state regulations 
on other constitutional grounds (see Tolson 2015, 206-212).  
83 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).  
84 Issacharoff admits that federal authority under the Elections Clause is “untested,” but he indicates that 
there is “room for expansion of congressional intervention” in moving beyond the discrimination model of 
voting rights enforcement (Issacharoff 2013, 113). But see Bagenstos (2014, 2870-2875), arguing that 
“universalist” approaches to voting rights may fail to offer sufficient protection against racial 
discrimination. 
85 As Tokaji explains, a policy of “universal” registration involves a proactive undertaking of government 
responsibility for registering voters, while “automatic” registration involves citizens being registered—
unless they affirmatively opt out—when they interact with a government agency (Tokaji 2008, 499, 503). 
As of this writing, automatic registration has been implemented in Oregon, and six other states and DC 




generally argue in favor of concurrent scheduling with first-order races. Admittedly, in 
these elections there may be information deficits of the kind that could present real 
difficulties even under the weaker epistemic standards of the unified liberal theory, which 
as discussed, still requires some rudimentary information about the options on the ballot 
or reliable heuristics to substitute for such knowledge.86 Particularly in local races with 
relatively little media publicity, and where party cues are generally absent, informational 
challenges may preclude the ability of citizens to make even basic judgments of character 
and leadership or to identify value-congruent candidates. However, in place of being 
satisfied with low and biased turnout, or relying on solutions like Somin’s that emphasize 
exit over voice, reform efforts could instead focus on policies designed to facilitate more 
informed voting in these elections. Elmendorf and Schleicher discuss a range of potential 
reforms along these lines, including the development of state and local party brands to 
provide partisan cues that do not simply mirror the positions of national parties, or 
employing substitutes for such cues, such as official endorsements or ballot notations to 
provide information outside the context of party affiliation (Elmendorf and Schleicher 
2013, 409-419).87  
In sum, the interpretation of the information costs of voting under the unified 
theory of liberal representative democracy advanced here—with its rejection of strong 
epistemic standards in election law and policy—lends support to participatory-based 
reforms that aim to minimize substantive voting costs, and prohibits any efforts to 
improve the ostensive quality of electoral decisions by increasing these costs. Even 
                                                
86 See also the discussion of second-order elections and ways of addressing their informational problems in 
Section 4 of Chapter 2. 
87 Elmendorf and Schleicher’s approach reflects a more minimalist interpretation of electoral competence 
generally consistent with the approach of this chapter. They accordingly conclude, “The central function of 
election law is to help citizens aggregate what little information they have into collectively sensible 




further, the emphasis on cost minimization suggests the policy option of reducing 
effective costs by introducing an incentive for voting, either in the form of a fine for 
unexcused abstention—as imposed by compulsory voting laws in some democracies, 
such as Australia—or with some form of compensation for turnout, which would have the 
same cost-offsetting effect.88 Without delving here into the debate on this topic, the point 
of emphasis for now is that a primary argument against incentives to encourage voting 
involves concerns for the “quality” of increased turnout under these participatory policies 
(see Rose-Ackerman 1985, 966-967; Somin 2015; Will 2014).89 The unified theory 
advanced here rejects that epistemically-based argument, and responds to the 
information-based criticism of compulsory voting with a coherent account of low 
information costs under representative institutions, thus defining a broader standard of 
voter competence that is more consistent with policies aiming better to realize a mass 
participatory vision of democracy.  
Admittedly, the introduction of monetary incentives for voting seems like a fairly 
radical reform proposal, and presumably is not something that politicians—or even 
scholars—are likely to agree upon at any time in the near future.90 There indeed seems to 
be very little room for reaching any consensus on electoral reform these days.91 In the 
                                                
88 In formal terms, both these approaches to cost reduction can be modeled by the D term of the voting 
calculus, and they are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, along with the complex normative issues 
surrounding compulsory voting laws and other incentives for turnout. 
89 In arguing against a policy of compulsory voting enforced by fines for abstention, Rose-Ackerman 
asserts that when exercising the right to vote is “slightly costly,” voters are more likely to be well informed 
and make better choices. Somin similarly states that “mandatory voting would exacerbate the already 
severe problem of voter ignorance,” and Will writes, “If money is necessary to lure certain voters to the 
polls, those voters will lower the quality of the turnout.” Note that in response to Rose-Ackerman, Karlan 
indicates that concern for voters making “bad” choices raises “an epistemological difficulty” (Karlan 1994, 
1474, n. 60). 
90 But see the discussion in Chapter 4, Section 5 regarding some practical possibilities for offsetting the 
costs of voting through implementation of a constitutional duty to vote. 
91 For example, the bipartisan Presidential Commission on Election Administration, which was established 
by President Obama following the 2012 elections, was able to reach agreement only on some minor 




short term at least, the prospects for “getting from here to there in election reform” 
(Gerken 2009, 6) seem highly uncertain. In the longer term, a fuller resolution of the 
voting wars may only be obtainable through judicial intervention that sets minimum 
standards of access through stricter enforcement of voting rights, and/or federal mandates 
for increased uniformity in election administration. In the meantime, principled 
discussion of voting regulations and their substantive costs should directly address the 
underlying theoretical assumptions of opposing sides in matters of election law and 
policy. If a way forward out of the voting wars is to be found, it will be by way of a more 
stable and secure bridge between the theories and practices of elections. 
 
6) CONCLUSION 
Beginning with the C term of the voting calculus, this chapter has examined the 
two basic types of voting costs: substantive costs arising from the practical burdens 
associated with casting a ballot, and information costs associated with deciding how to 
vote. The primary aim of the discussion has been to demonstrate that these two types of 
costs are related in a manner that depends on fundamental assumptions about the role of 
voting in a modern democracy. A comprehensively unified theory of liberal democracy 
has been outlined to demonstrate that strong epistemic assumptions—in the form of 
objective standards for judging the correctness of voting decisions—are not necessary for 
a coherent model of mass democracy that incorporates all the essential democratic values 
and supports highly participatory electoral institutions.  
                                                                                                                                            
recommendation that wait times not exceed 30 minutes. The Commission apparently did not even address 
the topics of prior registration or the substance of voter identification requirements, which continue to elicit 




Schattschneider has written of a need “to reexamine the chasm between theory 
and practice,” stating that “it is at least as likely that the ideal is wrong as it is that the 
reality is bad” (Schattschneider 1960, 131). This chapter represents an attempt to bridge 
that chasm by describing an approach to information in democratic theory that allows 
more space for competing versions of “truth” in politics. Without addressing the deeper 
philosophical issues raised by this approach, this perspective seems particularly desirable 
for American politics today, given the apparent entrenchment of ideological intolerance 
in the currently highly polarized environment. Indeed, when individuals or groups believe 
they hold a conceptual monopoly on the truth, backed by the strong epistemic assumption 
of objectively right and wrong answers to political questions, it may actually threaten 
democratic stability. At its core, democratic politics requires a minimum degree of open-
mindedness and willingness to compromise, including “at least some tolerance of 
differing truths” (Crick 1993, 18). This is the normative approach that should be reflected 
in the rules and procedures for elections, so that those who find themselves on the losing 
side do not come to believe that “evil has triumphed over good” (Holcombe 2013, 24),92 
but rather that they were simply outvoted and must work to realize their version of truth 
in future democratic decisions.  
  
   
 
                                                
92 The larger quote from Holcombe—in which he is criticizing Jason Brennan’s view on objective 
standards of common good in electoral outcomes—is worth highlighting: “Brennan is telling voters that 
when they end up on the losing end of an election, evil has triumphed over good; the common good has 
been defeated. This is much different from concluding that most people wanted this while I wanted that, 






 Chapter Four: The D Term and the Duty to Vote  
 
“Belief in a duty to vote is the opiate of democratic masses.” 
–Loren Lomasky & Geoffrey Brennan (2000, 86) 
 
“[A]n action from duty has its moral worth not in the aim that is supposed to be 
attained by it, but rather in the maxim in accordance with which it is resolved upon…”  
–Immanuel Kant (2002 [1785], 15) 
 
1) INTRODUCTION 
 It is by now clear that citizens participate in democratic elections for many 
different reasons, and that the context of elections, including the institutions that structure 
them, can have varying effects on individual motivations for turning out to vote. In 
discussing the instrumental benefits of voting, the possibility was raised of an ethical duty 
to participate for instrumental reasons associated with the outcome (Chapter 2, Section 
3b); however, is there—or should there ever be—a duty to vote irrespective of any 
expected effect on the electoral outcome? Many citizens believe that voting is their civic 
duty, and they will insist on participating even when it seems instrumentally useless. 
Elections are in an important sense constitutive of democracy as “government by the 
people,” and thus citizens may desire or feel obliged to vote for reasons that having 
nothing to do with the electoral outcome. How should these reasons be viewed as a 
matter of normative theory and constitutional design? Should voting be encouraged 
through the design and implementation of institutions such as compulsory voting so that 
citizens will participate even absent perceptions of instrumental benefits, or might it 
perhaps be preferable to discourage participation for non-instrumental reasons? These are 





 The D term in the rational choice calculus of turnout—which represents the 
expressive or otherwise non-instrumental benefits of voting—originated as a solution to 
problem of pivotal voting theory and the so-called paradox of turnout, as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (Section 2). However, even if the alleged paradox of turnout were resolved so 
that the expected instrumental benefits of voting in a large—but competitive—election 
were not always statistically equivalent to zero, there would remain a need for an account 
of non-instrumental benefits in order to fully explain the motivations of turnout. For one 
thing, a theory of non-instrumental benefits is necessary to explain motivations for voting 
in clearly non-competitive elections. Furthermore, there may also be expectations of 
negative utility in the act voting—such as in the perceptions of alienated citizens who do 
not wish to participate in what they see as an illegitimate democratic process. This form 
of expressive disutility modeled in the D term must then be weighed against any 
perceived instrumental benefits.1 Perhaps most importantly, the propensity to vote may 
be affected by various types of external pressures and incentives, both social and 
institutional, all of which can provide non-instrumental motivations for voting. Finally, 
there may be deeper reasons for voting that transcend the assessments of individual or 
social utility symbolized by the calculus, for if voting is viewed as a civic duty, citizens 
may come to see their participation as fulfilling a greater obligation in some sense. 
 This chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the existing 
literature on the D term of the calculus and discusses both theoretical constructs and 
empirical evidence of non-instrumental motivations for voting. Section 3 begins to focus 
on the constitutional-level issue of whether voting should be structured as a voluntary 
                                                
1 See Chapter 2, Section 3b. Negative utility from the act of voting might also be framed as part of the C 
term, or the costs of voting, but C conventionally represents logistical or informational costs that must be 






choice or as a duty of citizenship, and it then reviews some administrative 
implementations of the duty to vote cross-nationally, as well as and some empirical 
studies analyzing the effects of these institutions. Section 4, which takes up the bulk of 
the chapter, elaborates the normative arguments concerning whether voting should be a 
civic duty or a voluntary decision. This section first outlines an argument for a 
constitutional duty to vote based on Rawlsian principles of justice. It then responds to 
some of the main arguments against the duty to vote, and it concludes by exploring 
possible limits on the duty, both in principle and in the practice of compulsory voting. 
Section 5 discusses implications for election law and policy that follow from this analysis 
of the duty to vote, with a focus on the U.S. Constitution and the administration of 
American elections, and briefly discusses the prospects for some form of compulsory 
voting in this country. Section 6 concludes with a general discussion of the overall 
argument of this chapter: namely, that recognition of a civic duty to vote supplies the 
missing normative foundation for broadly participatory theory and practice under modern 
conditions of liberal democracy. 
 
2) MODELING THE D TERM 
As indicated, the D term in the rational choice calculus of voting represents the 
value attached to any expressive or otherwise non-instrumental benefit of participation, 
including the perception of a civic duty to participate in elections. D has also been 
described as representing the consumption—as opposed to investment—benefits of 
voting (Ferejohn & Fiorina 1974, 526). The foundation for adding this term to the voting 
calculus lies in Anthony Downs’ original solution to the apparent paradox of voter 





pivotal, a rational citizen might nevertheless decide to vote after considering that 
democracy itself would be imperiled if no one participated (Downs 1957a, 266-271). 
Downs refers to this as the “long-run participation value” of voting (270). Of course, 
Downs’ solution that individuals will decide to vote in order to save democracy runs into 
the same collective action problem that he originally described, since individuals might 
still reason that their one vote is highly unlikely to be pivotal to saving democracy 
(Fiorina 1976, 392). In their formalization of the D term in the calculus, Riker and 
Ordeshook confront the paradox more directly by defining D in explicitly ethical, or 
social-psychological terms. They thus list several different types of “positive 
satisfactions” that a citizen might receive from the act of voting, even indicating that 
some of what are generally considered to be costs of voting might be perceived by some 
individuals as benefits (Riker & Ordeshook 1968, 28). 
The D-term solution to the paradox was criticized early on for offering a 
tautological and non-predictive model of the voting decision (Barry 1970, 13; but see 
Riker and Ordeshook 1968, 26-27, n. 7). If the intrinsic or consumption benefits of 
participation are essentially responsible for all of the “action” in the calculus (Fiorina 
1976, 393), the rational choice explanation of voting seems reduced to simply: citizens 
vote because they like voting (Aldrich 1993, 258). This raises some difficult theoretical 
problems having to do with the nature and definition of rationality and whether 
expressive motivations for voting properly belong in a rational choice model of turnout 
(see e.g. Goldfarb and Sigelman 2010). Nevertheless, surveys generally confirm that the 
individual sense of a civic duty to participate in elections irrespective of any effect on the 
outcome is a major factor in reported reasons for voting, even where participation is 





Bowler and Donovan 2013, 266; Smets and van Ham 2013, 352; Elliot 2017, 660).2 
Similarly, social pressure to participate, which represents another source of expressive or 
non-instrumental motivations, has also been found to exert a significant effect on the 
propensity to vote (Kenny 1992; Gerber et al. 2008; Funk 2010; Davenport et al. 2010). 
Therefore, to the extent that there may in fact be both instrumental and expressive 
motivations for voting, the D term is an important addition to the calculus, as it allows at 
least formal specification of these two components of the turnout decision (Fiorina 1976, 
393). However, separating out these motivations in practice, or attempting to show that 
expressive motivations predominate, turns out to be a difficult problem.  
Several empirical studies have looked for evidence of primarily expressive 
motivations in voting, but this literature appears inconclusive and troubled by 
methodological difficulties. Building on the assumption that expressive motivations are 
expected increasingly to dominate as the chance of being pivotal decreases, some 
experimental studies confirm that varying the probability of being pivotal leads to 
changes in preferences that seem to reflect the dominance of expressive motivations 
(Carter and Guerette 1992, Fischer 1996, Feddersen et al. 2009). But these are relatively 
small-scale laboratory experiments that may have external validity problems when 
                                                
2 In 2010, the American National Election Studies (ANES) began directly asking whether respondents 
believed voting to be a duty or a choice, with just over 50 percent of respondents saying it was a duty, and 
over 35 percent of those reporting a strong sense of duty (Achen 2012, 1). Results were similar when the 
question was asked in the 2012 presidential-year study, with just under 50 percent reporting that voting is a 
duty (ANES 2015a, 358). Several previous versions of the ANES between 1952-1992 asked for agreement 
or disagreement with the statement, “one shouldn’t vote if one doesn’t care about the outcome,” which 
garnered on average about 50% disagreement (ANES 2015b). Comparatively, the United States appears to 
fall on the low end of a reported duty to vote, with about 75% of British respondents agreeing that voting in 
parliamentary elections is a civic duty (Bowler and Donovan 2013, 269), and upwards of 80% of 
respondents holding this view in Canadian surveys (Blais 2000, 95). Elliot cites 25 years of survey 
evidence (from Pew Research Center) consistently showing that about 90 percent of Americans either 
completely or mostly agree with the statement, “I have a duty to always vote,” but he also notes polls 
showing much less agreement with the duty to vote when respondents are given a choice between 





applied to large electorates under real political conditions, and moreover, other 
experimental studies have failed to confirm these findings (Tyran 2005, Morton and 
Tyran 2012). Additional studies have found at least implicit evidence of expressive 
motivations in survey data (Guttman et al. 1994, Copeland and Laband 2002, Jones and 
Dawson 2007, Bäck et al. 2011). However, it is theoretically difficult to distinguish 
instrumental from expressive motivations with certainty based on these data, since almost 
any apparently expressive behavior or opinion could potentially be explained in 
subjectively instrumental terms (Toka 2009, 277; see also Fischer 1996, 172).3   
Similarly, some of the apparent evidence for instrumental motivations, such as the 
well-documented relationship between turnout and the expected closeness of an election 
(see Blais 2000, 60; Blais 2006, 119), or observations of strategic voting in favor of a 
less-preferred candidate (Cox 1997), could also be explained in non-instrumental terms 
(see Aldrich 1993, 266-269; Toka 2009, 277).4 Motivations may also be characterized as 
instrumental without relating directly to the outcome of the election at hand; for example, 
one might vote to contribute to the political “mandate” of one’s preferred candidate or 
party (Guerrero 2010; Mackie 2014).5 There is also a related conceptual problem in 
distinguishing between motivations for turnout, conventionally assumed to be expressive, 
and motivations for vote choice, which have generally been assumed to be instrumental, 
although some argue this latter assumption is unwarranted (Schuessler 2000, 89; Toka 
                                                
3 For example, Guttman et al. (1994) argue that abstention due to alienation (as opposed to indifference) is 
evidence of expressive motivation, but as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3b), abstention due to alienation 
can also be modeled in terms of instrumental utility when it leads to functional indifference. 
4 Aldrich suggests that turnout effects for close elections and strategic voting can both be explained by the 
influence of campaign mobilization, while Toka suggests they can be explained by individuals seeking a 
“thrill” of voting in a close election, or escaping an “uncomfortable feeling” of not voting strategically (see 
also Guttman et al. 1994, 204). 
5 This motivation should formally be part of the D term, since any expected utility from adding to a 
mandate is independent of the given electoral outcome. Note that such explanations presumably remain 
subject to the alleged paradox of turnout, as individuals could reason that their one vote would make no 





2009, 273). Morris Fiorina (1976, 395) in fact adds an additional term to the calculus to 
denote the expressive value of voting in line with one’s party identification, and Aldrich 
(1997, 385) goes on to suggest that the value of this expressive utility is simply equal to 
the instrumental net benefit, or the value of B in the calculus.6 Gábor Tóka (2009, 273) 
likewise disputes what he cites as the rational choice orthodoxy that vote choice is 
primarily instrumentally motivated, suggesting that expressive motives may dominate 
vote choice as much as the turnout decision. Tóka assumes a priori that turnout decisions 
must be purely expressive (due to a miniscule p value), and he therefore uses 
observations on turnout as a benchmark to measure motivations of vote choice (277). 
However, if p is interpreted as significantly higher (at least in relatively close elections), 
and thus turnout decisions might be instrumentally motivated (at least to some extent), it 
becomes more difficult to distinguish between instrumental and expressive motivations. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that there may certainly be expressive components to the 
turnout decision, and in some cases (as in non-competitive elections), it may well be that 
expressive motivations come to predominate. 
This idea that the motivation for voting may be primarily characterized by non-
instrumental benefits has been seen to raise a difficult normative problem that goes 
beyond the question of whether a D-term solution of the turnout paradox is theoretically 
satisfying. In critiquing a dominantly expressive motivation for turning out to vote, 
Brennan and Buchanan (1984) were perhaps the first to introduce the analogy of voting to 
watching a sports competition. Despite knowing that one’s vote can exert no meaningful 
effect whatsoever on the outcome, Brennan and Buchanan claim that citizens vote for 
their preferred candidates in much the same way that sports fans cheer for their favorite 
                                                
6 The calculus thus effectively becomes: pB-C+D+B. Formally, this added expressive benefit is perhaps 
better modeled as part of the D term, but the salient point is that vote choice, which would seem to follow 





teams (186). However, they argue that the absence of any direct concern for an 
instrumental effect on the outcome opens the way for “electoral irrationality of the most 
basic kind” (199). Brennan and Lomasky (1985, 204) expand on this normative problem, 
suggesting that expressive voting could lead citizens to vote for “morally unsavory” 
policies that they would not choose if they thought their vote might really matter. 
Brennan and Hamlin (1998, 166) further point out that expressive motivations provide 
more room for candidates’ “rhetorical or presentational skills” to influence vote choices, 
prompting the question of whether outcomes motivated by expressive considerations will 
ever “serve the interests of the citizens.” Jones and Dawson (2007, 108) more generally 
suggest that when voting is based on non-instrumental considerations, “appraisal of 
democratic processes proves far more difficult.”  
These arguments again rely on the assumption that turnout can never be 
instrumentally motivated, due to the alleged paradox of turnout, and they also seem 
related to arguments that high information costs make well-reasoned voting extremely 
difficult, with the result that irrational preferences are likely to prevail in vote choices 
(e.g. Somin 1998, Caplan 2007). As discussed in previous chapters, both these 
assumptions may be unwarranted, but even without making them, there indeed does seem 
to be a need for a better-developed normative framework for understanding and 
evaluating non-instrumental motivations for turning out to vote. Keith Dowding has thus 
criticized the expressive D-term solution to the turnout paradox for failing to satisfy the 
“desire for deeper reasons” about why citizens vote or abstain (Dowding 2005, 453). 
However, other scholars studying turnout motivations have in fact offered explanations 
that provide deeper reasons for non-instrumental voting. Alexander Schuessler outlines 
the normative foundations for such reasons in his insightful theory of expressive 





(Schuessler 2000, 90). Schuessler thus ties expressive voting to the construction of 
identity through the association of individuals within larger social groups (92). In contrast 
to Brennan and Buchanan’s critical view bemoaning the irrationality of expressively-
based decisions, Schuessler actually defends the prevalence of ambiguity and abstract 
symbolism in democratic discourse, indicating that such “multiplicity of meaning” is 
necessary to the development of shared cultural understanding (94).  
Schuessler’s insight into the social construction of identity through voting 
decisions may provide the foundations for another set of D-term solutions to the turnout 
paradox, which frame the decision to vote as consistent with a concept of “group 
rationality.” Carole Uhlaner (1989) was among the first to formalize this approach in a 
decision-theoretic context, pointing out that even if one assumes that individual votes are 
never instrumentally effective, an increase in turnout among members of a sizable group 
could indeed have a pivotal effect on the outcome of a large election. Voting could thus 
be instrumentally rational from the perspective of group leaders, who might therefore 
provide group members with selective incentives in the form of expressive or 
consumption benefits in order to motivate their participation (Uhlaner 1989, 392). 
Rebecca Morton further elaborates on the group rationality approach, clarifying how this 
represents a D-term solution to the paradox, since the incentives provided by group 
leaders to motivate turnout are not directly dependent on the outcome of the election 
(Morton 1991, 761). In a game-theoretic context, Schram and van Winden explain how 
group members may be induced to vote by “producers of social pressure,” in a model 
they describe as endogenizing the sense of civic duty represented by the D term (Schram 
and van Winden 1991, 596). Shachar and Nalebuff likewise detail a “pivotal leader” 





without directly considering whether their individual votes will have any effect on the 
outcome (Shachar and Nalebuff 1999, 535).7 
Digging deeper beyond these act-utilitarian approaches that rely on selective 
incentives and social pressure begins to unearth the broader importance of ethical 
motivations within the rational choice calculus. John Harsanyi explicitly makes this 
connection between ethics and rational choice when he declares that “moral behavior…is 
a special form of rational behavior” (Harsanyi 1977, 625; see also Harsanyi 1986, 83).8 
Harsanyi provides the formal foundations for a strategic/ethical model of voter turnout in 
an important paper on rule utilitarianism, in which he indicates that the voting paradox 
can be resolved by a “rational commitment to a comprehensive joint strategy” (Harsanyi 
1980, 129, emphasis in original). Harsanyi thus explains how it can be perfectly rational 
to ask the Kantian-type question, “What would happen if people like me did not vote?” 
(130). Feddersen and Sandroni (2006a) derive a formal model of turnout based on 
Harsanyi’s rule utilitarian approach, with ethical agents receiving utility for taking the 
normatively “right” action, determined according to an optimizing rule of voting cost cut-
offs based on the expected closeness of the election. Feddersen and Sandroni also 
elaborate the theory behind their rule utilitarian model, emphasizing the need for 
consistent preferences among group members and strong group identity in order to 
motivate optimal levels of turnout (Feddersen and Sandroni 2006b, 8). Coate and Conlin 
(2004) apply this model to empirical turnout data, finding that the rule utilitarian 
                                                
7 Dowding (2005, 445) classifies social pressure to vote as a type of C-term solution, in that it increases the 
costs of not voting. This is formally no different from a D-term classification, but conceptually, social 
pressure is perhaps better framed positively as a benefit, rather than negatively as a cost.  
8 Riker and Ordeshook may be alluding to a similar notion when they state: “[T]he paradox of participation 
is solved by the construction of an ideology of obligation” (Riker and Ordeshook 1973, 60). Even Downs, 
at least in his later work, appears to lend support to an ethical approach in his discussion of the two basic 






approach provides more explanatory power than a basic model of expressive voting. 
Justin Valasek (2012) further extends this strategic model to provide a welfare analysis of 
different electoral rules aimed at increasing turnout. Overall, these ethical approaches to 
the voting paradox provide a much richer perspective on the D term than that suggested 
by the initial critics of expressive motivation in their comparison of voting to simply 
cheering on a sports team.   
 Yet some go even further to argue that the sense of obligation represented by D is 
not even coherently represented by the conventional calculus, at least among those 
citizens who acknowledge a strongly felt sense of a civic duty to vote. Blais and Achen 
accordingly suggest that the duty to vote is not properly viewed as satisfying a 
consumption or expressive benefit that must be weighed against other factors, such as 
instrumental benefits and costs, because for a “morally motivated voter… there is no real 
choice if she wants to do what is right” (Blais and Achen 2010, 5). They thus model the 
turnout decision through what they term a lexicographic model, in which the costs and 
instrumental benefits of voting are considered only after giving prior consideration to 
ethically-based motivations associated with a sense of duty (6).9 One might indeed go 
even further and insist that a deep sense of duty transcends any utilitarian calculus. Along 
these lines, Yanis Varoufakis (1991) explains the distinction between the approaches of 
                                                
9 Blais and Achen’s lexicographic model is similar in some ways to Ruth Chang’s “hierarchical 
voluntarism” discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3c). There might appear to be some conflict between the two 
approaches, as Chang’s theory was said to imply that instrumental benefits—as given reasons—should take 
precedence over non-instrumental, voluntaristic motivations, while in Blais and Achen’s model non-
instrumental motivations are considered first. Notably, Blais and Achen’s model is not normative but 
purely empirical, and they make no arguments about its moral correctness (Blais and Achen 2010, 5, n. 9). 
Note also that Blais and Achen define instrumental benefits (which they measure through reported strength 
of preference for a certain outcome) as “non-ethical,” but the application of Chang’s theory in the previous 
chapter suggests that instrumental benefits can in fact have important ethical implications. Nevertheless, 
Blais and Achen are presumably right that a strong sense of a “higher” duty (whether to vote or to abstain) 
could be an ethical motivation that comes closer to what Chang would describe as a given reason, rather 





David Hume and Immanuel Kant to the understanding of duty as a normative motivation: 
The Humean approach sees duty as just another internal motivation that—like all 
preferences—can be reduced to an assessment of expected utility, while the Kantian 
approach sees duty as an external reason that exists separate from and above any 
utilitarian expectations, a motivation that may reach beyond conventional notions of 
rationality. The Humean thus sees norms as “relevant only to the extent that individuals 
derive utility from respecting them” (Varoufakis 1991, 253), whereas under a Kantian 
approach, “duty bears a weight which must be qualitatively different to that of selfish 
interest” (254). 
Given the enormity of the potential motivations for the decision to vote 
represented by D, this aspect of the calculus emerges as the potential source of a powerful 
policy lever in efforts to increase electoral participation. It is thus natural to wonder 
whether anything can be done to increase the sense of a civic duty to vote, or otherwise to 
introduce non-instrumental incentives for participation. This leads to legal and policy 
questions of whether a civic duty of voting should be institutionalized via election laws 
and administrative procedures. In broadest terms, the question is one of fundamental 
constitutional design: Should participation in mass democratic elections be framed as a 
purely voluntary act, or as a civic obligation? (Levinson 2012, 116-117; see also Birch 
2009, 14).  
 
3) THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO VOTE AND COMPULSORY VOTING 
The question of whether voting in elections should be conceived simply as a 
formal right of the democratic citizenry, or whether it should be seen as a civic duty as 





election law and policy, as will be discussed further below. Moreover, this is an issue that 
is—or arguably should be—of great importance in political theory and ethics, not to 
mention being a matter of practical political concern. There is essentially universal 
agreement in established democracies that electoral participation should be an 
enforceable civil right as a matter of both theory and practice,10 but there is far less 
consensus on whether the decision to vote should be left as a purely voluntary matter, or 
whether participation should be formally considered—and perhaps also implemented and 
enforced—as a general obligation of all (or almost all) democratic citizens. In political 
theory, the question of a duty to vote has generally received fairly limited attention, 
although it does seem to be generating increased scholarly discussion and debate over 
recent years. Participatory democratic theorists (e.g. Pateman 1970) and those in the civic 
republican and communitarian traditions (e.g. Barber 1984; Bellah 1995), as well as more 
recent deliberative theorists (Fishkin 2009), have all tended to focus on forms of 
participation and civic engagement that are more intensive than voting, which may be 
understandable given their critical view of representative democratic forms in general. 
More traditionally liberal democratic theorists, on the other hand, have commonly 
assumed that compulsory voting laws violate liberal norms of non-coercion and self-
expression, often claiming that the right to vote implies a concomitant right to abstain 
from voting as well (e.g. Abraham 1955, 6-7).  
Although the notion of a duty to participate in elections may initially seem foreign 
to American political development, the pre-independence colonies of Virginia, Maryland, 
and Delaware, as well as the state of Georgia in its first constitution in 1777, all had 
                                                
10 There are of course many disputes and differences of opinion, however, regarding the particulars of how 





compulsory voting laws with fines for non-voting (see Birch 2009, 20).11 Although the 
practice appears mostly absent during the early history of the United States, proposals to 
make voting mandatory had a resurgence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, with constitutional amendments on this matter passed in North Dakota (1897), 
Massachusetts (1918), and Oregon (1919), although the Oregon amendment was rejected 
at a subsequent referendum, and the other amendments were never implemented or 
enforced (see Abraham 1952, 346-347; Birch 2009, 20-21;).12 Compulsory voting was 
also enforced for a short time beginning in 1889 in the municipality of Kansas City until 
it was declared unconstitutional under the Missouri state constitution (see Abraham 1952, 
347).13 Thus, the American tradition of electoral participation as a voluntary choice and 
not a civic duty, which might seem like a deeply entrenched part of American political 
culture (see e.g. Hasen 1996, 2174), was clearly not a matter that has been always taken 
for granted.  
Comparatively, the constitutional duty to vote and compulsory voting practices 
have been more common. In Europe, virtually everywhere other than Great Britain and 
the Scandinavian states has had some experience with compulsory voting during the 
twentieth century (Birch 2009, 23-24; Malkopouplou 2015, 5-6).14 The civic obligation of 
                                                
11 The Plymouth Colony itself instituted a fine for non-participation in 1636, as did several towns in 
Massachusetts in following years. As Birch indicates, the American colonies may in fact have originated 
the very practice of compulsory voting in modern democratic elections (Birch 2009, 20). Abraham (1952, 
346) also mentions the existence of compulsory voting in the pre-independence colony of North Carolina.  
12 According to Abraham, there were 57 compulsory voting bills introduced in nine different state 
legislatures between 1888 and 1952 (Abraham 1952, 346-7; see also Keyssar 2000, 128). 
13 The Missouri Supreme Court in Kansas City v. Whipple 136 Mo. 475 (1896) held that a fine for failure 
to vote amounted to “partial and discriminatory taxation” and an “invasion of [the] sovereign right of 
suffrage” (484). 
14 Compulsory voting laws are reportedly still enforced with some type of sanction in Belgium, 
Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, and the canton of Schaffhausen in Switzerland, while the constitutional duty to 
vote has remained formally unenforced in Greece since 2000, and in Italy since 1993 (IDEA 2016; see 
Constitution of Greece 1975 (amended to 2008), Article 51; Constitution of Italy 1947 (amended through 
2012), Article 48 (constitutions available at ConstituteProject.org). Although Portugal is not generally 





electoral participation is even more prevalent throughout South and Central America, 
where a duty to vote was included in almost all constitutions enacted beginning in the late 
1900s through the mid-twentieth century (Birch 2009, 24-25). In fact, every Latin 
American nation existing today appears to have recognized a civic duty to vote at some 
point in its history, and only Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela appear to lack any 
formal recognition of such a duty at the present time.15 The few countries in Asia and the 
Pacific that have recognized a duty to vote are generally not well-developed 
democracies;16 however, the foremost example of an established democracy with a 
compulsory voting regime is Australia, where legal enforcement of the duty to vote began 
in 1924 and continues to this day (Birch 2009, 32). A 2004 study of established 
democracies worldwide found that just over one-fourth had some form of compulsory 
voting laws (Massicotte et al. 2004, 35), although that figure today is probably at most 
                                                                                                                                            
a civic duty (Constitution of Portugal 1976 (amended to 2005)). Other major European states that practiced 
compulsory voting in the twentieth century include the Netherlands (until 1967), other cantons in 
Switzerland (until 1974), Austria (gradually abolished between 1982-2004), and Spain (1907-1923) (IDEA 
2016, Birch 2009, 22-23). In the near-European region, both Cyprus and Turkey are currently reported as 
practicing compulsory voting with some enforcement (IDEA 2016); but see Malkopouplou (2015, 4, 6) 
reporting an absence of current enforcement in these two countries. 
15 Chile moved in 2012 from a system of compulsory voting with voluntary registration to voluntary voting 
with automatic registration (Barnes and Rangel 2014, 573). Nicaragua recognized a constitutional duty to 
vote until the 1979 Sandinista revolution, as did Cuba until the revolution of 1959 (Birch 2009, 24). 
Venezuela removed legal sanctions for abstention in 1993 and constitutionally abolished the duty to vote in 
1999 (Carey and Horiuchi 2017, 7). Although neither Colombia nor El Salvador is listed as having 
compulsory voting by IDEA (2016) or Barnes and Rangel (2014, 575), Article 258 of Colombia’s current 
constitution does state that voting is a civic duty (Constitution of Colombia 1991 (amended to 2013)), as 
does Article 73 of El Salvador’s constitution (Constitution of El Salvador 1983 (amended to 2014). Fornos 
et al. (2004, 936) include El Salvador as having a duty to vote, but not Colombia. The only countries in all 
of Central and South America that appear never to have formally recognized a duty to vote are Belize, 
Guyana, and Suriname—countries that are not generally identified as Latin American (but rather as 
Anglophone and Dutch).  
16 The duty to vote is currently recognized in Singapore, Thailand, and Laos, as well as in the Pacific island 
of Nauru. In Fiji, compulsory voting was practiced between 1992 and 2004, and the duty to vote was 
formally abolished in 2014 (IDEA 2016; Birch 2009, 36). The few reported examples of compulsory voting 
in Africa include Egypt, where the duty to vote—although unenforced—apparently continues to this day, as 
well as Gabon, and what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, both of which briefly instituted 





about 20 percent.17 Thus, while construing electoral participation as a civic obligation as 
well as a civil right may be currently characterized as a minority practice among 
established democracies, it is by no means a radical or fringe view concerning the 
structure of the franchise, and it clearly has a strong historical provenance. 
It is important to emphasize that the practice of what is usually called compulsory 
voting—or sometimes mandatory, or obligatory voting—is extremely varied empirically, 
reflecting a wide range of different approaches to implementation and enforcement of the 
duty to vote. The institution of compulsory voting should thus be broadly understood to 
encompasses a spectrum of approaches, ranging from a constitutional exhortation 
accompanied by no attempt at legal enforcement, to a comprehensive administrative 
system for tracking all nonvoters and implementing sanctions for unexcused abstention 
(see IDEA 2016). In Australia, for example, both registration (or “enrollment”) and 
voting are mandated by law for all citizens aged 18 and over, with only limited 
exceptions for those deemed mentally incompetent, certain convicted criminals, and some 
citizens outside the mainland (AEC 2014). Following each election, the Australian 
Electoral Commission compiles a list of all apparent nonvoters and sends to each a notice 
that demands either an explanation of the individual’s excuse for failing to vote, or 
payment of 20 Australian Dollars.18 A representative of the Commission reviews the 
excuses provided by nonvoters to determine whether they constitute “valid and sufficient 
reasons” for failing to vote, and provides another opportunity to pay the fine for all those 
                                                
17 The Massicotte et al. study, which includes all countries with a Freedom House score of 1 or 2 (on a 
scale of 1 to 7) in political rights for 1996, found compulsory voting in 18 out of 63 countries (Massicotte 
et al. 2004, 11); however, the study excludes the United States and Switzerland (for methodological 
reasons), so the figure is really 18 out of 65, or about 28 percent. Of the 85 countries with a Freedom House 
score of 1 or 2 in political rights for 2015, 15 countries (including Switzerland) currently appear to 
recognize a civic duty to vote in some form, or about 18 percent of the total (see Freedom House 2017; 
IDEA 2016). If countries with a score of 3 in political rights are also included, the proportion is about 19 
percent.  





whose excuses fail to meet this legal threshold.19 A citizen who fails to pay the fine at this 
point may be prosecuted for an offense with a maximum penalty of $180 AUD, plus 
court costs. Failure to pay the fine imposed after conviction may result in a short jail 
sentence, although such cases appear to be relatively rare (AEC 2014).20   
At the other extreme, to the extent that a country like Greece can still be included 
in lists of countries that practice compulsory voting today, it is simply by virtue of the 
constitutional provision indicating that voting is a civic duty, for since the year 2000 
there has reportedly been no enforcement of that duty (IDEA 2016). In other places 
where a duty to vote is mentioned in the constitution there may be no formal 
administrative enforcement, but abstention can still be associated with informal sanctions, 
as appears to have been the case in Italy prior to 1993.21 Enforcement of compulsory 
voting can also occur by way of sanctions other than a monetary fine, including the 
possibility of bans on public employment or obtaining certain government services, as 
                                                
19 The AEC does not define exactly what constitutes a “valid and sufficient” reason for abstaining, but 
rather states that the administrative decision should be based on “the merits of each individual case, in 
accordance with the law as previously interpreted by the courts” (AEC 2014). It then cites a statute 
indicating that a perceived religious duty to abstain is a valid and sufficient reason, and it lists several court 
decisions holding that sickness, accident, or emergency are generally good excuses, but that political 
objections to the government or lack of a preference regarding any of the candidates on the ballot are not 
considered valid and sufficient reasons for abstaining. 
20 In the 1993 national elections, for example, at least 43 nonvoters were reportedly sentenced to one or 
two days in jail (Bennett 2008, 7). Out of a total of 11,385,638 registered voters in those elections, the 
Electoral Commission investigated 490,230 cases of nonvoting, of which 462,588 appear to have provided 
a valid excuse, 23,230 paid the $20 fine, and 4,412 reportedly went to court (Mackerras and McAllister 
1999, 224). In the 2004 elections, there were 458,952 notices issued, with 52,796 fines of $20 paid by 
nonvoters (a number indicated as significantly higher than previous years due to introduction of an online 
payment system), and final convictions entered in at least 22 cases (Bennett 2008, 27-28). It is unclear how 
many of the 22 convictions in 2004 resulted in jail sentences; the Electoral Commission indicates that court 
orders of community service or seizure of property are other options in cases of conviction (AEC 2014). 
Lisa Hill indicates that imposition of a jail sentence for non-payment of fines “no longer seems to happen” 
(Hill 2014, 115)  
21 According to IDEA (2016), the sanctions for abstention in Italy were termed “innocuous,” and might 
have included the possibility of difficulty in finding daycare for a child. Prior to 1993, Italian law also 
required lists of nonvoters to be publicly posted in municipal buildings (Birch 2009, 8). Mexico is another 






appears to be the case in some Latin American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Brazil (Birch 2009, 9). In Belgium, habitual shirkers of the duty to vote can actually 
be deprived of their associated civil right, as they may be removed from the electoral 
register for a period of ten years after failing to vote in four national elections (Birch 
2009, 8). Furthermore, in addition to the various types of negative sanctions, some 
governments may provide positive incentives for fulfilling the duty to vote, such as in 
Colombia, where voters by law receive preference over any equally qualified abstainers 
for acceptance at universities, government employment, and other state benefit programs, 
in addition to discounts on university tuition and fees for various government services.22 
Finally, beyond the wide variation in the content or existence of sanctions associated with 
the duty to vote, there may also be significant differences in the level of enforcement of 
any sanctions, either due to a deliberate decision in favor of lax enforcement—as 
reportedly is the case in Belguim—or due to deficiencies in administrative capacity, as 
appears to be the case in many Latin American countries (Birch 2009, 6).  
This extensive variation in the institutions of compulsory voting makes it difficult 
to empirically evaluate any causal effects associated with establishing voting as a civic 
duty in addition to a civil right. Studies that analyze cross-national variation generally 
seek to differentiate between countries with strong, weak, or no enforcement of the duty 
to vote (e.g. Chong and Olivera 2008), and they may also account for differences in the 
severity of any applied sanctions (e.g. Panagopoulos 2008); however, this modeling 
approach may still fail to fully capture the wide range of institutional variation, and the 
                                                
22 Colombian Law 403 of 1997, Article 2. Article 4 of the law allows for nonvoters to receive the same 
incentives if they demonstrate to authorities that their abstention was excusable due to force majeure or 
accident. Interestingly, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared the provision of incentives to voters 
unconstitutional with respect to voting in constitutional referendums or any other elections having a 
minimum turnout requirement, reasoning that in such cases abstention could be viewed as instrumentally 
effective, and it must therefore be a legally protected right with no adverse consequences (Judgment C-041 





data sources employed do not necessarily allow for a more fine-grained analysis.23 Other 
studies look at changes or differences in compulsory voting rules within a country (e.g. 
Hirczy 1994; Bechtel et al. 2015; Carey and Houichi 2017), but these analyses may lack 
external validity when applied to other legal/administrative contexts. Moreover, beyond 
these methodological problems, the substantive results of these empirical analyses are 
somewhat mixed, and it is therefore difficult to draw general conclusions based on the 
literature as it stands to date.  
The strongest finding—albeit one that is probably unsurprising—is that strict 
enforcement of compulsory voting, particularly when accompanied by relatively severe 
sanctions, tends to significantly increase voter turnout (Panagopoulos 2008; Birch 2009, 
93-94; Singh 2011; Quintelier et al. 2011).24 This finding is confirmed by analyzing the 
turnout effects of geographic and historical variation in compulsory voting rules within 
certain countries (Hirczy 1994), as well as by counterfactual analysis of the hypothesized 
effect of abolishing compulsory voting in Australia (Jackman 1999; Louth and Hill 
2005). Sarah Birch in fact concludes that compulsory voting is the strongest institutional 
variable impacting turnout, with an effect that ranges anywhere between six and twenty 
percentage points (Birch 2009, 91).25 However, there are of course many other factors 
that contribute to determining turnout levels, including socioeconomic, political, and 
                                                
23 Most of the cross-national analyses rely on data provided by IDEA (2016), which provides only general 
information on compulsory voting in countries around the world and does not provide detailed sources for 
its data collection.   
24 Norris (2004, 169) finds that compulsory voting increases turnout in established democracies, but that it 
might actually be associated with decreased turnout in other political systems; however, several other 
studies have found that compulsory voting increases turnout generally in all countries (Jackman 1987, 415; 
Blais 2000, 27; Fornos et al. 2004, 927; Geys 2006a, 652; Karp and Banducci 2008, 329; but see Yeret 
1995). Quintelier et al. (2011) find that compulsory voting is less effective at increasing turnout among 
younger citizens. Jaitman (2013) finds that the increase in turnout under compulsory voting in Argentina is 
twice as great among unskilled as opposed to skilled workers. 
25 Birch also finds, however, that a constitutional duty to vote without any accompanying administrative 





other institutional variables (see e.g. Geys 2006a), and it is clear that countries can have 
high turnout in national elections without compulsory voting, as is the case in Malta and 
(to a lesser extent) the Scandinavian countries (see Hirczy 1994; 1995). In addition, 
social norms of voting may exist separate from any legal standards (see Hasen 1996), and 
general factors such as the political salience of elections may also be important in 
determining turnout levels (Franklin 1999).  
Findings are somewhat murkier with respect to other potential effects of 
compulsory voting. In a counterfactual study of how abolishing compulsory voting would 
affect the composition of the electorate in Belgium, Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998) find 
that socioeconomic inequality in turnout would significantly increase, a finding 
confirmed by De Winter and Ackaert (1998). Likewise, Zachary Elkins (2000) finds in a 
study of Brazil that compulsory voting appears to at least modestly increase the electoral 
participation of conventionally underrepresented demographic groups, and Laura Jaitman 
(2013) finds even stronger effects in Argentina. These general findings are confirmed in a 
cross-national analysis by Aina Gallego, but she finds that the reduction in turnout 
inequality under compulsory voting is an indirect result of turnout levels moving closer 
toward universal participation, rather than a direct effect of increasing the propensity to 
vote within lower socioeconomic demographics (Gallego 2010, 246).26 On the other 
hand, Cepaluni and Hidalgo’s (2016) study of compulsory voting in Brazil finds that the 
practice actually tends to increase inequality in turnout, which they argue is a result of 
non-monetary sanctions for abstention being more effectively enforced against middle 
and upper class citizens. Regarding economic effects, Crain and Leonard (1993) find an 
overall reduction in government spending in countries with compulsory voting, which 
                                                
26 But see Singh (2015), finding that turnout inequality is reduced under compulsory voting specifically 





they theorize is tied to a reduction in the influence of special interest groups under these 
voting rules. O’Toole and Strobl (1995) question this result on methodological grounds, 
and they instead find that government expenditures on health as well as housing and 
transfer payments appear higher under compulsory voting rules, although they confirm 
that expenditures on defense and economic services are indeed lower. Chong and Olivera 
(2008) find that enforcement of compulsory voting reduces levels of income inequality 
cross-nationally, and Carey and Horiuchi (2016) confirm this finding in a study of 
Venezuela; however, Birch initially finds no such cross-national effect, although she does 
confirm the finding of reduced income inequality when considering only countries in 
Latin America and Western Europe (Birch 2009, 130-131). 
The question of the potential consequences of compulsory voting for the political 
system is closely tied to the complex issue of whether and how electoral outcomes might 
change under higher voter turnout, an empirical question that has generated substantial 
debate, particularly with regard to elections in the United States.27 The relatively few 
studies that have looked more specifically for political effects associated with the 
institutions of compulsory voting have also generated mixed results. In a study of 
political outcomes in Australia, Mackerras and McAllister (1999) find that compulsory 
voting decreases support for right-wing parties while increasing support for the political 
left and for minor parties in general. Jensen and Spoon (2011) confirm and explain the 
increased support for minor parties under compulsory voting through a cross-national 
analysis showing that compulsory voting laws spread out the distribution of vote choice, 
leading to a greater number of political parties represented in legislatures and a wider 
                                                





ideological range in governments.28 Similarly, Bechtel et al. (2015) confirm an increase 
in support for “leftist” policies in their study of compulsory versus voluntary voting in 
Swiss referendums. However, Birch finds no increase in support for either small or left-
leaning parties in her cross-national analysis, and she finds that enforcement of 
compulsory voting in Belgium actually appears to increase support for the political right 
(Birch 2009, 123-128).29 
Birch finds that compulsory voting tends to significantly increase perceptions of 
democratic legitimacy—at least outside of Latin America, where satisfaction with 
democracy is in general relatively low—and interestingly, she finds that this effect is not 
dependent upon the enforcement of sanctions for nonvoting (Birch 2009, 113).30 Her 
analysis also indicates that enforcement of compulsory voting is associated with at least a 
slight increase in the likelihood of political participation more generally, with a more 
significant increase in the likelihood of engaging in protests or demonstrations (Birch 
2009, 70-72).31 On the other hand, Birch finds that enforced compulsory voting is 
associated with decreased perceptions of political efficacy, which she indicates could 
provide evidence of increased levels of “democratic disaffection” (Birch 2009, 68). 
Krister Lundell (2012) generally confirms Birch’s finding that even unsanctioned 
compulsory voting tends to increase reported levels of trust in government, but Lundell 
also finds that the duty to vote—again whether enforced or not—has an overall negative 
                                                
28 Jensen and Spoon emphasize that their findings regarding the effects of compulsory voting are distinct 
from the effects of increasing turnout alone, which leads them to theorize that the institution of compulsory 
voting is qualitatively different from high turnout achieved by other means (Jensen and Spoon 2011, 708). 
They also note that their findings on the effects of compulsory voting are strongest when the duty to vote is 
mentioned in the constitution (709).     
29 Birch also finds that sanctioned compulsory voting results in lower levels of perceived governmental 
corruption (Birch 2009, 132). 
30 Birch finds weaker evidence of a positive effect of compulsory voting on perceptions of the quality of 
democratic representation (Birch 2009, 114). 
31 See also Yates (2008), finding that compulsory voting increases the propensity to engage in non-





effect on engagement in other types of democratic participation, an effect she attributes to 
“societal disillusion and an antipathetic attitude” engendered by this institution (Lundell 
2012, 226). Accordingly, Singh (2016) finds that compulsory voting—particularly when 
enforced—is associated with increases in anti-government attitudes and reports of 
dissatisfaction with the democratic system.32  
Studies of the effects of compulsory voting on the acquisition and use of political 
information have also generated mixed results. Jill Sheppard’s cross-national study finds 
that enforcing a duty to vote leads to noticeable increases in the political knowledge 
levels of citizens (Sheppard 2015), and Gordon and Segura likewise find a significant 
positive effect on political sophistication in countries with compulsory voting (Gordon 
and Segura 1997, 140). Studies by Caitlin Milazzo also confirm that the duty to vote can 
make citizens more likely to engage in political discussion, both cross-nationally (2008), 
and in Swiss national elections (2009). On the other hand, Selb and Lachat’s (2009) study 
of Belgian elections finds that compulsory voting induces unmotivated voters to make 
choices that are more likely to be inconsistent with their expressed preferences, implying 
a clear lack of informational sophistication. Similarly, an experimental study by Loewen 
at al. (2008) found no increase in information acquisition among Canadian university 
students who were required to vote in a provincial election in order to receive payment 
for participation in the study. Singh et al. (2016) find comparable results in an Australian 
experiment in which individuals who reported they would not vote unless compelled to 
do so are generally less likely to seek out political information. Birch also finds that 
                                                
32 According to Singh, “forced participation inflates the tendency of those with negative orientations 
towards democracy to see the democratic system as illegitimate, and to be dissatisfied with democracy” 
(Singh 2016, 1). This is also tied to the observation that compulsory voting leads to a greater number of 
invalid ballots (Singh 2017). However, a study of several Australian elections by Hill and Young concludes 
that the “vast majority” of invalid ballots—known in Australia as “informal” votes—are unintentional 
results of the complexity of the preferential electoral system, rather than expressions of dissatisfaction or 





compulsory voting has no significant effect on either acquisition of information or on the 
propensity to engage in political discussion (Birch 2009, 66-69). However, an 
experimental study by Victoria Shineman (2016) found that providing a financial 
incentive for voting in a San Francisco municipal election did in fact lead subjects to 
become more politically informed, and Shineman’s (2012b) comparative study of 
Austrian provinces likewise concludes that compulsory voting increases the propensity to 
acquire political information.  
The issue of information is also prominent in the mixed findings of game 
theoretic analyses of compulsory versus voluntary voting. Some of these studies assume 
the existence of an objectively correct decision corresponding with some “true” state of 
the world, and thus voters who are uninformed about this state of the world should 
strategically abstain from voting in order to allow informed voters to determine the 
outcome (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996).33 Thus, voluntary voting may be claimed as 
superior to compulsory voting, as the majority decision is more likely to reflect the 
“correct” outcome when abstention is allowed (Krishna and Morgan 2012). Similarly, 
Jackee and Sun (2006) show that random choices by disinterested voters under 
compulsory voting creates uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome and may prevent 
that outcome from accurately reflecting the preference of the majority. However, the 
assumption of an objectively correct decision based upon a true state of the world, often 
called an assumption of  “common values” (e.g. Krishna and Morgan 2012, 2086), is 
surely open to doubt in the context of political decision-making. Borgers (2004) 
                                                
33 See also Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), showing that if abstention is not allowed, it is theoretically 
irrational for all voters to vote “sincerely” in accordance with their beliefs about the true state of the world. 
Also see Bhattacharya et al. (2014), confirming this theory in an experimental study comparing compulsory 
versus voluntary voting rules. But see Shineman (2012a) for a decision-theoretic model showing that 
compulsory rules as applied in practice tend to increase informed voting consistent with the true state of the 





abandons this assumption is favor of a “private values” model and argues that voluntary 
voting is still superior to compulsory voting, but his analysis relies on the conventional 
rational choice expectation that individuals will not participate unless they have a 
substantial probability of being pivotal to the outcome, and he thus admits that his model 
cannot account for the behavior of voters in large elections (Borgers 2004, 57). In fact, in 
a private values model of a large electorate, Krasa and Polborn (2009) show that 
compulsory voting with fines for abstention actually makes it more likely that the 
outcome will accurately reflect the majority preference.34  
In sum, although the duty to vote and compulsory voting laws are fairly common, 
there is a clear lack of consensus regarding most of the empirical effects of these 
institutions. It may be that more definitive causal findings will never be realized due to 
the relatively small universe of cases available for analysis and the wide variation in 
administrative implementations of the duty to vote, in addition to the difficulty in 
controlling for confounding variables and proving external validity given the complexity 
of sociopolitical processes in different countries. The challenges to formal models of 
compulsory versus voluntary voting are also apparent, but the prominence of 
informational assumptions in these studies is notable, as it is apparent that fundamental 
ideas about the meaning and function of voting in modern democratic theory are 
extremely important for assessing these institutions. The bigger normative questions 
associated with the duty to vote and compulsory voting seem to have flown somewhat 
under the radar of conventional scholarship in political theory, but more recently there 
has emerged a fairly rich literature addressing these questions, with some interesting and 
enlightening debates. A closer look at these debates can assist in achieving a better 
                                                
34 See also Ghosal and Lockwood (2009), who model the voting decision as a mixture between private and 
common values and find that compulsory voting may be superior to voluntary voting when the weight 





understanding of these institutions and in formulating new arguments about whether 
electoral participation in a liberal democracy should be construed and administered as a 
general civic duty or as a voluntary choice of democratic citizens.  
 
4) SHOULD THERE BE A CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIC DUTY TO VOTE? 
As discussed in the previous section, formal recognition of a constitutional duty to 
vote does not necessary imply the existence of enforced compulsory voting laws, and 
there indeed may be other important policy implications for voting rules and procedures 
that follow from recognizing a duty to vote, as will be discussed further below. However, 
the broad normative question of whether there is—or should be—such a duty in the first 
place must be addressed.  
Conventional scholarly opinion in political theory has generally expressed 
skepticism concerning both the duty to vote and the practice of compulsory voting. Early 
treatments by Henry Abraham (1952) and H. B. Mayo (1959) argue strenuously against 
compulsory voting, citing various reasons why electoral participation by all citizens 
would be undesirable. However, it must be acknowledged that the intellectual 
environment surrounding voting—at least in the United States—was somewhat different 
in the days prior to the civil rights era, when this country arguably suffered from major 
democratic deficits given the denial of effective voting rights to many of its citizens. 
Accordingly, Abraham’s first argument against compulsory voting is that the franchise is 
not even a civil right, but rather only a “privilege, bestowed by the government” 
(Abraham 1952, 347),35 an opinion that presumably few would adhere to today. Although 
                                                
35 In Wesley Hohfeld’s classic formulation of legal relations, “a privilege is the opposite of a duty” 
(Hohfeld 1913, 32); thus, if voting is a privilege rather than a right, there is by definition no duty to vote 





it remains true that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly confer the right to vote, and 
the constitutional status of that right is indeed somewhat ambiguous, in practice it is 
fairly clear that the right to vote is considered “fundamental” in American jurisprudence, 
and that it cannot be denied, at least to adult citizens, barring a lawful reason such as 
criminal conduct or mental incapacity.36  
Early arguments also focus on the argument that a right to abstain from voting is 
required for free exercise of the right to vote (Abraham 1952, 348), an argument that 
echoes the 1896 opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court, which stated, “How can a 
citizen be said to enjoy the free exercise of the right of suffrage who is constrained to 
such exercise, whether he will or not, by a penalty?”37 Some have thus suggested that the 
establishment of voting as a civic duty is inconsistent with liberal democratic norms and 
practices, and even that the duty to vote has totalitarian connotations (Abraham 1955, 33; 
Jones 1954, 25). While the notion that compulsory voting is fundamentally undemocratic 
seems largely untenable given the examples of established democracies employing this 
practice, nevertheless, the argument that a duty to vote is somehow illiberal does continue 
to resonate today. Along these lines, some of the more recent normative scholarship 
argues that the right to vote in a liberal democracy must also include a right to abstain 
from voting (Karlan 1994, 1458; Blomberg 1995; Katz 1997, 244; Hanna 2009; Lever 
2010). Jeffrey Blomberg goes so far as to argue that the right to abstain “logically 
                                                
36 The Constitution does not explicitly grant a right to vote, although it prohibits some discriminatory 
voting practices (see Gerken 2014, 11). The U.S. Supreme Court first delineated the textual origin of the 
right to vote in Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the Court interpreted this right as implied by 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Douglas 2014, 97). Subsequent decisions 
and the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with its later amendments, further strengthened the 
status of voting as a fundamental civil right. Nevertheless, there remains doctrinal confusion about the 
constitutional status of the right to vote, and particularly whether that right is actually treated as 
fundamental by judicial decisions (see Gardner 1997, 894; Douglas 2008, 145). This confusion and 
uncertainty can be seen as reflected in the ongoing disputes regarding the form and content of voting rights 
protections in this country.  





follows” from the right to vote (Blomberg 1995, 1020; see also Ciccone 2002, 347-
348).38 However, there does not appear to be any logical contradiction in formally 
conceptualizing voting as both a right and a duty. Even some strong critics of compulsory 
voting admit this (Lever 2010, 905) and do not necessarily claim that a duty to vote is 
fundamentally inconsistent with liberal democratic norms (Brennan 2014, 13). While it is 
true that certain liberal rights—such as rights to religious expression or to bear arms—
include an “inverse right,” or a right to waive the right, there are other rights that cannot 
be inverted or waived—such as rights to workplace safety or to a minimum wage (HLR 
2007, 599; Hill 2014, 161). As Lisa Hill explains, there are many rights that encompass 
concurrent duties, which she terms duty-rights—such as the duty-right of a police officer 
to a arrest a criminal, or the duty-right to repay one’s debts (Hill 2014, 170).  
The reason some rights do not include an inverse right and cannot be waived is 
because rights may serve to protect not only the interests of individuals, but public 
interests as well (HLR 2007, 599; Hill 2014, 162). Defenders of the duty to vote as 
consistent with liberal democratic norms thus emphasize the collective—or structural—
interest served by protection of voting rights, in addition to the individual interest in 
electoral participation. As Lisa Hill writes, “The right to vote is not just an individual 
right; it also exists for the purpose of constituting and perpetuating representative 
democracy, which is a collective benefit” (Hill 2014, 162; see also HLR 2007, 600; 
Lacroix 2007, 194; Engelen 2009, 221). Similarly, Heather Lardy rejects a right to 
                                                
38 Blomberg argues that a right to abstain is constitutionally fundamental and should be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny in the context of purging registration lists, a practice that he argues substantially burdens 
the right to abstain. Although Blomberg admits that this specific argument was rejected by a U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Hoffman v. Maryland 928 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991), he explains that the Hoffman 
decision affirmed the lower court’s ruling regarding the existence of a right to abstain, but declined to rule 
on the level of constitutional protection required (Blomberg 1995, 1028). He also cites a Fifth Circuit case 
from 1974, and a 1972 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, both holding that there is a right to 





abstain as founded upon a mistaken assumption that the right to vote is associated 
primarily with protection of freedom or liberty in “the ‘negative’ sense” (Berlin 1969, 
121), or the ability to remain free from government interference (Lardy 2004, 309; see 
also Schäfer 2011, 15). Inste ad, according to Lardy, the right to vote “is about ascribing 
democratic authority to electors; about declaring their formal equal standing as qualified 
participants” (Lardy 2004, 310). This recognition of the collective interest served by 
voting rights may also lead toward a civic republican argument in favor of the duty to 
vote, such as Phillip Pettit’s endorsement of compulsory voting on the basis that the 
purpose of elections is to provide for the common interest (Pettit 2000, 135; see also 
Pettit 2012, 201, n. 26). As Armin Schäfer explains, “republicans see liberty as 
inescapably bound up with sharing in self-government” (Schäfer 2011, 17); the duty to 
vote may accordingly be justified in the name of “realizing an inclusive democracy” (21). 
Nevertheless, the right to free speech arguably also serves a public interest, yet it 
nevertheless does generally include an inverse right to remain silent (HLR 2004, 601). 
The question thus becomes, is voting a form of speech? To the extent that voting is 
comparable to speech, a right to abstain could be required, and citizens should not be 
forced to “speak” by voting (Karlan 1994, 1458). The U.S. Supreme Court has in fact 
held that voting does not legally qualify for the full protections of free speech under the 
First Amendment, because it is not primarily as an outlet for personal expression, but 
rather serves the more instrumental purpose of selecting government officials (HLR 
2004, 601).39 Furthermore, a compulsion to speak by voting would be a “viewpoint-
                                                
39 Hasen thus argues that a compulsory voting law should not be seen as violating the First Amendment—
particularly if it allowed for abstention in practice, as discussed below (Hasen 1996, 2176, n. 163). The 
High Court of Australia appears never to have directly addressed this question, but at least one Australian 
scholar has argued that compulsory voting is an unconstitutional violation of the freedom of political 
communication (Gray 2012). A 1972 decision by the European Court of Human Rights held that Austria’s 





neutral” regulation of speech as long as one is not required to vote for any specific 
candidate or party, and such regulations are subject to a lower level of scrutiny under 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence (HLR 2004, 602). Judicial doctrine on these matters is 
of course not necessarily dispositive of the normative question at hand, and as discussed 
in Section 2 above, there presumably are significant expressive motivations for voting.40 
Yet it must also be admitted that where the specific public interest at stake is considered 
important enough, even actual compulsion of speech can sometimes be acceptable in a 
liberal democracy—such as the power of courts to compel testimony (at least to the 
extent it is not self-incriminating). The question is thus whether the public interest served 
by a duty to vote is significant enough to override any individual right to remain silent by 
abstaining.   
In addition to the significance of the collective interest weighing against any 
expressive right to remain silent, a further issue would be to inquire into the nature and 
degree of government coercion involved in a particular compulsory voting regime. This 
requires an assessment of how the law is implemented in practice, which is related to the 
legal question of whether the regulation of speech is “narrowly tailored” to achieve the 
public interest served by the law (see HLR 2004, 602). As indicated previously, there is a 
great deal of cross-national variation in enforcement of the constitutional duty to vote. 
Where this duty remains completely unenforced, there would of course be no violation of 
any right to remain silent; however, the fact is that even the strictest implementations of 
the duty to vote through strong enforcement of compulsory voting do allow citizens to 
abstain from voting as a practical matter. This is due to the now universal norm of the 
secret ballot in liberal democracies, which in practice means that one is always free to 
                                                
40 See also the opinion of Justice Alito in Nevada Commission of Ethics v. Carrigan 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2354 





cast a blank ballot, or to intentionally spoil one’s ballot (see Lijphart 1997, 2; Birch 2009, 
2; Hill 2014, 116).41 This practical feature of compulsory voting is generally recognized 
even by opponents of compulsory voting (e.g. Abraham 1952, 349; Sheehy 2002, 48-49; 
Saunders 2010, 74).42 In fact, some proponents of the practice object to use of the term 
“compulsory voting,” preferring instead “compulsory turnout,” which is said to reflect 
the reality that what is actually required is only appearance at the polls (Keaney and 
Rogers 2006, 26; Machin 2011, 104).43  
Others have suggested that providing a “no preference” or “none of the above” 
option on the ballot would ameliorate the coercive effect of compulsory voting (Feely 
1974, 242; Orr 2002, 578; Elliot 2017, 658),44 or that conscientious objector status could 
be provided to allow for principled abstention (Hill 2002a, 443; HLR 2004, 603). These 
practical options for allowing citizens to refrain from casting a valid vote serve to limit 
the actual coercion involved in compulsory voting and to minimize any violation of free 
                                                
41 The European Court of Human Rights specifically referred to the option of casting a blank or invalid 
ballot in finding that Austria’s compulsory voting law did not infringe on protected freedoms (ECHR 
1972). Australian law appears to be somewhat unclear on this particular point, as strict interpretation of the 
relevant statutes could suggest that recording a valid vote may actually be required (see Hill 2002a, 448; 
Orr 1997, 292; Saunders 2010, 75). There does not seem to be any dispute about the fact that in practice 
Australian citizens are currently free to vote “informally” by casting invalid ballots; however, some have 
suggested that electronic voting could someday be designed in such a way as to require casting a formal 
vote while still preserving ballot secrecy (Chong et al. 2005, 13).  
42 Opponents of compulsory voting generally argue that a duty to simply turn out without voting is 
normatively problematic, or even incoherent (Saunders 2010, 75; Lever 2010, 911; see also John 2015, 
432). Malkopouplou thus indicates that while casting a blank ballot may always be possible in practice, the 
question of whether in principle actual voting may be required remains a matter of fundamental debate 
(Malkopouplou 2015, 7). These arguments are addressed below in the discussion of limitations on the duty 
to vote (Section 4c).  
43 When compulsory voting was practiced in the Netherlands prior to 1970, it was in fact referred to as 
opkomstplicht, which translates as “obligatory attendance” (Hill 2014, 116). In the case of absentee or 
postal voting, compulsory turnout would presumably require actual submission of a ballot, but individuals 
are of course still free to cast a blank or spoiled ballot.   
44 The state of Nevada provides this ballot option, as apparently do the countries of France, Spain, Ukraine, 
some Latin American countries, and Russia before 2006 (see Damore et al. 2012, 895, n. 1). The option has 
also been available since 2013 in India, when the Indian Supreme Court mandated that it be included on all 





speech engendered by enforcement of a duty to vote. In fact, some argue that requiring 
citizens to proactively register their dissatisfaction in one of these ways would actually 
serve the interest of free speech by providing a better outlet for expression than 
abstention, which arguably does not clearly express anything, since it can be interpreted 
in so many different ways (Wertheimer 1975, 293; Lardy 2004, 318; Hill 2014, 144). 
Furthermore, compulsory voting laws do not preclude opportunities for expression 
through civil disobedience, accompanied of course by acceptance of the penalty for not 
voting (Thompson 2002, 36).45 Nevertheless, protection of the right to free speech 
admittedly should require that individuals be free to choose their own modes of 
expression, and as one opponent of compulsory voting writes, even a “garbled” form of 
communication may still be deserving of protection (Gray 2012, 596). Even allowing for 
the options to spoil one’s ballot, to vote for none of the above, or to claim conscientious 
objector status, some will nevertheless continue to object to any enforcement regime 
connected to a civic duty to vote (Lardy 2004, 306). At root, the problem thus remains 
one of balancing any individual right to remain silent against the proposed public interest 
served by a civic duty to vote. But what exactly is the nature of that public interest, and 
how compelling is it? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss the 
primary normative argument in support of compulsory voting. 
a) A Rawlsian Argument for the Duty to Vote  
Perhaps the most notable scholarly argument for establishing and enforcing a 
civic duty to vote was made by Arendt Lijphart in his 1996 presidential address to the 
American Political Science Association, entitled “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s 
                                                
45 Hill provides some examples of this type of civil disobedience taking place in Australia, including public 
advocacy of informal voting and abstention (Hill 2002a, 439-440, 444-445). However, she indicates that a 





Unresolved Dilemma” (Lijphart 1997). As reflected in that title, Lijphart’s primary 
motive in advocating compulsory voting in the United States is to reduce political 
inequality by increasing voter turnout and reducing the demographic bias of the 
electorate. Similarly, Lisa Hill—who may well be compulsory voting’s most vigorous 
and prolific contemporary defender—emphasizes the value of “substantive political 
equality” (Hill 2014, 112), and particularly equality in the composition of turnout (153), 
as the strongest motivation for enforcing a duty to vote.46 However, actual applications of 
the value of equality are of course highly contested, and the meaning of political equality 
in practice can be difficult to pin down in contexts of its implementation in specific 
liberal democratic institutions (Beitz 1989, 3-4). It nevertheless remains an imperative 
question of constitutional design, as indicated, whether principles of equality should 
require that electoral participation be conceived only as a formal right of the democratic 
citizenry, or whether voting should also be framed as a generally applicable civic duty in 
a liberal democracy. Charles Beitz writes that “a theory of political equality should… 
explain what must be true of the terms of democratic participation if they can be said to 
reflect the equal public status of democratic citizens” (Beitz, 1989, 17).47 According to 
Beitz, interpretations of equality in democratic institutions should explain why one design 
approach to setting the terms of participation yields more fairness—and correspondingly 
more justice—than another approach (17-19). The main argument presented here will 
thus be that framing electoral participation as a civic duty, in addition to a civil right, is 
                                                
46 Lijphart and Hill also make other arguments for compulsory voting, but their primary arguments center 
on the issue of equality. 
47 Beitz does not address the question of compulsory versus voluntary voting, instead focusing his attention 






arguably required by principles of equality under John Rawls’ conception of “justice as 
fairness” (Rawls 1999).  
Again, the constitutional design question is whether principles of democratic 
equality require only equal opportunity to participate in elections, or whether equal actual 
participation should also be required—or at least aspired to—under the Rawlsian 
conception of justice as fairness. Rawls himself seems clearly to suggest that only the 
opportunity to participate is required for justice. His first principle of justice, the principle 
of “equal liberty,” translates in constitutional design into what he calls “the principle of 
(equal) participation,” which is said to require that “all citizens are to have an equal right 
to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes 
the laws with which they are to comply” (Rawls 1999, 194, emphasis added). With 
regard to democratic elections, Rawls states that the principle of participation requires 
that, “[a]ll sane adults, with certain generally recognized exceptions, have the right to 
take part in political affairs, and the precept one elector one vote is honored as far as 
possible” (195, emphasis added).  
The fact that Rawls conceives of electoral participation as a civil right only, and 
not as a civic duty as well, is also fairly clear when he later indicates that “it should be 
kept in mind that the principle of participation… does not define an ideal of citizenship; 
nor does it lay down a duty requiring all to take an active part in political affairs” (200). 
He continues this idea and concludes his chapter on the basic requirements of the 
principle of participation with the following significant qualification:  
In a well-governed state only a small fraction of persons may devote much of 
their time to politics…. But this fraction, whatever its size, will most likely be 





interests and centers of political life will have their active members who look after 
their concerns (200).48 
Here Rawls tellingly assumes that political participation—of which voting is of course 
the most prominent form—will be “more or less” unbiased with respect to the 
socioeconomic demographics of the citizenry. This presumably implies that if voter 
turnout were not more or less unbiased, the principle of (equal) participation would not 
be satisfied. This implication is fully consistent with Rawls’ understanding of the purpose 
of the principle of participation, which he says, “compels those in authority to be 
responsive to the felt interests of the electorate” (199). However, it is of course well 
established empirically that voter turnout in the United States is generally biased 
significantly in favor of the more privileged socioeconomic demographics, and there is 
substantial—though admittedly not unchallenged—evidence that this bias in turnout has 
significant political consequences (see Chapter 3, Section 2; see also Hill 2014, 137-140; 
Malkopouplou 2015, 29-30).  
It is not entirely clear how Rawls is able so casually to assume to that those who 
vote will likely “be drawn more or less equally from all sectors of society.”49 Certainly 
the possibility of significant bias in the electorate arising from the process of self-
selection into the electorate under voluntary voting is a real possibility worth considering. 
The only reliable way to avoid the possibility of bias—while providing an equal right to 
vote—is for the electorate to consist of not just a sample, but rather of the whole 
population of eligible voters. Of course the closer the electorate comes to universal 
                                                
48 In fact, as discussed below, Rawls goes even further in outlining (without fully endorsing) a justification 
of J. S. Mill’s well-known advocacy of “plural voting,” with extra weight given to the votes of citizens (viz. 
“men”) who “can be identified as having superior wisdom and judgment” (Rawls 1999, 205).  
49 It seems quite unlikely Rawls would be unaware of the substantial research to the contrary on this point, 
even in his original work of 1971, which contains the same concluding paragraph (see Rawls 1971, 227-





participation the smaller the possibility of bias creeping in, and so it is surely relevant that 
turnout in American elections is relatively low, at least in comparison to other 
democracies (see Chapter 3, Section 2). More to the point, however, the relevant question 
for Rawls’ theory is not so much one of empirical statistics, but rather the question of 
whether someone behind the conceptual “veil of ignorance” of the “original position” 
(Rawls 1999, 118) would choose to make voting a civil right only or a civic duty as well, 
and whether purely voluntary voting could vitiate the principle of participation by 
increasing the likelihood of bias in the composition of the electorate.  
Perhaps in ignoring the possibility of bias in turnout Rawls simply means to 
indicate that someone in the original position could assume that participation would be 
more or less equal? But the definition of the veil of ignorance does not appear to support 
this: 
[Parties in the original position] understand political affairs and the principles of 
economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of 
human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever general 
facts affect the choice of the principles of justice. There are no limitations on 
general information, that is, on general laws and theories, since conceptions of 
justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation 
which they are to regulate, and there is no reason to rule out these facts (119).  
It thus seems clear that someone in the original position would at least have to recognize 
the possibility of bias in turnout under a system of purely voluntary voting, particularly 
given the calculus of voting, which postulates at a basic level that the costs and benefits 
of voting are subject to varying assessments and impacts among various individuals and 
groups in the population. In fact, someone behind the veil of ignorance might well be 





whose members are less likely to vote voluntarily, and might therefore conclude that a 
democratic constitution should actively encourage everyone to vote in order to help 
ensure that the interests and welfare of such groups are better addressed by the political 
process.  
It does not seem that anyone has made this particular argument;50 rather, Rawls’ 
evident support for voluntary voting appears to have been taken at face value. For 
example, in a thought-provoking article entitled “Voters as Fiduciaries,” Edward Foley 
engages the Rawlsian theory to evaluate the electoral rules and procedures that would be 
chosen in the original position (Foley 2015). Foley conceptualizes voting as a public 
office in which “voters owe a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of all inhabitants of the 
polity, rather than to advance their own self-interests,” and he consequently emphasizes 
not just voting rights but also voting “responsibilities” (154). He actually compares the 
act of voting to service on a jury, but oddly, he ignores the fact that such service is 
institutionalized not just a civil right but as a civic duty as well (157).51 Foley echoes 
Rawls’ general concern with avoiding bias in turnout, stating that in the original position 
                                                
50 Lisa Hill does makes a similar argument that the equal opportunity to vote without equality in actual 
voter turnout reduces democratic legitimacy, however she bases her argument not on Rawls but rather on 
Robert Dahl’s conceptions of equality, participation, and inclusiveness (Hill 2014, 127-137).    
51 Foley states that just as citizens have a “right to exercise the responsibility of being a juror, so too they 
have a right to exercise responsibility of voting,” and he further refers to “the opportunity for jury service” 
(emphasis added) comparing it to “the opportunity to serve as a member of the electorate” (Foley 2015, 
158). He also compares the fiduciary office of voting to military service, stating that there is an equal right 
to vote just as there is “an equal right to serve in the military” (159), but again he fails to mention the 
possibility of compulsory service if a war necessitates a general draft. In personal correspondence, he 
further confirmed the military analogy, suggesting that it makes sense to treat voting like military service, 
which is currently voluntary. However, if high turnout is indeed viewed as a basic requirement of equal 
justice in a democracy, for the reasons discussed above, then perhaps voting is actually more comparable to 
military service during a war when conscription may be required to ensure full participation of all those 
eligible. Obviously, a duty to serve in the armed forces asks far more of individuals than a duty to vote, and 
compulsory military service is perhaps only justifiable during a war for national survival. Whether 
compulsory voting might ask too much of individuals is addressed below in discussing the limits of the 
duty to vote, but the analogous argument here is that this duty may be necessary to ensure the “survival” of 





one would prefer “as broad an electorate as is feasible,” in order to avoid the danger that 
elected representatives might “serve the interests of only a portion of society, rather than 
serving society as a whole” (178). He further declares that the best procedure from the 
perspective of the original position would be to “crowdsource” the function of voting, “so 
that any biases that inadvertently creep into the process tend to cancel each other out” 
(180).  
However, in discussing the specific implications of the original position for 
electoral rules and procedures, Foley asserts that under Rawls’ theory, “there would be 
less concern about maximizing voter turnout, as long as all citizens (regardless of race or 
other social circumstances) have equal and ample opportunities to cast a ballot” (Foley 
2015, 185).52 He continues, again echoing Rawls: “A citizen must have an equal and fair 
opportunity to participate in the fiduciary responsibility of electing society's lawmakers. 
But if a citizen chooses not to take advantage of this opportunity… then the task will be 
performed by those who choose to do so” (185). Foley then goes even further than Rawls 
in explaining why voluntary voting is preferable to compulsory voting:53 
From a Rawlsian perspective, society does not need every citizen to participate in 
the service of selecting the lawmakers. Rather, society needs those who choose to 
participate to do so from the perspective of endeavoring to elect lawmakers most 
likely to act in the public interest, and society needs that there be no barriers to 
participation in this form of public service (185-186).  
                                                
52 Strikingly, Foley here seems to suggest that under the Rawlsian approach there should actually be less 
concern about low voter turnout than there is currently.  
53 Foley notes that compulsory voting is practiced in Australia, but states that it is “unlikely to take hold” in 
the United States (185, n. 66). However, the pertinent question here is not whether the institution of 
compulsory voting along the Australian model is viable in the American context, but rather whether, based 
on the Rawlsian original position, voting should be constitutionally structured as a voluntary right or as a 





However, this once again begs the critical question of why someone in the original 
position should not be concerned about the potential for the emergence of significant bias 
in turnout under a system of voluntary voting, particularly if such bias might undermine 
democratic equal justice, as both Rawls and Foley appear to admit.54  
Foley apparently assumes that under voluntary voting, those who decide to vote 
rather than abstain will be more likely to cast their vote in a manner consistent with a 
fiduciary duty to advance the public interest, as opposed to their own self-interest. But he 
offers no real argument or evidence on this point, and it could well be that many of those 
who vote voluntarily do so to gain personal advantage, while many who would vote if 
induced by civic duty or sanction would do so “in good faith, on behalf of their sincere 
view of the public interest,” as Foley’s theory demands (Foley 2015, 186, n. 67).55 Foley 
further assumes that those who abstain from voting do so by deliberate choice because 
they are simply unwilling to participate. He thus states, “If some citizens decide that they 
cannot be bothered to participate, then the fiduciary duty will be better performed by 
those who take the responsibility seriously” (185).56 In fact, however, many nonvoting 
                                                
54 Such ambivalence about equal participation and apparent disregard for the implications of bias in 
electoral turnout is not unique to Rawlsian analysis. For example, Chad Flanders admits that “[i]n modern 
democracies, it is thought that participation should be equally distributed, or at least as close to equally 
distributed as is legally and practically possible.” Yet he continues, “I do not think that the value of 
participation requires participation be equal…. Democracy only requires that some of the people, in some 
capacity, have the ability to choose their leaders” (Flanders 2013, 60, emphases in original). 
55 In a lengthy footnote, Foley contrasts advocacy of a duty to vote with the approach to voting ethics of 
Jason Brennan, who argues that individuals have a duty to abstain from voting if they are not well enough 
informed to competently discern the public interest (Brennan 2011a). Foley characterizes his preference for 
keeping voting voluntary as a “neutral” approach that represents a middle position between a duty to vote 
and Brenan’s alleged duty to abstain (Foley 2015, 186, n. 67). Brennan’s theory was initially discussed in 
Chapter 2, where it was suggested that Brennan’s position, which implies that individuals may knowingly 
voting “wrongly” or incompetently, may be conceptually incoherent, in addition to being normatively 
problematic (see Chapter 2, Section 3b, n. 15). Brenan’s epistemic argument for implementing voter 
competency exams to ensure minimally informed voting is also addressed in Chapter 3 (see Sections 4a and 
Conclusion). The relevance of epistemic voting theory to the question at hand is discussed further below.  
56 Foley asserts that once citizens voluntarily decide to participate, they must exercise their fiduciary duty 
on behalf of all those who are unable to participate, including developmentally disabled citizens who are 





citizens are likely to abstain not so much by deliberate choice, but rather because they 
may be deterred by the costs of voting in the calculus, which as indicated, are distributed 
unequally among different individuals and groups.57 According to Foley, Rawslian equal 
justice simply requires that there be “no barriers to participation” (186), but again, the 
presence or absence of a barrier can be a matter of subjective perception.58 Furthermore, 
the basic voting calculus—which, as indicated, would be known in the original 
position—includes benefits as well, the perception of which may be equally (if not more) 
subjective.  
There is thus a strong argument that someone behind the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance would recognize the necessity of adding to the calculus a non-instrumental 
benefit in the form of fulfilling a duty to vote—which is of course formally equal to 
avoiding a cost associated with abstaining—in order to prevent unequal distribution of 
costs and benefits from resulting in an electorate that comprises a significantly biased 
sample of the population.59 Simply put, if allowing individuals to refuse, or to neglect, to 
participate in elections might put democratic equal justice at risk, then it seems prudent at 
                                                                                                                                            
Presumably, Foley would likewise assert that those who choose to participate must consider the interests of 
all the (supposedly) voluntary nonvoters. However, those who are legally ineligible to vote, or those who 
are not yet in existence, necessarily must rely on those who can vote, while eligible abstainers could in fact 
vote for themselves. Note that the issue of who should be eligible to vote is conceptually distinct from the 
current question, as in theory, the question of whether voting should be only a right or a duty as well could 
also arise with respect to a non-democratic (by modern standards) electorate that excluded some citizens.  
57 See also Hill (2014, 147-152), arguing that higher rates of abstention among socioeconomically 
disadvantaged groups cannot generally be attributed to a “positive choice” to abstain, but are rather more 
likely to result from the unequal distribution of voting costs. Hill also argues that disadvantaged individuals 
are subject to a collective action problem that results from the unequal distribution of the social norm of 
voting, a consideration that further echoes the voting calculus. 
58 Flanders goes even further than Foley in minimizing the significance of unequally distributed voting 
costs, stating, “Someone who is subject to inconvenience or delay is not being denied his right to vote; he 
still has the ability to participate…. [A]t some point, he or she is just choosing not to” (Flanders 2013, 65).  
59 Hill similarly argues that compulsory voting counteracts the unequal distribution of voting costs and 
resolves the collective action problem noted above (Hill 2014, 150-151). See also Feely (1974, 239-240), 
arguing that compulsory voting is justified because “selective benefits and voting costs are apt to be 
associated with prevailing divisions of labor, income, education, and membership in social groupings, such 





least to ask all citizens to participate—if not actually to compel them—by declaring that 
voting is a constitutional civic duty and not merely a civil right.60 It may be fair to assert, 
as Foley does, that citizens have a fiduciary duty to consider the public interest over their 
own selfish interests when voting. However, it does not seem in accord with Rawlsian 
principles of justice to institute voluntary voting at the constitutional level as a means for 
eliciting an electorate that will presumably be more collectively concerned with this 
fiduciary duty. As a matter of fact, most voters already do appear to cast their vote with 
the intention of supporting public over private interests (see e.g. Brennan 2011a, 162, 
196; Brennan 2014, 40-41),61 and there is no reason to assume that among current 
nonvoters a larger proportion would consider only their own selfish interests if they were 
actually to vote.62 
Additionally, beyond the dictates of justice for pursuing equality in electoral 
participation, there is a further argument for a constitutional duty to vote under Rawls’ 
theory. In addition to political rights, justice as fairness also implies certain political 
duties and obligations for individuals living under a constitutional framework (Rawls 
1999, 293).63 Rawls thus states that everyone has a “fundamental natural duty… to 
support and to comply with just institutions,” explaining that “if the basic structure of 
                                                
60 The question of how exactly such a constitutional duty to vote should be implemented and enforced is 
addressed below in the section on policy implications. 
61 Brennan cites several studies on this point and treats it as an established fact that voters generally 
consider the “national interest” over their own private interests when voting. He opposes the duty to vote, 
however, because he believes that most citizens are incompetent to discern and vote for the true national 
interest. See also Caplan (2007, 149), who admits unequivocally that voters are not “selfishly motivated,” 
although he too believes that most citizens are incompetent to vote well or correctly.  
62 Furthermore, the concept of voting in the public interest is inherently vague and difficult to define, as 
discussed in the following subsection. 
63 Rawls distinguishes between “natural duties,” which are said to apply to all “equal moral persons” 
without regard to any “voluntary acts, performative or otherwise” (98-99), and “obligations,” which arise 
because one has “voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of opportunities it 
offers” (96). Natural duties are said to apply “unconditionally” because they would be acknowledged by 





society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a 
natural duty to do [one’s] part in the existing scheme” (99). He explains this duty as 
having two parts, both of which seem conceivably related to a civic duty to vote: “[F]irst, 
we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to 
us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do 
not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves” (293-294). Rawls 
never mentions voting as a possible means fulfillment of this natural duty, and as 
discussed previously, it is fairly clear that he conceives of voting as a voluntary—and 
hence supererogatory—act. Others, however, have drawn the conclusion that the 
Rawlsian duty to “do our share” in support of just institutions should in fact imply a duty 
to vote in democratic elections. For example, Carole Pateman states that “the most 
obvious interpretation of Rawls’ argument is that, because all adults occupy the formally 
equal status of citizen… then all, necessarily, have certain political duties, including the 
duty to vote” (Pateman 1985, 121).64 There is thus a strong argument from Rawlsian 
theory that voting should be a civic duty, not only in order to help ensure equal 
participation, but also because supporting political institutions by voting is a fundamental 
duty of citizens of a liberal constitutional democracy that meets the basic requirements of 
justice.65 
                                                
64 Pateman further states, “[Rawls] argues that everyone has a natural duty to ‘support’ just, or nearly just, 
institutions, but he gives no indication of what kinds of actions constitute such support; it would be 
reasonable, however, that in the case of political institutions the support is given by citizens fulfilling their 
duty to vote” (Pateman 1985, 125). She also notes Rawls’ apparent ambivalence regarding mass electoral 
participation, as follows: “Rawls has remarkably little to say about voting and its relationship to the liberty 
and equality of democratic citizenship on which he places so much emphasis…. Rawls says that ‘the fair 
value for all of the equal political liberties’ must be preserved, but he also toys with the ideal of plural 
voting [citation deleted]” (126). See also Blais and Achen (2010, 3): “Rawls seems not to have explicitly 
endorsed a duty to vote, but in its absense [sic.], it is difficult to make sense of his strictures that democratic 
citizens are ethically obligated to ‘do what they can to hold government officials’ to public reason, and 
other similar remarks [citations deleted].” Also see Hill (2014, 172). 
65 Pateman in fact questions whether Rawlsian institutions meet the fundamental requirements of justice 





The preceding demonstrates that the public interests served by a constitutional 
duty to vote—namely, preserving equal justice and supporting democratic institutions—
are arguably compelling enough to justify intruding on any expressive right to remain 
silent and abstain, particularly if the constitutional duty is implemented in a manner that 
is narrowly tailored, for example by permitting formal and/or informal conscientious 
objection and abstention. However, all this might still be insufficient if there is a 
correspondingly compelling public interest that weighs against a constitutional duty to 
vote and in favor of framing participation as strictly voluntary. What then are the 
principal arguments against the duty to vote, which might reinforce any right to remain 
silent and potentially outweigh these proffered public interests in treating voting as a 
civic duty?  
b) Responding to Arguments Against the Duty to Vote  
Jason Brennan is perhaps the most outspoken contemporary critic of the notion of 
a civic duty to vote and the institution of compulsory voting. In a recent work on the 
subject, Brennan begins by asserting that voluntary voting should be the default position 
under liberal democratic norms, and advocates of compulsory voting therefore have the 
higher burden of proof (Brennan 2014, 6-7). He bases this on the assertion that 
compulsory voting involves a “controversial positive claim” in need of defense (7), and 
that it by definition involves coercion, which always requires justification in a liberal 
democracy (8-9). To assert that voting should be strictly voluntary, however, may also be 
                                                                                                                                            
through voting or otherwise—to the extent that it permits (under Rawls’ second principle of justice; see 
Rawls 1999, 53-55) significant socioeconomic inequality, and distinguishes too strictly between political 
and private spheres of society (see Pateman 1985, 122-132). Pateman is conceivably correct insofar as one 
who believes the liberal democratic state is unjust may have no individual-level civic duty to vote, nor any 
moral obligation to comply with a compulsory voting law (or perhaps even to obey other duly enacted 
laws), as discussed below in the section on limitations of the duty to vote, but that is a separate matter from 
the current question of whether voting should be constitutionally framed as a civic duty, assuming the 





viewed as a positive claim that needs defending,66 and the question of coercion can be 
conceptually separated from the constitutional design question of whether voting should 
be a right only or a duty as well.67  
Furthermore, while implementing or enforcing a duty to vote in almost any 
manner is admittedly likely to involve some level of coercion, there are many different 
degrees of coerciveness, which may be more or less justified in theory and in practice.68 
Assessing administrative fines for unexcused nonparticipation—as in Australia—
obviously involves economic coercion and possibly even loss of personal liberty if fines 
go unpaid.69 Even a positive incentive, such as perhaps a tax credit for voting, would still 
involve some coercion insofar as taxation is backed by the coercive power of the state; 
however, a tax credit is clearly much less coercive than a fine, and it may be easier to 
justify. Moreover, as discussed previously—and as the case of Australia arguably 
demonstrates—even implementing compulsory voting through a coercive administrative 
                                                
66 See supra n. 2 and accompanying text, indicating that even in the United States, at least half of survey 
respondents perceive voting as a duty rather than a choice, with higher percentages in other democracies. 
Brennan himself states that “the overwhelming majority of citizens… believe they have a moral duty to 
vote,” citing the 1990 American Citizen Participation Study showing that 96 percent of respondents 
reported that “doing my duty as a citizen” was a very or somewhat important motivation for voting 
(Brennan 2014, 47); see also Elliot (2017, 660). 
67 In his 2014 work cited here, Brennan is arguing mainly against the institution of compulsory voting, 
which he asserts is unjustified even if one assumes there is a civic duty to vote (62-82). Nevertheless, he 
clearly opposes the notion of voting as a civic duty, for epistemic reasons he discusses later in this work, 
and which he elaborates upon in his 2011 book, The Ethics of Voting. 
68 Brennan admits that there are more and less coercive means of enforcing compulsory voting ((Brennan 
2014, 16-19), and he even mentions a method that involves no actual coercion—publicizing the names of 
nonvoters in an effort to shame them into participation (18; see also supra n. 21 on such a practice 
previously in Italy). He further states that the less coercion one advocates, the lower the burden of 
justification, but he perhaps wrongly asserts that the more one believes compulsory voting to be justified, 
the more coercion one should advocate (19). While this might make some sense in the abstract, having a 
strong belief in the importance of the civic duty to vote does not preclude a decision to institutionalize a 
relatively non-coercive means of enforcement, or even choosing no active enforcement, as discussed in the 
following sections. Brennan eventually asserts that even the “pettiest violations” (20) of liberty in service 
of a duty to vote are unjustified, because he thinks that there are “noncoercive (or less coercive) means of 
achieving the same goals” as compulsory voting (22), as discussed further below. 





regime of strictly enforced fines should not be viewed as undemocratic or beyond the 
pale of liberal norms.70 As Rawls recognizes, some fundamental individual liberties may 
justly be sacrificed to facilitate greater systemic liberty for all (see e.g. Rawls 1999, 179), 
and given that voting contributes to the foundation for all civil liberties—liberal 
democratic government itself—the freedom not to participate in elections may be a 
liberty that is worth sacrificing, at least in principle.  
Indeed, to the extent that voting may be viewed as participation in a collective act 
of popular sovereignty that mirrors the formation of the original democratic social 
contract, it may make sense to associate it with some actual sacrifice of liberty, signifying 
how one gives up of the individual freedom of the state of nature in order to take part in 
civil society. In this vein, in his recent book The Sleeping Sovereign, Richard Tuck 
associates the early democratic sovereignty theorists, most prominently Hobbes and 
Rousseau, with the radical—and according to Tuck, still somewhat controversial—idea 
that “a sovereign people can act like a monarchical sovereign through the process of 
majority voting” (Tuck 2015, 257). Tuck explains that both Hobbes and Rousseau 
understood the act of democratic voting to represent the subsuming of individual wills 
within the general will, as revealed through the will of the majority (128-129), and he 
thus concludes that “the democratic sovereignty theorists believed that only an organised 
democracy in which we participate has any authority over us” (277). Although Tuck is 
specifically discussing voting on matters of constitutional ratification or amendment (as 
are Hobbes and Rousseau in Tuck’s account), voting for representatives can arguably 
also be seen as a constitutional-level act of popular sovereignty, given that voting 
                                                





determines the substantive content of constitutional offices—namely, who will hold them 
for the specified term.71  
Related to this notion of voting as an expression of popular sovereignty reflecting 
the original social contract, Peter Singer suggests that compulsory voting could prevent 
the act of participation from implying consent to the outcome of the democratic process, 
and from thus yielding a moral obligation to obey the laws of the government, because 
true consent can only be obtained voluntarily (Singer 1973, 55-56).72 However, Pateman 
counters Singer’s argument by asserting that voting for representatives in a liberal 
democracy does not in fact imply consent to be governed, and would be a weak and 
normatively inadequate basis for justifying an obligation of obedience to the law 
(Pateman 1985, 87-90, 128).73 The problem of political obligation is a complex issue 
beyond the current scope, but Pateman is probably correct in concluding that individuals 
should feel free to vote and yet still consider themselves morally unbound by what they 
regard as unjust laws.74 Returning to the earlier point, the argument here is not that voting 
                                                
71 Tuck briefly discusses “the modern disinclination” to the idea of popular sovereignty expressed through 
majority voting (Tuck 2015, 257), but he does not address the broader normative problems for a theory of 
popular sovereignty through representative democracy, of which there may be many (see e.g. Levinson 
2014). On the radical nature of an “individualist theory of popular sovereignty” more generally, see Barnett 
(2007). For an interesting discussion of the roots of ideals of popular sovereignty in relation to the 
individual, see Gilmartin (2012). Gilmartin historically frames the 19th century conception of popular 
sovereignty as an “enchantment” of the individual in response to the “disenchantment” of the world, with 
individual voters coming to be seen as “capable of exercising autonomy as sovereignty’s enchanted 
essence” (Gilmartin 2012, 412). 
72 Singer argues that participating in an election is not actual consent, but rather a form of “quasi-consent” 
that creates “an obligation to act as if there were consent” (49). He later argues that the act of voting gives 
rise to political obligation regardless of the voter’s intentions (125). Singer adds that there may be “other 
factors” relevant to whether compulsory voting is justified (56), and in fact more recently he has written in 
favor of compulsory voting and endorsed the Australian model for other countries “worried about low voter 
turnout” (Singer 2007). 
73 Pateman gives several reasons for doubting that voting implies consent, but her most fundamental 
objection seems to be that citizens must be able to understand “what kind of commitment” they are making, 
yet it is “virtually impossible for them to do this in liberal democratic elections since the consequences of 
voting are so difficult to determine” (88). 
74 Furthermore, even if Singer were correct that voting (voluntarily) implies consent to be governed, this 





actually embodies the democratic social contract, but rather that voting—as an expression 
of popular sovereignty—signifies and symbolically reflects that contract in an important 
sense.  
In fact, denying that the act of voting has any such deep meaning and significance 
seems effectively essential to arguing against a civic duty to vote. In their seminal article, 
entitled “Is there a Duty to Vote?” Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan (2000) 
methodically devalue the act of voting, and it is quite clear they do not see it as an 
expression of popular sovereignty, or indeed an expression of much at all. In their view, 
“The mere act of showing up at the polls every several years and grabbing some levers is 
palpably inadequate to qualify as a significant act of political expression” (82). They 
minimize not only the expressive value of voting—the D term of the calculus—and deny 
the duty to vote; they also deny that voting can have any real instrumental value, and they 
further assert that the costs of voting—or of voting correctly—are prohibitively high.  
Their argument begins by introducing a formal model equivalent to the rational 
choice calculus, and they proceed by interpreting its terms in a manner aimed at proving 
there can be no civic duty to vote. First they recount the well known problem of p, 
dismissing what they term “the prudential argument” for a duty to vote by affirming the 
near impossibility of one vote could ever affecting the outcome of a large election (66). 
They continue with what they call “the argument from act-consequentialism,” contending 
that the instrumental benefits of voting—or B in the calculus—are generally insignificant, 
since it is only rarely that the “stakes are very high” in an election, and because the 
informational costs of voting—the C term—will generally far outweigh any perceived 
difference in utility between candidates or parties (67-74). They summarize:  
                                                                                                                                            
without any implication of consent (Wertheimer 1975, 293). This of course leaves the problem of political 





[O]n those occasions when one's vote is most likely to make the sort of difference 
that stirs the hearts of act-consequentialists, there will rarely be any firm 
indication concerning for whom it ought to be cast; and when there is 
unmistakable evidence concerning which is the better candidate or policy, it is 
almost inconceivable that one's vote will be needed (72).  
They continue by arguing that low turnout is not necessarily evidence of any democratic 
deficiency (78), and that the expressive value of voting is in essence no different from 
being “a fan of the New York Yankees” (80). They conclude provocatively, evoking 
Marx’s famous maxim and declaring: “Belief in a duty to vote is the opiate of democratic 
masses” (86).  
Despite all this, Lomasky and Brennan actually admit that there could be a duty to 
vote for an individual living in a “small community”75 that happens to have a tradition of 
“widespread political involvement in which each citizen plays a roughly equal and 
complementary part with all others” (Lomasky and Brennan 2000, 64). Under these 
circumstances, they suggest that abstaining might be an instance of morally offensive 
“free-riding on the exertions of others,” depending whether or not the individual had 
sought out the “advantages arising from the pattern of citizen involvement.” They 
indicate in a footnote that they will later explain why this “does not generalize to usual 
democratic politics” (n. 4), but they never appear to return directly to the example. 
                                                
75 It is interesting that Lomasky and Brennan suggest this possibility of a duty to vote in the context of a 
“small community,” seeming to evoke the democracies of antiquity and the traditional idea that only a 
relatively small polis can be a true (participatory) democracy (see e.g. Dahl and Tufte 1973, 4-5). Tuck’s 
thesis in The Sleeping Sovereign—as reflected in the subtitle, The Invention of Modern Democracy—is that 
seventeenth and eighteenth century theorists of democratic sovereignty—primarily Hobbes and Rousseau—
were specifically concerned with demonstrating that electoral institutions could lay the foundation for mass 
participatory democracy in larger modern states (see Tuck 2015, x, 249). Note that Dahl and Tufte echo the 
conventional view that Rousseau intended his theory only for small polities along the ancient model (see 
Dahl and Tufte 1973, 6); however, Tuck argues that this view of Rousseau’s work is incorrect, and that 
Rousseau actually “believed that ancient democracy was not an appropriate model for modern societies,” 





Instead they discuss the Kantian categorical imperative—or what they call “the argument 
from generalization”—which requires one to consider the consequences “if everyone 
were to stay home and not vote,” and they in fact conclude that “the claim that it would 
be disastrous if no one voted is far from evident” (75). They further argue that free-riding 
in general is not morally offensive unless the underlying activity is wrongful, and the act 
of abstaining from voting is ethically closer, in their view, to a “decision to abandon 
farming in order to take up dentistry,” than to “failing to pay one’s share of taxes” (77-
78). Lomasky and Brennan go so far as to argue that abstainers actually confer a benefit 
on those who vote, because each voter’s probability of being pivotal increases as a result 
of the abstention of others (78). They also conclude that abstainers do not harm 
democratic functioning in any meaningful way, since low turnout—even at “5 percent 
participation”—does not necessarily bode ill for democracy (79).  
Beyond the question of whether Lomasky and Brennan’s argument by this point 
strains credulity, they are clearly quite distant from the idea of voting as a fundamentally 
valuable expression of popular sovereignty that ensures equal justice and fulfills a 
foundational duty to support just institutions. 
Jason Brennan’s more detailed argument against the duty to vote, in his book The 
Ethics of Voting (2011), echoes the critiques of Lomasky and (Geoffrey) Brennan and 
likewise proceeds by devaluing the decision to vote as reflected in the terms of the 
calculus. Brennan begins by citing a widely accepted “folk theory of voting ethics” that 
presumes the existence of a civic duty to vote (Brennan 2011a, 3), but he proceeds to 
argue against this view and in favor of the assertion that there is nothing morally wrong 
in abstaining, even for an apparently frivolous reason (4). Although he emphasizes that 
voting would not be a duty even if the act had “significant instrumental value” (17), he 





course to the pivotal voting problem (18-28). Brennan also addresses and purports to 
disprove Tuck’s theory of the causal effect of individual votes, and Brennan further 
emphasizes that the costs of voting (C), even just in terms of lost opportunities to do 
relatively unimportant things, will generally make participation irrational (28-34). 
According to Brennan, if someone holds the goal of seeing a certain candidate elected, 
but somehow “attaches no special value to… helping to cause [that candidate] to be 
elected,” then it would be perfectly rational behavior if that person simply felt like 
“watching television and abstaining from voting,” even if Tuck’s theory happened to be 
correct (33).76 
Interestingly, Brennan indicates that in challenging Tuck’s theory of causal 
efficacy in voting, he aims to preempt a future attempt to “use [Tuck’s] arguments to 
show there is a duty to vote” (28). Brennan in fact describes how such an argument could 
proceed from Tuck’s theory based on the notion of “agency” in voting (34-36). This is 
interesting, because Tuck himself, in his more recent work, mentions how his theory of 
causation in voting is crucial specifically because it allows “for citizens to think of 
themselves as agents” (Tuck 2015, 261). Indeed, this is why Tuck’s resolution of the so-
called paradox of turnout is so important: By confirming that voting can be an 
instrumentally valuable exercise of individual causal agency, Tuck’s theory allows for the 
possibility of voting as an act of popular sovereignty. Admittedly, Tuck doesn’t discuss 
whether voting should be a civic duty or not, although his conception of electoral 
participation as expressive of popular sovereignty under mass democracy is understood to 
                                                





“make it the default position that everyone within the boundaries should take part in the 
vote in order to render its outcome authoritative for everyone” (Tuck 2015, 262-263).77  
However, even if Tuck’s theory of causation in voting happened to be incorrect, 
and if participating in a large election were indeed always instrumentally irrational, it is 
still not entirely clear why Brennan (and Lomasky and Brennan) believes this to weigh so 
heavily against a duty to vote. In fact, viewing the act of voting as irrational arguably 
strengthens the argument for a duty to vote, and particularly the argument for establishing 
and implementing the duty in some formal manner, assuming that the production of 
democracy through elections is viewed as public good. After all, coercion—or some type 
of “selective incentive”—is in fact the conventional solution to collective action 
problems involving public goods that might not be produced—or produced at optimal 
levels—absent some incentive (Olsen 1965). Alan Wertheimer thus writes: “Elections are 
desirable political mechanisms which we should all help to sustain. Since the rational 
action for each of us would be ‘free ride’ and allow other citizens to carry the burden, we 
should force ourselves and our fellow citizens into carrying a fair share of the burden” 
(Wertheimer 1975, 290; see also Feely 1974). Thus, even if voting is generally viewed as 
instrumentally irrational from the individual perspective, from the societal perspective it 
is may still be completely rational—and indeed necessary for democracy. It may 
therefore make good sense to institutionalize voting—and perhaps also to enforce it—as a 
generally applicable civic duty. As Lisa Hill explains, compulsory voting responds to the 
apparent individual-level irrationality of participation by introducing a type of “system 
rationality” that resolves the collective action problems associated with voting (Hill 2014, 
                                                
77 In this quote, Tuck is discussing the issue of whether non-citizens residing “within the boundaries” of the 
state can be excluded from the electorate; however, it may be significant that he states everyone “should 





190-191). In Hill’s words, “Compulsion collectivizes and co-ordinates ‘irrationalities’ of 
voting, thereby making them disappear” (Hill 2002b, 89).  
In addition to the general collective action problem associated with the presumed 
instrumental irrationality of voting, Hill also discusses a “significant and paralyzing co-
ordination problem” that specifically affects individuals from disadvantaged 
socioeconomic groups under a voluntary voting system. Since members of such groups 
are generally known to be less likely to participate, it might seem like an especially 
irrational choice for any individual in these demographics to decide to vote; under a 
compulsory voting system, however, Hill explains that “co-ordination among the 
disadvantaged is assured” (Hill 2013, 461).78 This further supports the Rawslian 
argument for a duty to vote to ensure equal participation and minimize inequality in 
turnout. Lomasky and Brennan address this issue only in a footnote late in their 
argument, where they admit the possibility that demographic bias in the electorate could 
be viewed as a “democratic deficit which one might be thought to have a duty to 
overcome”; however, they conclude that “even if this constitutes a rationale for voting by 
the electorally underrepresented, it just as strongly argues for abstention by the over 
represented” (Lomasky and Brennan 2000, 79, n. 17, emphasis in original). Brennan falls 
back on the same logic, claiming that arguing for compulsory voting based on a 
presumed civic duty to vote is inconsistent with arguing for it based on unequal 
participation, because if equality in participation were truly desirable, “the rich and 
advantaged could do the poor a favor by abstaining” (Brennan 2014, 74).  
However, Brennan’s main objection against the argument from unequal 
participation—or what he calls the representativeness argument—is that there is a “less 
                                                






expansive, more reliable, equally democratic, more representative, noncoercive 
alternative to compulsory voting” (2014, 35-36, emphasis in original). Namely, Brennan 
suggests using a “voting lottery” to randomly select a relatively small subset of citizens to 
serve as voters. This is similar to the argument discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 5a) for 
utilizing random selection of representatives—or sortition—in place of elections. The 
response given there—that elections are necessary to satisfy the value of mass 
participation—applies here as well, and is perhaps now even more clear: Voting lotteries 
and sortition are insufficiently democratic because they lack the element of participation 
necessary for voting to be an expression of popular sovereignty.79 Tuck essentially makes 
this precise point in addressing similar arguments for replacing mass elections with a 
“fair lottery for participation in political decisonmaking.” According to Tuck, given that 
democratic voting is an act of agency expressive of popular sovereignty, “the lottery 
ceases to be a plausible alternative, as only a very small subset of the group will actually 
contribute to the outcome” (Tuck 2015, 261).80 
In fact, even if Tuck’s theory of causal efficacy and individual agency in voting is 
assumed to be correct, expectations of instrumental value alone are insufficient to ensure 
equality in turnout. As mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, and discussed generally 
                                                
79 This is also a response to the argument that some individuals from advantaged groups should abstain in 
order to offset inequality in turnout; in addition to the practical problems of how such a counterbalancing 
scheme could be implemented, this suggestion flouts the democratic value of participation. 
80 It is not entirely clear if Tuck is addressing random selection of eligible voters (as Brennan suggests), or 
random selection of representatives (sortition), but his argument applies to either case. Note how both these 
options differ from the suggestion of Akhil Amar for “lottery voting,” in which an election is held, but the 
winner is determined by random selection of a single ballot (Amar 1984, 1283). This type of system would 
allow for mass participation, but it would be lacking in (strict) majoritarianism, although a majority choice 
would have the highest probability of being selected. Tuck states generally that majoritarianism is essential 
because “it is the only principle that offers both equality and agency”, but he also seems open to super-
majoritarian requirements that in effect increase minority power (Tuck 2015, 261). Amar’s system is 
designed specifically to address the problem of “overweening majoritarianism” by providing additional 
power to minorities, whose candidates could by sometimes prevail over those with a greater number of 





in Chapter 2, there are many situations in which individuals will perceive little or no 
instrumental value in participating, such as when an election seems clearly 
uncompetitive, or when alienation causes one to discount the significance of any 
differences between candidates on the ballot. For this reason, the argument set forth here 
for a duty to vote does not rest on the existence of instrumental utility in voting, but 
rather is formally modeled in the D term of the calculus.81 As noted previously, Brennan 
argues there would be no duty to vote even if voting had instrumental value, because the 
act could still be considered supererogatory, or it might be “just one way among others of 
discharging a duty to act beneficently” (Brennan 2011a, 17). Brennan thus spends an 
entire chapter of his book arguing for a conception of “civic virtue without politics” (43-
67), and he concludes that even if there were a civic duty to contribute to the public good 
of democracy and avoid free-riding, or even a general duty to “exercise civic virtue,” 
there still would be no duty to vote. According to Brennan, there may simply be a 
“division of labor” in how citizens fulfill their civic duties: “Some citizens can exercise 
civic virtue through writing letters to the editor, others through activism, others through 
political philosophizing, and others through voting” (66). However, while there may 
indeed be many different ways of exercising civic virtue that are in some sense 
interchangeable, voting arguably exemplifies a minimum standard of civic virtue that 
should be generally applicable to all citizens of a democracy, apart from specifically 
justified exceptions (see Chapman 2014, 22-23). As discussed, this approach is consistent 
with the normative foundations of Rawlsian justice, as it seems necessary to ensure equal 
                                                
81 An argument for a duty to vote based on purely instrumental reasons was outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 
3b), but such a duty was explained as applying only when the value of B is perceived as relatively high. As 
discussed there, even Brennan might be forced to admit the possibility of an instrumentally based duty 
under such circumstances (see n. 16 and accompanying text). By contrast, the D-term duty advanced here is 
formulated as generally applicable, although it might not apply under some specific circumstances, as 





participation and to mitigate bias in turnout, which Brennan has not adequately 
addressed.  
In his following chapter, entitled “Wrongful Voting” (Brennan 2011a, 68), 
Brennan clarifies what seems to be his principle reason for assuming voting is not a civic 
duty even if citizens do have certain obligations of political participation. As clear from 
the chapter title, Brennan holds strong epistemic premises regarding the purpose and 
meaning of the act of voting in a democracy, and accordingly he assumes there are 
objective standards for judging the quality or correctness of voting decisions, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.82 Indeed, fundamental epistemic premises, and the assumption 
that the information costs of voting “correctly”—or at least “well”—are prohibitively 
high for most citizens, appear to be at the root of most objections to compulsory voting 
and the duty to vote. Lomasky and Brennan thus conclude that even if there were a duty 
to vote, it would not be a duty just to vote but rather “a duty to vote right” (Lomasky and 
Brennan 2000, 74, emphasis in original).83 Although they fail to explain what their 
standard of right voting entails, it is clear that in their opinion most citizens cannot meet 
it, and thus if there were a duty to vote, it would not be “a duty of the citizenry at large, 
but only of the political cognoscenti.”84 Brennan provides somewhat more detail 
regarding his conception of epistemic standards, and it is clear that he too believes 
many—if not most—citizens will fail to meet those standards.85  
                                                
82 Epistemic conceptions of voting are strongly related to deliberative democratic theory, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 4). Epistemic premises are also evident in game theoretic studies of compulsory versus 
voluntary voting that employ a “common values” model assuming an objectively correct decision 
corresponding with some “true” state of the world, as discussed toward the end of Section 3 above. 
83 See supra n. 55, and Chapter 2 (n. 15) regarding the coherence of demanding that citizens vote “right” 
and avoid “wrongful” voting. 
84 See also Abraham (1952, 349): “We could conceivably enforce voting, but we could hardly enforce 
informed, intelligent voting. Little would be gained by a mass of uninformed voters in the ballot booth.”  
85 Brennan gives some examples of what he considers wrongful voting, but declines to expound on his 
epistemic standards, stating that his argument “rests upon there being such a thing as unjustified political 





As discussed in Chapter 3,86 Brennan has argued for implementing voter 
competency exams to ensure minimally informed voting, going so far as to assert that 
universal suffrage should be “replaced by a moderate epistocracy, in which suffrage is 
restricted to citizens of sufficient political competence” (Brennan 2011b, 700). This is an 
extreme proposal that seems unlikely to gain acceptance under existing democratic 
norms; however, the idea that an epistemic conception of voting might support some 
limitations on electoral participation is perhaps a more mainstream view. As discussed 
previously, Rawls assumes that voting should be a voluntary civil right rather than an 
obligatory civic duty, and his reliance on strong epistemic premises is clear when he 
further suggests that limitations on universal suffrage and the principle of “one person 
one vote” could be justified—at least in theory—if “the inequality of right would be 
accepted by the less favored in return for the greater protection of their other liberties” 
(Rawls 1999, 204). He thus outlines a possible justification for J. S. Mill’s proposal for a 
system of “plural voting,” with extra weight given to the votes of citizens who “can be 
identified as having superior wisdom and judgment,” because “others are willing to trust 
them and to concede to their opinion a greater weight.” In principle, Rawls seems to 
believe such a scheme might actually be justified if not for the fact that a right to equal 
participation “is bound to have a profound effect on the moral quality of civic life,” and 
to “enhance the self-esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen” 
(205).  
Likewise, in Foley’s treatment of voters as fiduciaries, he notes how Rawls 
“refuses to condemn” Mill’s scheme of plural voting (Foley 2015, 178, n. 55), and then 
                                                                                                                                            
that “it is not obvious that my theory implies that only a small percentage of people will be justified in 
voting,” but he indicates that even if this were the case, it “need not be a problem” and “would not 
undermine democratic stability” (105). 





goes on to discuss the possibility that a Rawlsian original position analysis might support 
the requirement of a high school diploma for voting. Foley asserts that this is an idea 
which, “in theory, we cannot rule out entirely” (182), and in fact he seems only to reject it 
in practice because it might result in the electorate being “disproportionately skewed on 
the basis of race” (183).87 Thus, while Foley’s notion of voters having a fiduciary duty to 
advance the public interest might not seem like an inherently epistemic conception, 
epistemic criteria nevertheless creep into his approach, for prospective voters presumably 
need a certain amount of political knowledge and information just to be able to 
distinguish between public and private interests in casting their vote. It thus seems clear 
that Foley views voters in some sense as distinctly epistemic fiduciaries, as evident in his 
suggestion that a minimum educational requirement for voting could be justified to 
ensure that “members of the electorate have some degree of education concerning the 
responsibilities to the public interest” (Foley 2015, 183).88  
                                                
87 Foley indicates that literacy tests should be rejected for the same reasons (184). For evidence of the 
“discriminatory effects of educational requirements and civics test[s]” (183, n. 62), Foley cites Joseph 
Fishkin’s important article on voting rights equal and citizenship (Fishkin 2011). However, Foley seems 
perhaps to overlook Fishkin’s argument regarding a “universalist turn” in voting rights, under which “[t]he 
wrongness of disenfranchisement is not simply the wrongness of race discrimination or other similar group-
based exclusion: it is also a violation of a fundamental right of citizens” (Fishkin 2011, 1345). Fishkin also 
mentions a shift in voting rights jurisprudence away from acceptance of epistemic qualifications to promote 
informed voting, as in literacy tests, and towards what he calls “the politics of universalism,” with voting 
understood as “a fundamental right of citizens, closely tied to citizenship itself” (1349). Fishkin does not 
discuss the question of whether voting should be voluntary or compulsory, although he notes that the 
“question of compulsory voting” is raised by Bruce Ackerman’s view that “‘voting is the paradigmatic 
form of universal citizenship participation,’” which implies that “a high level of participation in the form of 
voting is a necessary component of a robust democracy” (1301, n. 41). However, Fishkin also indicates that 
a citizen’s participatory interest in voting is fulfilled by simply having the right to vote and “does not 
depend on whether a voter actually exercises the right” (1300).  
88 Foley does explain exactly what he means by “education concerning the responsibilities to the public 
interest,” and it is admittedly not entirely clear if he is referring just to education concerning the concept of 
the fiduciary responsibility of voting, or if he also means to include learning enough substantive political 
information to identify the vote choice consistent with the public interest. If he is not articulating a standard 
of substantive knowledge, then it is perhaps unclear why a high school diploma would be necessary, as 
individuals can probably understand the concept of voting for the public interest even without graduating 





The problem is that Foley’s concept of voting in the public interest, like 
Brennan’s stronger epistemic conception, is inherently vague and difficult—if not 
impossible—to define. For example, is a vote intended to benefit one’s own social group 
at the expense of other groups considered voting in the public interest? Or voting for 
one’s preferred political party? Or based on personal religious beliefs? What about voting 
to benefit one’s own state or locality at the possible expense of the national interest? 
Some might even suggest that voting in the national interest at the expense of the global 
public interest could involve a violation of fiduciary responsibility. Contrary to Foley’s 
argument, such ambiguities provide reasons for someone in the Rawlsian original 
position to decide against constitutionally designing an electoral system and 
implementing voting procedures in a way meant to ensure that voters intend to benefit 
some conception of the public interest. This point also applies generally to stronger 
epistemic standards, for even if valid epistemic criteria for correct and incorrect voting 
decisions did exist (which is certainly debatable), such criteria would likely be impossible 
to conclusively identify in a manner that “could be accepted by all qualified points of 
view” (Estlund 2008, 33). Since anyone in the original position would not know if they 
might be one of those whose views would be identified as incorrect, insufficiently 
informed, or contrary to the public interest, one would seek to avoid this possibility by 
avoiding strong epistemic standards in electoral rules and procedures.  
Furthermore, if Foley’s concern with demographic bias in the electorate weighs so 
conclusively against requiring a high school diploma to vote, why is he apparently 
unconcerned, as indicated previously, with the inequality in turnout that results from 
constitutionally structuring voting as voluntary rather than as a civic duty? In fact, just as 
Brennan is arguably wrong in his assertion that blocking some citizens from voting will 





Foley arguably mistaken in believing that keeping voting voluntary will tend toward that 
same goal. The notion that everyone who votes should—ethically speaking—intend to 
benefit the public interest is not that controversial.89 Admittedly, if any subset of citizens 
could really be trusted always to correctly identify the choice most consistent with the 
true public interest, it might be acceptable for only that subset to participate, at least in 
principle. In reality, however, no subset of citizens can be trusted in this way, particularly 
if one has doubts as to the validity of any particular epistemic or fiduciary standards for 
good decisions. Therefore, as previously argued, in the original position one would seek 
to prevent the turnout inequality likely to arise under voluntary voting, and instead 
encourage everyone—or as close to everyone as possible—in the eligible population to 
participate, by institutionalizing voting as a general civic duty. Indeed, voluntary voting 
may only make sense to the extent that one assumes the validity of given standards for 
good decisions, and one believes so strongly in those standards that any resulting 
demographic bias in the electorate is deemed unimportant. Furthermore, one must of 
course also believe that a process of voluntary self-selection into the electorate will tend, 
on the whole at least, to result in the participation of more voters who choices are 
consistent with the given standards.  
Nevertheless, even granting the dubious existence of unassailable epistemic 
criteria, there would still be an argument for keeping epistemic democratic theory “in its 
right place” and excluding such criteria from the constitutional design of electoral 
                                                
89 Foley is perhaps right to suggest that voters have a fiduciary duty to consider the public interest in some 
sense, and Brennan could even be right that it would be ethically better if those who intended to support 
their own “selfish” interests at the expense of the public interest—or otherwise intended to knowingly vote 
“badly”—would simply abstain. However, in terms of constitutional design based on the Rawlsian original 
position, voting rules and procedures should arguably still be structured under the assumption that 
individuals are free to vote for their own private interests if they so choose. This is primarily a theoretical 
point, since voters do generally intend their votes to benefit the public interest, or at least their conception 





participation.90 Returning again to The Sleeping Sovereign, Tuck’s approach builds on a 
fundamental distinction early democratic theorists made between the political spheres of 
“sovereignty” and “government.” If voting for representatives is viewed as a 
quintessential expression of democratic popular sovereignty—as Tuck’s theory arguably 
suggests—then it may be that while the activity of government is subject to strong 
epistemic standards of correctness, the exercise of sovereignty in the popular 
authorization of democratic representatives should remain a matter about which there are 
no objectively right and wrong answers.  
Notably, this perspective on the argument for a civic duty to vote does not depend 
on the consequentialist issue of whether and how outcomes might change under higher 
levels of turnout.91 As Hill argues, the democratic values of “‘equality,’ ‘effective 
participation,’ and ‘inclusiveness’ aren’t valued and upheld only when they yield 
particular outcomes; they are valued and upheld regardless of the outcome” (Hill 2014, 
141). Thus, if full participation—or as close to it as possible—is viewed as an essential 
element of democratic sovereignty, its effect on outcomes may be largely irrelevant.92 
From this perspective, regardless of any standards of correctness that might apply in 
evaluating outcomes within the sphere of government, the sovereign activity of voting to 
appoint representatives should be an area where such standards are inapplicable.  
                                                
90 See generally Chapter 3 (Section 4c) for a discussion of the “right place” for epistemic democratic 
theory. 
91 On the relationship between turnout and electoral outcomes generally, see Chapter 3 (Section 2). See 
also supra ns. 27-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of compulsory voting on 
political outcomes. 
92 This is not to say that democratic participation is valued for purely procedural reasons. Hill admits that if 
full participation began to “routinely produce outcomes that we wouldn’t expect or desire—for example, if 
high turnout elections started to exacerbate rather than ameliorate bias—the procedures would need to be 
reevaluated” (Hill 2014, 141, n. 50). Furthermore, as discussed in the concluding section below, democratic 
legitimacy may require a confidence that outcomes are a “true” expression of popular sovereignty in the 





In the end, it may be necessary to choose between targeting voting rules and 
procedures toward improving the quality of the electorate, or toward improving equality 
by minimizing the chances for demographic bias in turnout and enhancing popular 
sovereignty by encouraging full participation. Those who choose the former route must 
of course be prepared to defend their notion of quality and to explain clearly how their 
proposed voting rule will improve it. The argument here, however, is that supporting 
participatory equality through a duty to vote is more consistent with fundamental 
democratic norms, although admittedly this view appears contested by contemporary 
treatments of voting in liberal democratic theory and constitutional design.93 Voting rules 
and procedures provide a ready tool for implementing broadly professed standards of 
correctness in political decisionmaking. This gives rise to arguments that voting should 
remain strictly voluntary, as discussed above, and it may likewise support proposals for 
higher substantive voting costs intended to dissuade “bad” decisionmakers from 
participating, as discussed in Chapter 3. The argument in that chapter was that strong 
epistemic standards are not needed for a coherent and comprehensive understanding of 
the role of voting in a representative democracy, and that mass participatory democratic 
theory is therefore defensible, in principle at least, without such standards. Here that 
                                                
93 As an additional example, John Ferejohn has recently asserted that the duty to vote is problematic, 
because from the standpoint of liberal theorists who believe that “the justification for government is 
instrumental to private self-rule, it does not seem obvious that the instrumentalities of government inherit 
any strong priority over private choices” (Ferejohn 2015, 233, n. 8). This assertion perhaps needs further 
explanation, which Ferejohn does not provide, and arguably he mistakes voting as an instrumentality of 
government, while it is better conceived as an instrumentality of sovereignty. Furthermore, the context of 
Ferejohn’s argument seems to show that he holds epistemic assumptions about voting, as he worrys that 
ballot secrecy prevents the verification of whether citizens have “good” reasons for their electoral choices. 
Admittedly, Ferejohn may be correct to the extent that private moral obligations can take ethical 
precedence over publicly owed duties, as discussed in the following subsection. However, this does not 
mean that voting should not be constitutionalized, and possibly enforced, as a general civic duty; it just 
means there can and should be exceptions for those who have personal moral objections to participating. 
Ferejohn also argues that voting should not be a duty because abstaining can itself be a kind of political 
expression, an argument was discussed previously in connection with the question of a right to abstain (see 





argument is extended, and an affirmative basis for the value of participation is set forth 
more clearly: The civic duty to vote that follows from conceiving of voting as the 
quintessential expression of popular sovereignty—effective to the extent that (as close as 
possible to) everyone participates—supplies the missing foundation for broadly 
participatory theory and practice under modern conditions of representative democracy.  
c) Limitations on the Duty to Vote 
Even assuming a constitutional-level civic duty to vote, it is important to 
acknowledge that such a duty may have its limits. An initial issue concerns the fact that— 
given the secret ballot—even strictly enforced compulsory voting laws do not compel the 
actual casting of a valid vote, and in practice individuals can choose to abstain by casting 
a blank or intentionally spoiled ballot, as discussed previously.94 The question thus arises 
whether a constitutional duty to vote should be formally understood as an obligation 
actually to vote, or as a more limited duty basically just to appear at the polls. In other 
words, should compulsory voting really be understood, and perhaps even 
constitutionalized, as compulsory turnout, as some proponents of the duty to vote have 
suggested?95  
Opponents of compulsory voting have asserted that a duty “simply to turn out and 
tick your name off a list” is not normatively meaningful, and it may indeed even be 
incoherent to the extent proponents mean to suggest that “it is easier to justify 
compulsory turnout than compulsory voting” (Lever 2009, 224; see also Saunders 2010, 
75). Sarah John thus asserts that admitting that compulsory voting really entails only 
compulsory turnout “fatally undermines the case that having all people vote, from all 
social classes, is so important that the state should compel it” (John 2015, 432). 
                                                
94 See supra n. 41 and accompanying text. 





Admittedly, such critics may be correct in pointing out that a formal duty simply to 
appear at the polls does not seem to be very meaningful standing alone.96 Any law or 
administrative procedure that required only turnout would thus presumably rely 
normatively on a more fundamental duty to actually vote. At the constitutional level, 
therefore, it is perhaps more correct to speak of a civic duty to vote, and it may also be 
more accurate to refer to the laws and procedures of “compulsory voting” rather than 
“compulsory turnout.”97 Nevertheless, it is arguably not just coherent but actually quite 
useful to consider a constitutional duty to vote that is administered in practice as 
compulsory turnout. Admitting that actual compulsion of valid voting may be neither 
practically nor normatively desirable in implementing and enforcing a constitutional duty 
to vote should not mean giving up on the fundamental importance of “having all people 
vote, from all social classes,” as John suggests.  
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that compulsory turnout alone, even without 
compulsory voting, could still be viewed as unacceptably coercive. As indicated, whether 
a given level of coercion is justified under liberal norms is an issue that requires weighing 
the competing interests of the individual and the state, although this can be seen more as 
a question of administrative implementation and enforcement, rather than an issue of 
constitutional design. That said, there is certainly an argument that citizens should not be 
coerced even to appear at the polls and have their names checked off a list, particularly if 
they have principled objections to doing so. Some of those who are extremely alienated 
might wish to express their opposition to the political system specifically by not turning 
                                                
96 This is not to say that turnout alone can have no meaning in itself. For one thing, turning out might lead 
in the future to actual voting, and furthermore, “participating” by casting an invalid vote as an act of protest 
could also be valued as a form of expression.  
97 The term “compulsory participation” might also be accurate, and a constitutional provision could set 
forth a civic duty to “participate” in elections, which perhaps leaves somewhat open the question of 





out, and by abstaining completely rather than being seen as participating in the election in 
any way. This would be consistent with allowing for conscientious objector status, and 
the constitutional duty to vote could be interpreted and administered so that any objection 
based on sincerely held personal beliefs would serve as a valid excuse.98 Indeed, the 
competing interests reflected in these two constitutional provisions—the civic duty to 
vote and the individual right to free expression—are arguably best reconciled in this 
manner. Presumably, the state would still be within its rights in compelling objectors to 
formally express their objection in some form, whether before or after the election, but 
this could be seen as just a general instance of the fact that individuals are not free to 
completely ignore administrative or judicial process, even in the most liberal of liberal 
democracies.  
Thus, whether structural limitations to compulsory voting were provided by the 
constitutional text itself, or applied through legal and administrative channels, it would 
not make the concept of the civic duty to vote incoherent either in theory or in practice. In 
the end, however, the moral force of a compulsory voting law or constitutional duty to 
vote would only be as strong as any law or constitutional provision might happen to be, 
and the general problem of political obligation under liberal democracy, as noted 
previously, is a complex and difficult one (see Pateman 1985).99 While there may be a 
civic duty to support just institutions, as Rawls states, “The real question is under which 
circumstances and to what extent we are bound to comply with unjust arrangements” 
                                                
98 This would contrast with enforcement of compulsory voting in Australia, where a political objection to 
participating appears not to constitute a valid excuse for abstaining, although a religious objection is 
deemed sufficient (see supra n. 19). 
99 See supra ns. 73-74 and accompanying text. Machin argues that a law compelling turnout is normatively 
coherent simply because citizens have a duty to obey any “democratically made law” (Machin 2011, 104-
105). This is debatable, however, so it may be better to conceptualize a constitutional duty or legal 






(Rawls 1999, 308). Individuals may decide to disobey a compulsory voting law whether 
it requires actual voting or just turnout, though of course such disobedience—even if it 
happens to be justified—may have consequences in terms of sanction.100 It is thus crucial 
to distinguish conceptually between a purely political obligation founded on a 
constitutional civic duty to vote, and the more personal moral obligations of individuals, 
which could indeed engender a duty to abstain based on fundamental objections to the 
political system (see Hanna 2009).101 As Rawls recognizes, all political obligations have 
limits, and they “may sometimes be overridden” (Rawls 1999, 309).  
Another possible limit on the duty to vote involves the attitude of indifference. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, individuals can be instrumentally indifferent either through 
complete lack of information about the options on the ballot, or because they perceive the 
options as effectively equivalent. Either way, a duty to vote should not be understood to 
suggest that anyone who is truly indifferent to the outcome of an election should 
nevertheless cast a vote.102 In common practice, this means there is no requirement to 
vote in every election on the ballot, as there may be good reasons to allow indifferent 
voters to engage in “rolloff” and abstain in down-ballot state and local races, or other 
                                                
100 See supra n. 45 and accompanying text; see also Rawls’ general discussion of justifications for civil 
disobedience and “conscientious refusal” (Rawls 1999, 319-335).  
101 Hanna argues that given an unjust and fundamentally undemocratic political regime, one may be 
ethically required to abstain rather than “contributing to the false and harmful appearance of legitimacy” 
(Hanna 2009, 277). In terms of the calculus, this could be modeled as expressive disutility in the D term 
(see supra n. 1 and accompanying text). Notably, Hanna admits the possibility of a moral duty to vote 
based on purely instrumental motivations in the case of “a close election that poses the threat of a 
particularly horrible candidate being elected,” which could “outweigh worries about perpetuating 
unfairness” (282). 
102 This is perhaps another reason for implementing and enforcing the duty to vote in practice as 
compulsory turnout only, for individuals should arguably be free to abstain if they are truly indifferent. 
This again contrasts with the enforcement of compulsory voting in Australia, where voting appears to be 
required even for those with no clear preferences: The Australian Electoral Commission’s website cites the 
case of Lubcke v Little VR 807 (Supreme Court of Victoria, 1970), in which the court ruled that a 
“subjective incapacity” to form a preference ordering among candidates did not constitute a valid excuse 





items on the ballot about which they may have insufficient information to make a choice 
(see Wattenberg et al. 2000).103 There is thus no implication that individuals should vote 
randomly, or for reasons that they themselves would not regard as meaningful, simply to 
fulfill their civic duty.104 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, the voting decision must 
retain at least minimal epistemic qualities, although this is arguably better understood as a 
minimum standard of cognitive capacity, rather than a standard of political 
knowledgability.105 While citizens ideally should vote in an informed manner, the 
definition of what exactly that means must be allowed as highly subjective, and no 
particular conception of informed voting should be implemented or enforced through 
electoral rules and procedures. In general, the argument from Chapter 3—and continued 
in this chapter—is that election law and policy should be structured to increase turnout as 
much as possible. If the duty to vote reflects the value of mass participation as an 
expression of popular sovereignty, then even though completely indifferent voting is not 
normatively desirable, strong epistemic conceptions of voting should be rejected, 
particularly to the extent they may be used to argue for higher substantive costs or 
limiting electoral participation in any way. 
A somewhat harder issue involves whether instituting the duty to vote as a general 
obligation of citizenship simply requires too much of individuals. In his book The Limits 
of Obligation, James Fishkin asserts that general obligations tend to interfere with “the 
robust zone of indifference” that must be assured in a liberal democracy (Fishkin 1982, 
                                                
103 As discussed in Chapter 2, informational indifference may be more common in “second-order” 
elections that receive more limited media attention and often lack partisan affiliation as an informational 
cue on the ballot, although there may be ways to address such problems (see Chapter 2, Section 4; see also 
Chapter 3, text accompanying ns. 86-87). 
104 There might arguably even be a duty to abstain in such situations rather than knowingly voting “badly” 
(see supra n. 89). 





23).106 This raises the question: how burdensome are the actual costs that a duty to vote 
would impose on democratic citizens? Even assuming that the substantive costs of 
casting a ballot are not prohibitive, the deeper issue comes down to information costs. 
Proponents of compulsory voting must admit that the duty to vote includes a duty to be at 
least minimally informed about electoral choices, and not to remain completely 
indifferent by willful ignorance. Although there is a great deal of free or very low cost 
information available today—as Downs indicated there was even in his day (see Downs 
1957b, 146)—opponents of compulsory voting nevertheless may insist that the 
information costs of voting in even a minimally responsible manner are prohibitively 
high for many—if not most—citizens. Epistemic theorists like Brennan obviously believe 
this, and Fishkin himself appears to agree, as evidenced by his work on deliberative 
democratic theory discussed in Chapter 3.107 Assuming that epistemic and deliberative 
theorists are wrong at least with regard to citizens who have some basic interest in 
politics, those having no interest in politics whatsoever do pose a more difficult problem. 
For such individuals, the informational costs of voting might be perceived as simply too 
high, and so there may be a real question whether asking these citizens to devote some 
                                                
106 Fishkin identifies the zone of indifference with Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) conception of “negative liberty” 
(see Fishkin 1982, 20, n. 1). Notably, a civic duty to vote would not technically be considered a general 
obligation as Fishkin defines it (27), because voting is an example of an act that is “agent specific” (160), 
since it can only be performed once (legally) in any election. Fishkin does not address whether a duty to 
vote would go beyond the “limits of obligation,” although he mentions an assumption that “any special 
obligations attached to citizenship” are not overly burdensome (43, n. 8). Nevertheless, Fishkin discusses 
voting extensively as a typical example of the problem that general obligations pose in large groups given 
the apparently negligible effects of an individual vote, and he also discusses voting in the context of 
Kantian generalization arguments (102, 109-110). Interestingly, Fishkin’s analysis prefigures Tuck’s 
approach in Free Riding with regard to the theory (attributed to David Lyons) that threshold effects offer a 
possible solution to the problem of negligibility (Fishkin 1982, 111-123). However, Fishkin appears to 
make the mistake Tuck mentions of not realizing how each contributor can claim responsibility for the 
entire benefit, not just a proportional share (124-127; see Tuck 2008, 41); see also Chapter 1, Section 5, 
regarding the same mistake made by Brennan (2011a). 





attention to politics, to form an opinion, and to vote, might actually begin to infringe on 
their protected “zone of indifference.”108  
While there may be no definitive answer to this question, the argument here is 
that requiring even these completely disinterested citizens to pay attention to politics and 
incur some information costs around election time does not in principle ask too much, 
because the standards for informed voting are not very high, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
and as discussed in this chapter, participation of as many citizens as possible helps to 
ensure and enhance democratic popular sovereignty.109 Nevertheless, given the 
limitations on implementing and enforcing the duty to vote in practice, there will always 
be opportunities for some citizens to remain blissfully disinterested if they so desire. 
Moreover, if the civic duty to vote includes a duty to be at least minimally informed, it 
arguably follows that the state may also have a duty to help facilitate citizens’ acquisition 
of political information. It would certainly seem like a worthy policy goal to help citizens 
become more politically informed, whether through support for civic education and other 
efforts to increase access to information, or by structuring elections in ways that reduce 
information costs and diminish opportunities for indifference, as discussed in Chapter 2 
(Section 4). This approach might also offer support for regulation of political campaigns 
and the media in the interest of more informed voting, although in the U.S. this of course 
                                                
108 See also Elliot (2017, 666) on this general objection. Perhaps another difficult question involves 
whether it is asking too much to require those who are deeply ambivalent about their vote choice to reach a 
decision by creating identity-defining “voluntarist reasons” for how they vote—as discussed in Chapter 2 
(Section 3c). As indicated there, those who are politically ambivalent generally seem self-motivated to 
reach a decision and vote; however, if one were truly unable to reach a decision it would presumably 
provide an acceptable excuse for not voting, as the individual would be functionally indifferent. 
109 It is also possible that a duty to vote might lead some of these disinterested citizens to take an interest in 
politics in the future and become more politically informed and active (see Lijphart 1997, 10), although as 





raises highly contentious free speech issues under the First Amendment.110 Nonetheless, 
those who are truly concerned with uninformed voting might consider some of the things 
the state can do on the supply side of information, rather than focusing exclusively on the 
demand side of how citizens can (or cannot) acquire more and better political 
information. 
There are other issues to explore regarding possible limits on the duty to vote: For 
example, one question is whether the duty should apply in all elections, or perhaps it 
should apply only in “first-order” elections for higher offices, but not in all state and local 
races or other down-ballot elections. As discussed, second-order elections can pose more 
difficult informational problems,111 but these may also be the types of elections that could 
benefit most from a duty to vote, since turnout in these races is often so low. Relatedly, 
there is the question is how often citizens can be obliged to vote, which has consequences 
for whether elections at different levels of government should be consolidated or held 
separately, as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as possible implications for whether there 
should be a duty to vote only in general elections or in primaries as well.112 Furthermore, 
one could wonder whether the duty to vote should apply to direct democracy initiatives, 
which can implicate more difficult informational issues than voting for representatives.113 
                                                
110 In any liberal democracy, the state clearly does not—and indeed should not—have the same control 
over the information costs of voting as it has over substantive costs; however, this does not mean the state 
should exercise no control at all over the distribution of information costs. 
111 See supra n. 104. 
112 Basic information problems can also arise in primary elections, particularly given the absence of a party 
cue; however, whether primaries should also be subject to a duty to vote is a more complex question. 
Higher turnout, at least among partisans, arguably might be needed to assure the “legitimacy” of candidate 
selection, but the wider issues of normative legitimacy that arise in general elections do not seem as urgent 
in the context of primaries. Nevertheless, party primaries play a crucial agenda-setting role in a majoritarian 
system, and any duty to vote should arguably apply also in primaries, as advocated by Mann and Ornstein 
(see infra n. 126). See also Abu El-Haj (2016) on the importance of a “broad and representative” electorate 
in primaries. 
113 See Chapter 3, n. 38. There is a strong argument that any referendum on a proposed constitutional 
amendment (or on initial ratification) should be included in a duty to vote, since these concern fundamental 





However, further discussion of the contours of the duty to vote and its limits must await a 
work focused more specifically on addressing these questions. Here the objective has 
been to present an argument that participating in elections should be a constitutional-level 
civic duty as well as a civil right, to respond to some of the main objections to the duty to 
vote and compulsory voting, and to briefly discuss some of the limits of the duty in 
theory and practice. The next section will proceed to consider some of the implications 
that recognizing a civic duty to vote could have for election law and policy. 
 
5) IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTION LAW AND POLICY  
The objective of encouraging universal participation of all eligible voters emerges 
from the foregoing analysis and argument, and it is important to recognize that election 
law and policy is essential in helping to reach this objective. Some opponents of 
compulsory voting might concede that voting is a social duty, or a moral obligation of 
some sort, but will nevertheless insist that this duty or obligation should not be legally 
enforceable in any way (e.g. Abraham 1952, 348).114 In fact, even without any 
implementation or enforcement, or indeed any changes to election law and policy, the 
formal recognition of a civic duty to vote could have significant consequences for voting 
behavior. A compulsory voting law—even if not strictly enforced—might encourage 
citizens to vote simply by reinforcing a social norm of voting (see Hasen 1996, 2168; see 
also Birch 2009, 148).115 As Patricia Funk explains, the legal duty to vote may also serve 
                                                                                                                                            
may be more like ordinary legislation through direct democracy than matters of fundamental constitutional 
design. 
114 According to Abraham, “Voting is not a social duty that should be made a legal duty. It is a moral 
obligation, a demonstration of responsible citizenship, a worthy endeavor, but not a duty enforceable at 
law” (Abraham 1952, 348). 
115 This could be true notwithstanding the finding that compulsory voting’s effect on turnout is strongest 





an “expressive” function, reflecting what she calls the “moral message” of legal norms, 
which can induce individuals to vote independently of any sanctions for noncompliance 
(Funk 2007, 139).116 Moreover, there is abundant evidence that social motivations in 
general are important factors for inducing turnout at the individual level (see supra 
Section 2).  
Nevertheless, beyond its effect on voting behavior, it is difficult to imagine that 
formally recognizing a civic duty to vote would not have major implications for election 
law and policy. Richard Hasen’s seminal article on compulsory voting is entitled “Voting 
Without Law” (1996), and by voting “with law” Hasen essentially means compulsory 
voting enforced through negative sanctions (2169-2172).117 However, because he 
believes that this is not a viable option for the United States, Hasen is forced to conclude 
that for many citizens in this country, voting without law “means simply not voting” 
(2178). However, Hasen curiously seems to neglect the fact that there is far more to the 
involvement of law in the motivations for voting beyond the possibility of sanctions for 
abstention.118 In an important if obvious sense, there can be no such thing as voting 
“without law,” since rules and regulations are of course necessary to the functioning of 
elections. In a deeper sense as well though, the laws and administrative procedures of 
elections fundamentally structure the act of voting and may thereby influence the 
                                                
116 Funk finds that removal of the formal legal obligation to vote in several Swiss cantons led to a 
significant reduction in turnout, even though sanctions had previously been extremely low and effectively 
only symbolic (Funk 2007). She theorizes that a compulsory voting law could affect behavior even without 
any enforcement whatsoever, but that some minimal enforcement might be useful to maintain the strength 
of the social norm of voting (155). 
117 Hasen takes his article’s title from Robert’s Ellickson’s book on social norms, Order Without Law 
(1991). 
118 Also, Hasen’s article discusses only the question of whether legal norms can serve as a substitute for 
social norms, but strangely perhaps, he does not seem to address the possibility that legal norms could also 
work to strengthen otherwise weak social norms, as could be the case with voting. Although this topic is 
beyond the current scope, legal and social norms are probably best seen as potentially working together and 





individual turnout decision in many different ways. Whether voting is considered a right 
only or a duty as well should therefore be seen to have major implications—from the 
highest levels of fundamental law, down to the administrative implementation of electoral 
policy—all distinct from the issue of whether there is any enforcement mechanism for 
actively compelling participation.  
The highest level legal implication would be the possibility of formally 
constitutionalizing the duty to vote. Recently there have been recurring calls for an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution to explicitly provide for a right to vote, coming from 
politicians (H.J. Res. 25, 114th Cong.), legal scholars and practitioners (Raskin 2004; 
Nelson 2013; Daniels 2017, 601-604), and policy advocates (Soros & Schmitt 2013; 
FairVote 2017).119 However, it appears that no one has yet suggested that such an 
amendment to the Constitution might establish voting as a civic duty as well as a civil 
right. If there is ever to be a new constitutional convention in this country, as some have 
urged there should be, the question of whether voting should be only a right or a duty as 
well is surely something worthy of consideration (Levinson 2006; 2012, 116-117). 
Before considering the question of whether and how to implement and enforce the 
duty to vote, the mere recognition of a constitutional-level civic duty could have 
significant implications for the jurisprudence of voting rights in this country. The most 
important implications could be for cases alleging that the administrative rules or 
procedures for voting are so burdensome that they effectively deny the right to vote, or 
                                                
119 See supra n. 36 on the ambiguous status of the right to vote in American constitutional jurisprudence. 
The most recent bill proposing a constitutional amendment on the right to vote, House Joint Resolution 25, 
114th Congress (2015-2016), was introduced by Rep. Mark Pocan (D-WI) and co-sponsored by 40 other 
Democratic representatives (https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-joint-resolution/25/text). 
There has been some pushback on a voting rights amendment from election law scholars who argue that 
agreement on the text of an amendment would be extremely difficult, and it would likely fail to resolve 





what election law scholars have termed “new vote denial” cases.120 If a claim of vote 
denial were characterized as preventing a citizen from exercising a fundamental civic 
duty as well as a fundamental civil right, this would certainly provide additional weight 
to the individual interest when courts perform balancing tests against state interests, as in 
the controversial voter identification case, Crawford v. Marion County (2008). As 
discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 7),121 Joseph Fishkin (2011) criticizes the use of 
“structuralist,” or group-based conceptions of voting rights in such cases, arguing that 
courts should instead recognize the value of participation for individual citizens. A duty 
to vote similarly draws attention to the individual interest in normative conceptions of 
election law. Fishkin argues that this interest should be protected against “dignitary 
harm” (Fishkin 2011, 1296), and in Chapter 1 it was argued that instrumental motivations 
provide an even stronger reason for individual-level protection of voting rights; this 
chapter now provides another strong reason based on the non-instrumental motivation of 
fulfilling one’s civic duty. Furthermore, recognition of a duty to vote also bolsters the 
argument, as set forth in Chapter 3, that a strict scrutiny standard of review should apply 
in judging whether specific impositions of substantive voting costs are constitutional.122 
If voting were not only a fundamental right, but a fundamental duty as well, the argument 
is even more forceful that the government should bear the brunt of the costs of 
administering elections, and it should not be permitted to shift these costs onto individual 
citizens in a manner that unduly burdens their participation, unless the administrative 
procedure can be demonstrated as narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means of 
fulfilling a compelling interest in electoral efficiency or integrity.   
                                                
120 See Chapter 1, n. 38. 
121 See also Chapter 3, n. 9. 





Establishing a constitutional duty to vote could also have major implications for 
U.S. electoral policy even without enactment of a compulsory voting law. One example is 
the system of voluntary registration used in American elections, which is fairly unique 
among contemporary democracies (see Rosenberg and Chen 2009, 1). If voting were 
established as a duty as well as a right, it might make more sense for voter lists to be 
compiled by the government under a system of “automatic” or “universal” voter 
registration (see Tokaji 2008, 502-503).123 Alternatively, same-day and Election Day 
registration procedures would receive support from formal recognition of a duty to vote, 
as it would seem harder to justify imposing an additional burden of prior registration in 
order to fulfill one’s civic duty. Strict voter identification laws that do not allow for 
reasonable individualized exceptions could also be more problematic from a policy 
perspective focused on voting as civic duty. In general, recognition of a duty to vote 
would entail a very different perspective on the role of the state in administering 
elections. Under the current system of purely voluntary voting, it stands to reason that the 
state should essentially just avoid “overburdening” participation, however that is defined. 
If voting were a duty, however, the state would conceivably have a more affirmative 
responsibility for ensuring that participation is as easy and accessible as possible, as Hill 
illustrates in her description of the extensive efforts in the Australian system to ensure 
that everyone eligible is able to vote (Hill 2014, 122-123).124 In general, all this provides 
                                                
123 If a compulsory voting law were enacted, another possibility would be to make registration compulsory 
along with voting (see Tokaji 2008, 504).  
124 Of course the actual enforcement of compulsory voting in Australia makes this argument even stronger. 
See also Elliot (2017, 659), indicating that policies to minimize substantive voting costs should be 
implemented along with sanctions for failure to appear at the polls. Elliot indicates that his argument for 
“mandatory turnout” does not take a position on whether voting should be considered a duty (657). Of 
course, even if voting is considered a right only and not a duty, the government may still take on a more 
affirmative responsibility for making voting accessible to all citizens, as appears to be the case in India, for 
example (see Roy 2012, 174; Mukherji & Anand 2014). See Gilmarin (2012) for a discussion of the 





added support to the arguments in Chapter 3 (Section 5) for keeping substantive voting 
costs as low as possible and strengthening the overall policy mandate for high levels of 
turnout.  
The question then arises as to whether to implement and enforce the constitutional 
duty to vote, and if so how. Should voting in the United States be compulsory? Hasen’s 
assessment that enforcement of the duty to vote through negative sanctions “has virtually 
no chance of enactment in the United States” probably still rings true (Hasen 1996, 2173; 
see also Tokaji 2008, 505).125 Nevertheless, there have some calls for compulsory voting 
along the Australian model from notable political science and policy scholars, and from 
at least one very notable politician. As mentioned previously, Arendt Lijphart advocated 
for this in his APSA presidential address (Lijphart 1997). More recently, in their widely 
read book, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein feature 
compulsory voting as one of their most prominent proposals aimed at resolving 
contemporary crises in American politics (Mann & Ornstein 2012, 140-143).126 William 
                                                                                                                                            
between conceptions of popular sovereignty in the United States and India “can perhaps best be read in 
ongoing differences in election law—and in processes of voting” (Gilmartin 2012, 420). 
125 Hasen discusses compulsory voting at the federal level, which he indicates would likely be 
constitutional, at least insofar as the First Amendment (see supra n. 39). The broader question of the 
constitutionality of compulsory voting enforced at the federal level through fines for unexcused abstention 
is a complex question beyond the current scope. Presumably there could be strong legal arguments on both 
sides of this issue, particularly if the 2012 decision on the “individual mandate” associated with the 
Affordable Care Act offers any insight (National Federation v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___ (2012)). The 
possibility of compulsory voting at the state or local level is discussed below.  
126 Mann and Ornstein argue generally that compulsory voting could reduce political polarization by 
expanding the centrist base of the electorate and minimizing the need for voter mobilization efforts. On this 
point, see Malkopouplou’s argument—based on an insightful historical study of compulsory voting in 
Europe—that “political moderation is perhaps the most important effect of compulsory voting” 
(Malkopouplou 2015, 34). However, Malkopulou also concludes that compulsory voting “is not very 
compatible” with a majoritarian electoral system like that of the United States, but rather proportional 
representation may be necessary “to render any application of compulsory voting meaningful” (172-173). 
Mann and Ornstein argue for mandatory voting in all federal elections—general and primary, which they 
admit seems unlikely at present, but they say that could change “after another lengthy period of dominance 
by political extremes and the divisive discourse, agenda, and outcomes that follow” (Mann and Ornstein 





Galston of the Brookings Institution has also been a vocal supporter of this type of reform 
(Galston 2010, 7; 2011; 2014). In fact, President Obama advanced the possibility of 
compulsory voting at a town hall meeting, reportedly stating, “If everybody voted it 
would completely change the political map in this country” (O’Donnell and Arkin 
2015).127 Legal scholars have perhaps been somewhat more reticent about making voting 
an enforceable obligation, although Nicholas Stephanopoulos has prominently advocated 
for compulsory voting with fines for unexcused abstention, suggesting that it could 
actually have a chance of being enacted if it began first at local levels of government 
(Stephanopoulos 2015; see also Tokaji 2008, 505).128 So perhaps Hasen’s pessimistic 
assessment of the possibility of compulsory voting in the United Sates might actually be 
somewhat less true today?  
Nevertheless, it may be that the Australian model of administrative fines for 
abstention really is not appropriate for the United States, if only due to the particular 
sensibilities of American political culture, and institutional path dependence (Hasen 
1996, 2177).129 In fact, while proponents of compulsory voting have focused attention on 
dispelling the notion that actual voting is really required, insisting that in practice only 
turnout is compulsory, the deeper problem perhaps relates to the compulsory part of the 
term, not the voting part. For it is the literal prospect of the government compelling or 
                                                
127 Obama was also quoted as saying that compulsory voting as practiced in Australia could help 
“counteract” problems of money in politics. The White House press secretary later reportedly clarified that 
the President “was not making a specific policy prescription” (Boyer 2015).  
128 Stephanopoulos does not address the additional informational problems with voting at local levels (see 
supra n. 104), but he points out that locally implemented compulsory voting would lead to voting in higher 
order races if local elections are held concurrently with federal elections. Tokaji suggests that compulsory 
voting should start with experimentation at the state level, as does Galston (2010, 7).  
129 Hasen identifies the main objection to compulsory voting as coming from the American tradition of 
libertarianism (2176). He writes, “Although the government tells people what to do all the time—file an 
income tax return, serve on a jury, register in the Selective Service Program, separate trash—hackles rise 
when compulsory voting is mentioned. I have no good explanation for this phenomenon, especially in a 





coercing participation that seems to draw the most ire of opponents of the duty to vote, 
and this is probably what most threatens to offend American sensibilities. However, even 
in Australia, the system can accurately be described—more accurately perhaps, at least in 
strictly economic terms—simply as the government incentivizing voting in a manner that 
happens to be through negative monetary sanction, or fine.130 Additionally, as discussed 
above in Section 3, what is generally referred to as compulsory voting encompasses many 
different methods of institutionalizing a civic duty to vote, with varying types of positive 
or negative sanctions, as well as different levels of administrative enforcement. In the 
American context, policy analysts and advocates might do best first to focus attention on 
the normative argument for voting as a civic duty, as opposed to a purely voluntary act, 
and perhaps on introducing this argument into efforts aimed at a constitutional 
amendment on voting. Then, when it comes to the question of implementing and 
enforcing this duty, discussion could focus on enabling and encouraging participation, 
which presents a more acceptable frame for American sensibilities, though still 
controversial enough (see Parker 1993, 572).131  
The idea of “nudging” citizens to vote could likewise be useful (Elliot 2017).132 
Pamela Karlan has suggested the government might provide some form of financial 
                                                
130 Opponents of compulsory voting might insist on adding that the negative monetary sanction is enforced 
through the coercive power of the state, but this is generally implicit in any government fine.  
131 Parker promotes what he calls a “Populist sensibility” in American constitutional theory, which looks 
favorably on the exertion of “political energy” by “ordinary people,” and which is opposed by a more 
dominant “Anti-Populist” sensibility. When it comes to the implications of this approach, Parker writes, 
“To favor the exertion of political energy isn’t to require it. Those who don't participate in political life 
should not be penalized, since compelled behavior is not exactly a release of energy. Neither, however, 
should they be insulated in their privacy, protected from exposure to politics. Rather, they should be both 
enabled and encouraged to take some part” (Parker 1993, 572). Parker is not discussing voting in 
particular, but he continues by stating that the “central mission” of this approach should be “to promote 
majority rule” (573). When he later mentions voting—among other forms of political participation—he 
suggests a concern for whether rights of participation are “actually being exercised” (576).  
132 Elliot frames compulsory voting—or as he prefers it, “mandatory turnout”—as a precommitment 
mechanism for those who already have some motivation to vote, and as a nudge for those who would not 





compensation for voting in order to boost turnout, comparing this to compensation 
provided for jury service (Karlan 1994, 1472; see also Saunders 2009).133 The obvious 
objection is that payments for turnout risk a “commodification” of the franchise, which 
raises familiar anxieties about citizens voting for the wrong reasons (Hasen 2000, 
1358).134 Hasen thus expresses a general preference for “sticks over carrots” in increasing 
turnout, and he suggests that paying citizens for participation might actually be 
counterproductive to instilling the norm of voting as a civic duty (Hasen 1996, 2172; see 
also Macmullen 2014, 74).135 Karlan acknowledges the “commodification objection” and 
admits there may be a risk of “devaluing voting by paying for it”, but she considers the 
value of high turnout to outweigh that risk (Karlan 1994, 1473). More importantly 
                                                                                                                                            
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6, emphasis added). Admittedly, encouraging turnout 
through implementation of a duty to vote might require a change in economic incentives, as reflected in the 
voting calculus, although it seems unclear to what extent such a change would be considered “significant.” 
Elliot in fact frames mandatory voting as a nudge simply to pay attention to politics, rather than to actually 
vote (Elliot 2017, 665) 
133 As mentioned previously (see supra Section 4), Karlan believes that the right to vote must include a 
right to abstain, and she thus opposes a duty to vote on First Amendment grounds. This might explain why 
she suggests a positive incentive for voting, rather than a negative one; however, she also notes, without 
further discussion, that compulsory voting as practiced in Australia is “the functional equivalent” of her 
suggestion (Karlan 1994, 1472, n. 54). Saunders argues that a policy of payment for voting can increase 
turnout “without threatening individual liberty” in the manner of compulsory voting (Saunders 2009, 130).  
134 Hasen argues that “turnout buying” raises normative concerns similar to “core vote buying”—or 
payments for voting a certain way—in that both compromise the principle of the inalienability of votes 
(1358), which has the “purpose of promoting public-regarding voting” (1336). Hasen admits this may be 
less of a concern with payments for turnout, but he states that “the equation of incentives for voting could 
still have a ‘corrosive effect’ on politics” (1358). Notably perhaps, he focuses mainly on targeted campaign 
efforts to raise turnout in certain areas, of which he cites examples in California, and he thus indicates that 
laws allowing payments for turnout are subject to “partisan manipulation” (1355). However, he does not 
seem to address directly whether a general policy of compensation for voting administered by the 
government would be subject to the same concerns. Hasen also indicates that payments for turnout are 
illegal in federal elections, although some states do allow the practice (see Hasen 2000, 1326). 
135 Hasen states that a compulsory voting law “suggests moral authority or social consensus,” while a 
positive incentive for voting “inspires an outcome-oriented calculus.” MacMullen indicates more generally 
that positive incentives “may increase the quantity of civic action at grave cost to its quality.” But see 
Malkopouplou (2015, 54), indicating that Aristotle himself favored payments for participation in the 
ancient Greek assembly over fines, which he believed were unfair to poor citizens. Plato, according to 
Maklopouplou, was opposed to both payments and fines, indicating that participation should be 





perhaps, Karlan suggests that there could be creative ways of designing positive 
incentives in ways aimed at increasing the “sense of political efficacy” and fostering 
additional civic participation, such as a policy of providing voters with vouchers for 
donation to non-profit organizations.136  
Framing any positive incentive for turnout as a policy intended to offset the costs 
of voting could also be useful in this regard.137 One idea for implementing a positive 
incentive that would fit with this type of framing might be a voter’s tax credit or other tax 
subsidy, something a few policy scholars have suggested (Hicks 2002; Mann & Ornstein 
2012, 142-143).138 Notably, this option might be less susceptible to the general critique 
that paying everyone who turns out is less economically efficient than selectively 
imposing fines on abstainers (Feely 1974, 241; Hasen 1996, 2172). A positive incentive 
in the form of a tax credit could be made more economically efficient, particularly if it 
were enacted as part of a larger tax reform and implemented in a revenue neutral manner 
(see e.g. Brunk 1980, 561).139 Tax incentives could also be targeted toward low-income 
demographics with the worst turnout rates (Hicks 2002, 67), such as by making any tax 
credit for voting refundable, similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit (see IRS 2017). 
Another option some have suggested would be to enter all voters into some form of 
                                                
136 Karlan likens her proposal of “vouchers for voting” to policies that have been suggested (and recently 
implemented in the city of Seattle) for campaign finance vouchers (Karlan 1994, 1473, n. 58). 
137 Indeed, Hasen notes that although payments for turnout are illegal under federal law, it is apparently 
legal to provide compensation aimed at directly reducing substantive voting costs, such as a payment of 
free gasoline to cover transportation to the polls, which is permissible according to a federal case Hasen 
cites (Hasen 2000, 1358, n. 185, citing Dansereau v. Ulmer, 903 P. 2d 55 (Alaska 1995)). 
138 Hicks advocates a tax credit for voters in Canadian elections. Mann and Ornstein mention this idea only 
briefly, attributing it to former Republican congressman Mickey Edwards. 
139 Brunk suggests simply raising taxes by a certain amount and then refunding it to those who participate 
in the election; however, there obviously could be more complex ways of providing and paying for any tax 





lottery (see Karlan 1994, 1472, n. 54; Mann and Ornstein 2012, 143).140 However, such a 
turnout lottery would arguably detract from an emphasis on electoral participation as an 
act of individual agency in which all citizens share equally.141 In the end, it would 
probably be best to allow for experimentation at state and local levels with different 
policies of positive or negative incentives for turnout, perhaps even used in combination 
with each other.142  
Finally, any implementation or enforcement of the duty to vote could also have 
significant implications for the mobilization efforts of political campaigns. In fact, where 
compulsory voting is strongly enforced there should essentially be no need to “get out the 
vote,” and campaigns might instead focus more of their energy and resources on message 
rather than mobilization (Karp et al. 2007, 96).143 Interestingly, the issues raised by 
mobilization efforts seem to cut against the most common argument made by opponents 
of compulsory voting; namely, that leaving voting voluntary improves the epistemic or 
                                                
140 Hasen cites a Mississippi Supreme Court case upholding a turnout lottery run by a political candidate 
(see Hasen 2000, 1326, n. 11, citing Naron v. Prestage, 469 So, 2d 83 (Miss. 1985)). See also 
Panagopoulos (2012, 266), describing a failed 2006 Arizona ballot initiative that would have established a 
state-sponsored (revenue-neutral) lottery awarding a million dollars to one lucky voter in every even-year 
general election. 
141 Furthermore, the miniscule chance of winning a lottery seems to echo the so-called paradox of voting 
and the supposedly negligible probability of casting an instrumentally useful vote in a large election (see 
e.g. Gelman et al. 2012, 324). Mann and Ornstein indicate that rather than entering voters into a lottery, 
they “prefer a change that strengthens the civic fabric of society, one with responsibilities and opportunities 
for citizens” (Mann and Ornstein 2012, 143). 
142 For empirical evidence on the turnout effects of varying monetary incentives, see Panagopoulos (2012). 
Based on field experiments in actual elections, Panagopoulos estimates that compensation of about $40 
would increase turnout by an average of about 6 percentage points, while $100 could increase turnout as 
much as 15 points (277-278). He indicates that incentives in the $40-50 range have about the same turnout 
effect observed in studies of social pressure, including door-to-door canvassing (278).  
143 Karp et al. do find evidence of increased mobilization efforts in marginal districts in Australia, 
demonstrating that even with strongly enforced compulsory voting, mobilization can still be somewhat 
important, particularly in close elections. They also fail to find strong evidence of campaigns in Australia 
focusing on voters who report weaker party identification, which would indicate “conversion” strategies 
focused more on message (102-103). However, the tendency to emphasize message over mobilization 
could be more subtle, as Karp et al. acknowledge in their hypothesis that campaign efforts in Australia are 
“likely to be flavored by attempts at conversion rather than mobilization” (96, emphasis added). A more 





deliberative quality of the decision. Indeed, most would probably agree that the resources 
and efficacy of campaigns in mobilizing supporters should not necessarily be allowed to 
determine the winner of an election, as there is no reason to assume that candidates with 
more skilled and well-funded ground campaigns are normatively better in any way. 
Furthermore, voluntary voting also leaves much more room for political parties and 
campaigns to pursue strategies of “demobilization” of likely opponents in efforts that 
may undermine norms of participatory equality (see Piven et al. 2009).144 Even without 
active demobilization strategies, the get-out-the-vote efforts that are necessary under 
voluntary voting can actually exacerbate inequality in turnout, since campaigns largely 
target individuals from already over-represented demographics (Enos et al. 2014). Thus, 
an additional policy argument for implementing and enforcing a civic duty to vote is that 
it could minimize the ability of political campaigns to influence election outcomes in 
ways that infringe on principles of equal participation and democratic justice. 
 
6) CONCLUSION  
 This chapter’s argument for the civic duty to vote as an important non-
instrumental motivation for voting, represented by the D term of the voting calculus, has 
relied and built upon the arguments of previous chapters. Chapter 1 demonstrated that 
voting can be instrumentally rational and causally efficacious, while Chapter 2 showed 
that the instrumental benefits of voting may be perceived to be substantial. Chapter 3 then 
explained how the informational costs of voting are not necessarily prohibitive for the 
average citizen, proceeding to outline a normative argument for election laws and 
                                                
144 Lijphart also indicates that campaigns under compulsory voting could feature less negative advertising, 
which is thought to work by demobilizing opponents (Lijphart 1997, 10, citing Ansolabehere & Iyengar 





policies aimed at minimizing substantive costs. With this chapter, the foundations for a 
coherent and cohesive argument for a civic duty to vote are now complete, and the 
overall conclusion is as follows: The duty to vote provides an ethically meaningful and 
rationally coherent normative foundation for broadly participatory theory and practice 
under modern conditions of liberal democracy. Some implications of this argument for 
U.S. election law and policy are that a civic duty to vote should be considered for 
inclusion in efforts for a Constitutional amendment on voting rights, and some form of 
implementation and enforcement of this duty could be designed in a manner appropriate 
to political and cultural norms for this country.    
An institutionalized addition to the D term of the calculus through a constitutional 
duty to vote is probably only needed where turnout is low, as in the U.S., for if turnout is 
high, citizens either already recognize the duty as a social norm, or they may have strong 
instrumental motivations for participating due to the structure of the political system (see 
Hill 119-120; Hirczy 1995). At the risk of further belaboring readers of this already long 
chapter, some final comments on the dangers of low turnout may be useful: Rates of 
turnout are related to an important concern for democratic legitimacy, specifically the 
confidence that may or may not be justified in the belief that political outcomes—or more 
specifically, choices of political leadership—are “true” expressions of popular 
sovereignty, in the sense of accurately reflecting the majority preference of the eligible 
voting citizenry. This is crucial, because if it were believed that the choice of 
leadership—and hence political outcomes—might have been different had more citizens 
voted, it could decrease democratic legitimacy, both empirically and normatively. The 
force of this point is revealed in the extensive efforts of political scientists to prove as 





reasonably close to those of voters, at least in recent history.145 Yet from a constitutional 
design perspective, and from the perspective of the Rawlsian original position, if one is 
truly concerned with minimizing the possibility of a deviation from the “true” democratic 
outcome, and knowing with more than just a certain statistical confidence that outcomes 
are legitimate, electoral institutions can and should be structured toward this goal. 
Instead, there seems to be more concern among democratic theorists with ensuring some 
sort of substantive epistemic quality in the voting decision, which many believe would 
actually diminish with higher turnout.  
Furthermore, if there were a deviation in popular sovereignty such that the “true” 
majority’s preferences were contravened, it might not actually be observable in political 
outcomes. It is possible that a totalitarian dictator could win a democratic election due to 
low turnout, but more likely the winner would be just another liberal democratic party. 
The winner would then take the country in a different direction—not necessarily making 
it substantively less democratic, or moving it to the political left or right—or consistently 
in any particular direction—but rather just to a different place than it would otherwise 
have gone. Perhaps this helps explains why studies of compulsory voting’s effects have 
not turned up much conclusive evidence beyond the increase in turnout. More 
fundamentally, these studies may be misguided to the extent they seek out substantive 
effects as a means for either defending or criticizing compulsory voting normatively. 
What arguably makes Australia more democratically legitimate than the U.S. could have 
nothing to do with the substance of political outcomes in either country, but rather with 
the fact that in Australia there can be greater confidence that the choice of leadership is 
an expression of popular sovereignty reflected through the will of the majority. In the 
                                                





U.S., by contrast, one is always somewhat unsure on this point, and so statistical studies 
are needed to convince. In fact, there may be reasons to believe that many elections in 
this country would turn out differently if turnout were generally higher. Indeed, the 
country as a whole might look very different today—and could look very different in the 
future—if more citizens participated in elections.  
Yet the larger argument for a civic duty to vote reaches beyond these outcome-
oriented concerns. As discussed in Section 2 above, conceptions of duty can transcend 
considerations of instrumental aims and even ideas of rational choice, as reflected in a 
Kantian approach to ethical behavior. The duty to vote has a natural affinity to the notion 
of religious duty, and voting from a sense of obligation may thus be valued as 
participation in a shared public ritual that contributes to republican ideals of civic virtue 
and a communitarian “civil religion” (Bellah 1967).146 It may thus be understandable that 
Lomasky and Brennan choose to evoke Marx’s well-known denigration of religion; 
however, just as Marx was arguably wrong in thinking that the sociological phenomenon 
of religious belief was an irrational delusion that would eventually die out, so may 
Lomasky and Brennan be wrong about the duty to vote. Rather than the opiate of 





                                                
146 Indeed, Bellah states that “democratic communitarianism is committed to the idea of participation as 
both a right and a duty” (Bellah 1995, 54), although as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2), he and other 
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